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WHERE WAS THE GOVERNMENT? AN INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Elizabeth A. Bradshaw, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2008
The terrorist attacks of �eptember 11, 2001 have forever changed the
geopolitical landscape. Yet despite the significance of such an event, those working
in the field of state crime have been reluctant to investigate the role of the United
States government in failing to prevent the attacks. Utilizing the five criteria of state
crime put forth by Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003), the ._actions and
inactions of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the North American Aerospace Defense Command
and the Federal Aviation Administration are examined. Drawing on the testimonies
of government officials from each of the five agencies to the 9/11 Commission,
evidence suggests that key officials failed to act on available information to prevent
the attacks therefore constituting an explicit crime of omission. Most significantly, the
National Security Council composed of top Bush administration officials, who were
charged with the task of coordinating a response to such a threat, neglected to take
crucial actions which may have prevented the attacks.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001 is a day that has forever changed the global political
landscape. In addition to opening the gateway for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
terrorist attacks of September 11th have also allowed for an expansion of
governmental authority into the domestic lives of its citizens. Despite the catalyzing
effect which September 11th has allowed for, state crime theorists have been reluctant
to evaluate the inconsistencies of government intelligence and response surrounding
the attacks.
At its foundation, representative democracy depends on trust. Without it, the
United States system of governing is nothing more than an autocratic plutocracy.
Relinquishing power and autonomy to a higher governmental authority in exchange
for protection from external threats is a core concept of the social contract. So crucial
is the role of the state in protecting its citizens that it is spelled out in the preamble to
the Constitution. It is the responsibility of the United States government to provide
for the common defense and to support the general welfare of its citizens. The failure
to do so demands accountability.
Drawing on the concept of crimes of omission, this project seeks to examine
the actions and inactions of government officials in the National Security Council, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Aviation
of Administration and the North American Aerospace Command in the months
leading up to and on the morning of the attacks. Judged by Kau:2larich, Mullins and
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Matthews's (2003) criteria for a. state crime, the culpability of government officials
will be assessed through an analysis of publicly available transcriptions of testimonies
to the. 9/11 Commission. Despite its limitations, the 9/11 Commission's investigation
is the only official account of the government's role surrounding the attacks. As such,
its conclusions must be critically considered. ,
The parameters of this project limit the scope of the inquiry to a definitional
assessment of the failures of the United States government to prevent the September
I I th terrorist attacks as a state crime. Thus a consideration of the motivations of the
state and state actors is left for future inquiry. · By qualifying the actions and inactions
of government officials which allowed for the attacks to occur as forms of state crime,
focus is drawn away from the successes of the hijackers and onto the failures of the
government. This is the necessary first step towards demanding government
accountability and deconstructing the mythology that continues to justify state
criminality in the name of 9/11.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEWState crime theorists have faced an uphill battle within the traditional
criminological discipline. Tending to focus almost exclusively on crimes committed
by the poor and working classes, criminologists have failed to recognize crimes
committed by the wealthy and powerful. Acknowledging this disparity, Friedrichs
(2000:60) contends that
in part, this relative lack of attention can be attributed to the challenge
of gaining access to the politically powerful, their ability to conceal
many of their crimes, the complexity and broad scope of the illegalities
involved, and some ideological resistance to regarding government
officials as criminal.
In spite of much criticism and resistance, state crime theorists have sought to expand
the boundaries of criminology by developing alternative standards by which to define
crime and criminality.
Challenging many of the traditional assuµiptions about crime, the "intellectual
transgression" (Sharkansky 2000) of state crime even breeds disagreement among
state crime theorists themselves. While some theorists assert that the definition of
crime should be limited to strict legalistic criteria (Tappan 1947), some
. prefer a more
'

expanded legalistic definition which incorporates violations of regulatory and
international law (Sutherland 1983; Chambliss 1988; Kramer, Michalowski and
Rothe 2005), while others insist on a definition based on human rights (Schwendinger
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and Schwendinger 1970; Green and Ward 2000). Encouraging the study ofstate
crime through all ofthese avenues, Friedrichs (2000:55) makes clear that
governmental crime is not always crime in the narrower legal sense of
the term. One must distinguish between those governmental or
political actions prohibited by the state's laws, those defined as
criminal by international law, and those acttons regarded as criminal
by some other criteria ofharmfulness not necessarily recognized by
either the state's laws or international law.
Regardless ofthe approach, a close examination ofstate crimes with any ofthese
· standards will inevitably yield a more robust understanding ofcrime and criminality.
The concept of"the state" so frequently employed by state crime theorists
implies a number ofassumptions which frequently go unacknowledged. Friedrichs
(2000:53), adopting Plano and Greenberg's (1979) definition, suggests that "the _term

state refers to a political entity with a recognized sovereignty occupying a definite
territory, where as the term government refers to the political and administrative
apparatus ofsuch an entity/' Despite such a distinction, much ofthe literature on
state crime tends to use such terms interchangeably. Often, crimes charged against
"the state" are perhaps more appropriately crimes committed by the government. In
either scenario, the study ofstate crime allows for the examination ofboth crimes
committed by states as well as governments.
The necessity oflaw, many would contend, arises from the conflicts between
social actors. Perhaps to protect the well being ofthe community, or to preserve the
interests ofa few, laws fundamentally reflect, alter and assert the social order. Many
criminologists and state crime theorists in particular, postulate that law functions
primarily to address the structural contradictions embedded within the social system.
One ofthe state's many functions is to mediat'e the conflicts that stem from
contradictions inherent in the societal structure, especially within a capitalist system
(Chambliss 1993a).
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Another function of the state, Tilly (1985) argues, serves as a protection racket
for war making. Governments, which offer protection from local and external
violence to its citizens, are only able to provide such services to the extent that a clear
and present threat exists (Tilly 1985). · Since governments must create threats and then
charge for protection against them, therefore ensuring their legitimacy, Tilly argues
that governments can be considered racketeers. He states,
to the extent that the threats against which a given government protects
its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the
government has organized a protection racket. Since governments
themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of
external war and si1:1ce the repressive and extractive activities of
governments often constitute the largest current threats to the
livelihoods of their citizens, many governments operate in essentially
the same ways as racketeers.. (1985:171)
Establishing a monopoly over violence, governments function to protect their citizens
from threats while at the same time condemning the use of violence amongst the
public. However, since the threat of violence is essential to the maintenance of
government legitimacy, states are forced to create threats of external war to ensure
their continued survival.
Legalistic and Expanded Legalistic Definitions
Although a few criminologists in the early part of the century had insinuated a
class bias present within the literature, it was not until 1939 when Edwin Sutherland
introduced his concept of"white collar crime" that criminologistsbegan to shift'their
attention to the crimes of the wealthy and powerful. . Sutherland asserted that this term
applied to" ... a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in
the course of his occupation" (1983:7). A marked departure from the street crimes
being studied by other criminologists of the time, Sutherland's definition incorporated
the requisites of both high social status and occupation. Specifically, Sutherland
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intended the term 'white-collar' to apply "principally to business managers and
execu�ives, in the sense that it was used by a president of General Motors who wrote
"An Autobiography of a White Collar Worker "' (1983:265). In th�s context, the
significance of high socioeconomic status is made clear. More importantly,
Sutherland's work highlighted the failure of criminologists to acknowledge the
socioeconomic bias of their sample of"criminals.".
Sutherland concluded that the differential interpretation of the criminal law
for white collar criminals was a result of the high status of the offenders (1940:9;
1983:60). Due to their high status white collar criminals were often able to
circumvent the penalties and social stigmas experienced by offenders with diminished
social status. In order to bring the illegal, though not necessarily criminal, acts of
high status offenders into the realms of criminological inquiry, Sutherland proposed a
definition of crime emphasizing the socially injurious behavior. Defining socially
harmful violations of civil law as criminal was Sutherland's attempt to direct
criminological inquiry towards the crimes of the wealthy and powerful.
Challenging Sutherland's concept of white collar crime, Tappan (1947) asserts
that acts which are not legally defined as criminal, no matter how socially injurious,
cannot be classified as such. Doing so, he argues, depletes criminology of the
rigorous standards characteristic of science. Firmly asserting that no matter how
flawed the legal system may be, it is the best set of standards by which to study crime,
---,

Tappan condemns the classification of white collar crime for allowing private values
such as economic ethics to intrude upon the criminological discipline (1947:99).
Noting its fallibility, yet lacking a thorough �valuation of the normative processes
which culminate into the creation of a criminal code, Tappan concedes that no matter
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how imperfect, the criminal code is the best standard by which to judge criminal
activity.
Any deviation by sociologists or criminologists from the legal code as
established by state authorities, Tappan implies, is neither criminology nor social
science and is not objective (1947:99). A criminal (white collar or otherwise) cannot
be defined as such unless they have violated a criminal statue and have been properly
convicted (1947:101). Ultimately, Tappan deferred to the state the power to define
crime and restrain criminological inquiry (Schwendingers 1970:128).
Even so, Sutherland's definition ofa crime also granted the state the ability to
define criminality. He stresses that "the essential characteristic ofcrime is that it is
behavior which is prohibited by the State as an injury to the State against which the
State may react, at least as a last resort, by punishment" (1983:46). Although it
marked a definitive shift in criminology, Sutherland's concept ofwhite collar crime
was hardly out ofbounds with many ofthe criminological and legalistic definitions of
crime which granted the state the power to define socially injurious behavior
(Schwendingers 1970:126).
- Remaining firmly within the boundaries oflegalistic definitions ofcrime,
Chambliss (1989) highlighted the necessity ofstudying crimes committed by the
government through the concept ofstate-organized crime. Chambliss contends that, _
"the most important type ofcriminality organized by the state consists
ofacts defined
---by law as criminal and committed by state officials _in the pursuit oftheir job as
representatives ofthe state" (1989:184). In sync with Sutherland's definition ofwhite
collar crime, state organized crime is a distinct hybrid. Like many ofthe white collar
crimes examined by Sutherland, state organized crimes are rooted in the need for
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capital accumulation by modem nation states (202). In his definition of state
organized crimes, Chambliss (1989:184) cites
examples include a state's complicity in piracy, smuggling,
assassinations, criminal conspiracies, acting as an accessory before or
after the fact, and violating laws that limit their activities. hi the latter
category would be included the use of illegal methods of spying on
citizens, diverting funds in ways prohibited by law (e.g., illegal
campaign contributions, selling arms to countries prohibited by law,
and supporting terrorist activities).
Still heavily relying on the criminal law to define state-organized crimes, Chambliss
furthers Sutherland's concept of white collar crime by drawing attention to the crimes
committed by state administrators while in the course of their occupation.
Challenging state crime theorists, Sharkansky (2000) argues that "state crime"
is an intellectual transgression which has been used to define state actions which are
undesirable. Stressing that although state actions may be viewed as "nasty'' or
"distasteful," Sharkansky asserts that acts deserving of such labels do not warrant the
title of state crimes. Assuming the position that "Crime implies an action that invites
an authoritative response" (2000:36), Sharkansky proclaims that " ...many activities
described by the label ofstate crime in the literature are not appropriate to such
expectations" (2000:36). Similar to Tappan (1947), this contention implies that the
only suitable criteria for the label of 'crime' are that which is defined by the state.
Since states themselves have a monopoly ofcontrol over the laws, and what is
identified as criminal varies between time and place, Sharkanskyconcludes that the
label of state crime simply cannot be applied to those acts which criminologists find
to be undesirable.
Frequently, the division between corporate crime and state crime appears
rather vague. Recognizing this ambiguity, Michalowski and Kramer (2006)
introduced the concept of"state-corporate crime." The 1986 Challenger disaster,
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which was the result of the interactions between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) which set the timeline for the launch, and Morton Thiokol,
Inc. who manufactured the solid rocket boosters used on the shuttle, brought the
conceptual overlap to the forefront. Clarifying the seemingly obvious though
unarticulated artifact, Michalowski and Kramer (2006:20) declare that
state-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that
result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies
and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of
political governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of the
goals of one or more institutions of economic production and
distribution.
This definition of state-corporate crime encompasses both legal criteria as well
socially injurious actions. Leaning towards human rights criteria as a classification
for crime, though retaining the state-defined legalistic element, state-corporate crime
is one of the many "intellectual transgressions" which permeate the state crime
literature.
Human Rights Definitions
The debate between criminologists on whether to accept the legal statue as the
recognized standard by which to classify crime and criminals or to pursue a more
encompassing definition of crime remains a point of contention. Arguing for the
ability to define criminality beyond the state instituted statutes, Schwendinger and
Schwendinger (1970) contend that the laws themselves define the phenomena to be
studied as well as the procedure by which to investigate it. They note that the ability
to define crime hinges on political power. "This is why it can be assumed that with
regard to the legal definition: political power determines the precision of the
definition and the measurement of the phenomena" (Schwendinger and Schwendinger
1970:133).
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Quite in line with Sutherland's assertion that wealthy and powerful
"offenders" are often exempt from criminal sanctions, the Schwendingers also make
poignant that those with political power direct the scope of criminological inquiry;
often away from themselves. Once their actions are exempt from the ethical
considerations embedded within law, those holding the reins of political power can
effectively set the moral standards for criminology. Already laden with moral and
ethical assumptions, a legalistic definition of crime establishes the boundaries of
criminological inquiry (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970).
Offering alternative criteria to define crime the Schwendingers (1970) posit a
humanistic definition founded on human rights. Asserting that all human·s have
equal intrinsic value and should therefore be granted racial, sexual and economic
equality in addition to basic rights, they argue that criminologists must work to
protect human rights above defending the social order. "To defend human rights,
criminologists must be able to sufficiently identify the violations of these rights-by
whom and against whom; how and why'' (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970:
146). Proceeding in this manner, criminologists must inexorably move beyond a state
officiated definition of crime.
Attempting to retain a definition of state crime inclusive of human rights,
Green and Ward (2000) argue that the term "state crime" be reserved for a

---

convergence between both violations of human rights and state organizational
deviance. Along the same lines as Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1970), Green
and Ward adopt a definition of human rights as articulated by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. They ass1:1me human rights to be " ...the elements of
freedom and well-being that human beings need to exert and develop their capacities
for purposive action" (2000: 110).
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Maintaining a more traditional approach to defining crime, Green and Ward
(2000) include state organizational deviance in their definition of state crime. By
defining state crime in such a manner, the authors are able to incorporate a definition
focused on human rights while also retaining the concept of deviance so fundamental
to traditional definitions of crime. State organizational deviance draws a distinction
between acts committed by individual state actors and organizational misconduct.
The authors clarify that
state organizational.deviance is conduct by persons working for state
agencies, in pursuit of organizational goals, that if it were to become
known to some social audience would expose individuals or agencies
concerned to a sufficiently serious risk of formal of informal censure
and sanctions to affect their conduct significantly (for example, by
inducing them to conceal or lie about their activities). (2000:110)
State organizational deviance may take the form of seemingly legitimate state
operations and organizations which become entangled with illegal ones. One
example, given by Green and Ward (2004:107), is the willingness of the United States
CIA to employ members of organized crime syndicates including known drug
traffickers and terrorists. The use of right-wing guerilla organizations to destroy left
wing movements in Latin America, as well as the funding and support provided to
Osama bin Laden and al Q�eda during the Afghan War against the Soviets,
demonstrates numerous criminal ramifications. The CIA's willingness to rely on
known criminal sources implicates them in the consequences.
International Law
In an effort to concentrate on human rights violations perpetrated by the state
while also combating the charges by fellow criminologists of injecting personal and
political bias, many state crime theorists have sought international law as the
standards by which to. examine the crimes of the wealthy and powerful.
. Not without
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its criticisms, utilizing international law as a criminological standard does have its
limitations.
Reluctant to relinquish power to a higher authority, many states simply refuse
to ratify international treaties; thus preserving their jurisdiction over the law of the
land. ''.Under a treaty, obligations are binding on a state once the government of that
state has ratified the treaty. Therefore, the state clearly controls the treaty obligations
it undertakes" (Molina 2000:351).
Being the current hegemonic power, the United States has been particularly
reluctant to sacrifice any of its sovereignty to a higher global authority. Barak
(1990:40) argues that "when it comes to the ratification of the major multi-lateral
human rights agreements or instruments, the USA has one of the very worst records
among Western liberal democracies; By refusing to sign and recognize these various
documents, the U.S. has, at least indirectly, contributed to the world-wide abuse of
human rights." One reason for this poor track record is the potential for international
treaties to create impediments to capital accumulation in favor of human rights (Barak
1990). Thus, the failure of the United States to conform to the rules of international
law threatens human rights at home and abroad.
Despite its inability to hold state and corporate actors accountable,
international law does provide a more. versatile tool by which to judge globally
injurious behavior by states and transnational corporations. Embracing United
Nations codes of conduct for transnational corporations, Michalowski and Kramer
(1987) argue that international standards provide for a more open discourse of.
corporate transgressions. Since more nation states, particularly developing ones, are
involved in the discussion of injurious behavior by transnational corporations than
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would be in natio.nal legislation, a greater degree of participation which encompasses
a critical reflexivity will result· (Michalowski and Kramer 1987 :47).
Although the United States has quite frequently been unwilling to ratify a
number of treaties, the ones which have been ratified become synonymous with
•

I

domestic law as stipulated by the U.S. Constitution. Central to the United Nations
Charter, which the U.S. is signatory to, is the prohibition of aggressive war with
exceptions for self defense (against an armed attack) and U.N. approval. The United
States invasion of Iraq in 2003, Kramer, Michalowski and Rothe (2005) argue, was a
war of aggression and thus constitutes a war crime.
Making a clear attempt to justify their actions under international law, the
Bush administration claimed that the U.N. Charter (specifically Article 51) granted
them the authority to invade Iraq. Since Iraq was demonstrated to have no
connections with the events of September 11th 2001 or to have weapons of mass
destruction, there was no justification to use armed force for self defense. After
failing to meet the legal criteria for war with Iraq, the United States began to portray
its mission as humanitarian intervention. Despite this, Kramer, Michalowski and
Rothe (2005 :65) contend that "the heavy burden of persuasion to justify a
humanitarian invasion was not met, and subsequent events have made it clear that
intervention increased rather than decreased the humanitarian crisis for the Iraqi
people."
The United States actions in Iraq were not in accord with international law and
more significantly inflicted great devastation and destruction upon the Iraqi people.
As a result, Kramer, Michalowski and Rothe argue that the Bush administration is
'

'

criminally responsible for the deaths of Iraqi civilians, coalition forces as well as the
detention and torture of prisoners of war (2005 :73). Even so, it is quite unlikely that
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the U.S. will be held accountable for its actions. Highlighting one of the major
pitfalls of international law, Kramer, Michalowski and Rothe note that "the U.S. is
not a signatory to the International Criminal Court, and as permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council the U.S. and the U.K. can veto any move to censure their
illegal behavior" (2005:73).
State crime theorists have made significant milestones for criminology.
Perhaps most importantly, state crime theorists have challenged the traditional
assumptions of the discipline and particularly the role of the state in defining crime.
Critically evaluating the structure, function and actions of the state is of quintessential
importance the study of state crime. Regardless of which definitional approach
theorists adopt, their efforts force attention on the crimes committed by the
government which far too often go unregulated, unpunished and unnoticed.
State Crime and September 11, 2001
Despite the plethora of research which has been done on state crime, relatively
little attention has been paid to the role of the United States government surrounding
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Stressing the importance of catalyzing
events like September 11th, some state crime theorists have asserted the need to
analyze such events because of their tendency to alter the basic components, and thus
interactions, of the polity (Chambliss 1979; Wonders and Solop 1993). Without
doubt, the 9/11 attacks have been used to justify and expansion of U.S. hegemony and
military power throughout the globe, including �ur own backyard.
A number of researchers have noted how these attacks provided justification
for numerous illegal activities. For example, in their analysis of the illegal invasion
of Iraq, Kramer, Michalowski and Rothe (2005) assert that key administration
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officials exploited the events of September 11 in order to establish a connection
between Iraq and al Qaeda as a pretext for war. They state,
Clarke personally informed President Bush that al.Qaeda was
responsible for the terrorist attacks and that Iraq had no connections to
al Qaeda. Administration leaders ignored this information, and instead
made intimations of a link between Iraq and the attacks of September
11 a staple of the prewar campaign to build support for an invasion of
Iraq. (2005:58)
Along this same line, Kramer and Michalowski (2005) also make similar
assertions that the events of September 11th were used to further political goals that
had already been set in place prior to the attacks. Referencing the attacks as "a stroke
of good luck" and "a political godsend," they note the importance of the attacks in
setting in motion the Plan for A New American Century's "Rebuilding American's
Defenses" which argues for an expansion of American global military dominance and
spending. Although Kramer and Michalowski deem the attacks as ''unanticipated,"
they recognize that "the 9/11 attacks presented the neocons with the 'catalyzing event'
they needed to transform their agenda into actual policy'' (2005:459).
Furthermore, Rothe and Muzzatti (2004) also note the role of the attacks in
enacting strategic plans for global hegemony, facilitated by a deliberately stimulated
moral panic. They assert that,
the events of September 11, 2001 (as horrific as they were) provided
the Administration with the excuse to act on its simmering geo
political agenda. The orchestration of the Administrations� intentions
had begun prior to the terrorist attacks ...The time was perfect, an
excuse had been given to them, and the ease of creating and enhancing
a moral panic to ensure public conformity was ripe. (2004:345)
In this account, as well as the others, the strategic significance of the attacks of
September 11th provided government officials with the opportunity to put in place
'

'

previously contrived policies. Similar to Tilly's (1985) assertions that the
government functions as protection racket to ensure its legitimacy, the Bush
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administration actively stim1;1lated the fear spawned by the attacks to justify a war in
Iraq.
Despite the seeming consensus among a number of state crime theorists that
the terrorist attacks of September 11th provided the United States government with the
opportunity to put in place and provide justifications for numerous policies which
include but are not limited to: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U SA PATRIOT
Act, a curtail 9f civil liberties of U.S. and global citizens, and a preemptive military
doctrine (i.e. the War on Terror), the events of 9/11 have yet to be examined by state
crime theorists. With such consequential alterations to the domestic and global
political landscapes, the reluctance of state crime theorists to undertake a more
thorough evaluation the role of the United States government in the events
surrounding the September 11th terror attacks seems astonishing. An investigation of
these ''unanticipated" though undeniably catalyzing events through a state crime lens
is long overdue.
Crimes of Omission
Many state crime theorists have concluded that barricading state crime
inquires within the boundaries mens rea, or criminal intent, will ultimately shroud
many of the socially injurious and illegal acts perpetrated by the state. Perhaps more
subtle, though causing great physical, economic and social harm," ...state negligence
describes a situation in which 'crimes of omission' are committed" (Freidrichs
2007:128). Put simply, the failure of a state to act in an instance where it clearly has
responsibility constitutes a crime by omission (Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews
2003; Friedrichs 2007).
Furthering studies of crimes of omission, state crime theorists have offered
numerous criteria by which to study state negligent behavior. �roposing a definition
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of state crime which encompasses the intended as well as the unintended effects of
goverirment policy, Henry (1991) includes crimes of omission in his definition of
state crime. He asserts that
...we can define state crime as the material or physical harm on its
citizens, a subgroup of citizens, or citizens of other nations resulting
from the actions or consequences of government policy, mediated
through the practice of state agencies, whether these harms are
intentional or unintentional. (1991: 256)
Recognizing that the state is n�t a unitary force, Henry emphasizes the importance of
evaluating policy since it is " ... enacted, interpreted, and enforced by the government
in the name-of the state" (1990:254). Thus, !he ineffective regulation and
enforcement of government policy implicates the state in the resulting actions,
regardless of intent.
Despite the assumed lack of criminal intent involved with state negligence, a
clear pattern of causation leading up to a crime of omission can often be identified.
For example, government negligence is often a product of favoring particular policies,
programs and constituencies at the expense of others (Freidrichs 2007). These
preferences, directed by elites within the polity, work to preserve the interests of the
state and expand its legitimacy (Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews 2003). While in
pursuit of these goals, the serendipitous consequences are not the result of
government inaction but rather of decisive choices made at the expense of more
socially beneficial ones.
Incorporating criteria which span the gamut of state crime literature,
Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews propose five standards by which to evaluate state
crimes. A state crime, they assert, must meet these guidelines: (1) Generates harm to
individuals, groups,· and property (2) Is a product of action or inaction on behalf of the
state or state agencies (3) The action or inaction related directly to an assigned or
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implied trust and/or duty (4) Is committed, or omitted, by a government agency,
organization or representative and (5) Is done in the self interest of (a) the state itself·
or (b) the elite groups controlling the state (2003:244-246). These criteria allow for
the evaluation of both acts of commission as well as omission as state crime.
Creating a continuum of state crime, Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews
(2003) draw a distinction between crimes of implicit and explicit omission. Crimes
of implicit omission involve complete and utter negligence to address_problems in
society. The government's failure to alleviate the perils of racism and income
inequality would fall within the category of crimes of implicit omission. In contrast,
explicit acts of omission" ...occur when the state disregards unsafe and dangerous
conditions, when it has a clear mandate and responsibility to make a situation or
context safe" (249). Often, this type of omission is the result of bureaucratic failures
and institutional dysfunction. "The major distinction between [ explicit acts of
omission] and [implicit acts of omission] is the degree of negligence or facilitation
and whether the state has a responsibility to actto reduce the likelihood of harm"
(250).
Beyond the.physical and economic harm caused by crimes of omission is the
violation of trust and the destructive effect it has on the social fabric. As Sutherland
noted, one quintessential aspect of white collar crimes is that they involve a"violation

--

of delegated or implied trust" (1940:3). Violations of trust on this level, Sutherland
argues, have the potential to ruin social morale and create widespread social
disorganization. Friedrichs affirms this position, pointing out that
although the violation of trust is a key element in governmental crime
and white collar crime generally, in the former case the violation of a
public trust occurs, whereas corporate and occupational crime involve
a violation of a trust which is essentially private. (2000:59).
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Following in these footsteps, Kauzlarich, Mullins and Mattews (2003) also stress the
role ofthat trust plars in crimes ofomission. They argue that" ...a key·aspect oftrust
involves taking certain actions to protect a citizenry. Thus, when a state (or state
agency) fails to act when necessary, this too constitutes a violation oftrust" (245).
At its foundation, representative democracy depends on trust. Without it, the
United States system ofgoverning is nothing more than an autocratic plutocracy. The
social contract- the theoretical rationale that citizens give up some of their rights in
order to gain protection (from each other as well as from external threats) from the
government- is fundamental to democratic governance. Elected to serve the interests
ofthe people, government representatives are responsible, perhaps above all, for
protecting citizens from foreign and domestic threats. Failure to do so destroys the
trust assigned to representatives and threatens democratic governance.
More than a mere violation oftrust, the failure ofthe United States
government to protect its citizens is also a violation oflaw. The supreme law ofthe
land, the U.S. Constitution sets forth in its preamble that it is the job ofthe
government to"insure domestic tranquility,""provide for the common defense" and
"promote the general welfare." Thus, the failure ofthe government to protect its
citizenry from foreign attacks is a violation ofconstitutional law.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 directly resulted in the deaths of
over 3,000 people. As stipulated by the U.S. Constitution, it was the explicit duty of
the government, its agencies and its officials to prevent these attacks from occurring.
As Friedrichs makes clear,"the most serious form ofstate criminality involves the
unnecessary and premature loss oflife that occurs when the government and its agents
fail to act affirmatively in certain situations" (2007:128). The premature loss of
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thousands oflives as a result ofthe negligence ofUnited States government therefore
warrants a state crime analysis.
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CHAPTER III

DATA AND METHODS

Data
Determining the role of the United States government in the events
surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks requires a thorough evaluation of
publicly available archival data. Incorporating government documents and news
articles into the analysis, the strengths of each source will work to compensate the
weaknesses of the other.
Using archival data in this project provides the best historical record for the
government actions and inactions taken before, during and after September 11th•
Since the data is publicly available, and in many cases accessible via the internet, tlie
information utilized can easily be found and reproduced by anyone. The ease of
accessibility does not come without consequence. Due to the use of secondary
sources, the opportunity to direct inquiry and probe specific questions is relinquished.
Thus, the nature of this inquiry will be restricted to the questions raised by
government officials and members of the media.
Government documents, which provide officials with a degree of
accountability, are quite likely the best kept record of the functions of government.
. On the whole, most people regard government documents as legitimate and reliable

sources of information. As such, government documents allow for justifiable
conclusions to be drawn on issues which may otherwise be contentious. Conversely,
investigatory government documents are also created by the very body which they
seek to study. A� a result, government wrongdoings are often concealed or distorted.
Furthermore, not all government actions are documented. Information concealed for
reasons of national security or executive privilege are examples of "state secrets"
which will not make their way into the historical record. Perhaps above all, any
product of the polity will inherently be politicized and therefore must be analyzed
within the context in which it was produced.
Working to correct for many of the weaknesses associated with government
documents, newspaper sources help to accent an analysis of government accounts.
Also widely available and thus more accountable to the general public, newspapers
provide a more objective perspective of government assertions. Theoretically, it is
the media's role to act as a "watchdog" on behalf of citizens. Guarding against
corruption and tyranny, the media functions as an intermediary between a government
and its citizens. Due to the reliance on informants, if government corruption is to be
revealed, it will most likely be through the media. Thus, media records are essential
to maintaining government accountability. Most generally, newspaper accounts work
to draw public attention to both government documents and actions that might
otherwise be lost in a sea of information. Nevertheless, these political
alerts do not
--.
diminish the necessity of thorough investigations.
Not without criticism, a reliance on newspaper accounts also has its
weaknesses. Often referred to as the "fourth branch of government," the media has
fallen far short of its theoretical 'watchdog' role. Functioning as the mouth piece of
government officials, some news sources do nothing more than echo the ideology of
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the dominant political party. Most frequently owned by a corporate entity with ties to
the political arena, media networks are limited in their ability to critically probe the
halls of Washington. Although such blanketed statements cannot be made of all
newspaper sources, the potential for bias must be acknowledged.
In an effort to correct for the weaknesses of each of these types of archival
data an incorporation of both is needed. Using government documents as the bulk of
this analysis will help to ensure its legitimacy and justify potentially controversial
claims. To correct for the internal bias of government documents, employing media
sources will work to highlight and draw critical attention to the more unsavory
government actions and inactions.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was signed into law by Congress and
President George W. Bush on November 27, 2002. From the beginning, the Bush
administration had sought to block an independent investigation of the attacks,
arguing that an investigation would hinder the government's response to the war
against al Qaeda- most specifically in Iraq. Over a year after the most deadly attacks
on American soil, Bush reluctantly established a national commission to investigate
the attacks after facing intense pressure from the victim's families as well as Senator
John McCain. In comparison, the Warren Co�ission, which investigated the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, was established in as short as one
week after the event.
Once established, the 9/11 Commission was severely under-funded. Initially,
the Bush administration allocated only $3 million for the eighteen month long
investigation. This is in comparison to the $112.6 million spent to investigate the
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2003 Columbia space shuttle disaster (Marrs 2006:152) and the $40 million budget
for the Challenger (Shenon 2008:31). Following public outcry and protest,
particularly from the victim's families, an additional $10 million was devoted to the
investigations.
Initially, Henry Kissinger was appointed to head the bipartisan commission.
Rather than publicly disclose a list of clients from his consulting firm Kissinger and
Associates, Kissinger chose to resign as chair of the commission amidst allegations
that his clients included_ several large oil-giants possibly connected to Saudi Arabia.
A second-choice candidate, the White House selected former New Jersey Govef!lor
Thomas Kean over long-time Bush family consulate James A. Baker to assume
Kissinger's vacated position as chairman of the 9/11 Commission. Even though the·
law allowed for only one chairman, Kean, however, found it necessary to designate
Lee Hamilton as 'co-chair' to bolster the bipartisan image of the Commi�sion
(Shenon 2008).
Although all ten commissioners (five Democrats and five Republicans) had
separate jobs and participated in varying levels in the investigative work, the
Commission was also backed by a professional staff led by an executive director who
buttressed much of the work load. It was the responsibility of the executive director
of the Commission to select and manage the staff, direct the investigation, arrange
witnesses and write the report. Philip Zelikow did all that and so much
more.
--.
Perhaps the most powerful person on the commission, Shenon explains that "Phillip
Zelikow's micro-management meant that the staff had little, if any, contact with the
ten commissioners; all information was funneled through Zelikow, and he decided
how it would be shared elsewhere" (2008:317). His greatest legacy as a historian and
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gifted writer, Zelikow authored and edited much of the 9/11 Commission's official
report.
Selected unilaterally by Kean and Hamilton without the consultation of the
other commissioners, the assignment of Philip Zelikow to the position of executive
director of the 9/11 Commission has drawn a plethora of well deserved criticism for
his connections to the Bush administration. Though Kean, Hamilton and the other
commissioners were aware of Zelikow's friendship with Condoleezza Rice, the
details were not revealed until midway through the commission's work. To make
matters worse, Zelikow omitted the extent of his connections to the current
administration in the resume provided to the Commission. Most of them were aware
of Rice and Zelikow's work together on the National Security Council during the first
Bush administration. They also knew· of a book the two published together in 1995
on German reunification.
The Commissioners were not aware of Zelikow's role in the Bush
administration's NSC transition team in 2000. Once Rice had been appointed as
National Security Advisor she selected Phillip Zelikow to serve as her
counterterrorism advisor on the NSC transition team. In this capacity Zelikow was
responsible for a review and reorganization of counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke's
Counterterrorism Security Group within the NSC, which ultimately led to his
• demotion. Rather than reporting to the Principals Committee as he_had done
throughout the Clinton administration, Clarke was directed to report to the Deputies
Committee thus ceasing his contact with top administration officials.. This proved to
be significant when Clarke credited the successful prevention of the Millennium
terrorist attacks to his close and frequent interactions with the Principals Committee.
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Nor was the Commission informed of Zelikow's authorship of the thirty one
page "preemptive war" doctrine, written anonymously at Rice's request. In the early
stages of the investigation, the United States launched the war in Iraq based on the
alleged connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, and thus an insinuation of 9/11. Even
though the Commission found no evidence to support the link, the pressure to find
one was great, especially from Zelikow and many of the 'experts' he selected to
testify on the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda. One of his many conflicts of
interest, Shenon (2008:43) reveals that
at Rice's urging, Zelikow was the principal- if not initially secret
author of a national security strategy paper that would tum American
military doctrine on its head and justify a "preemptive war" against an
enemy that posed no immediate threat to the United States. It was
being written with Iraq in mind; the administration needed a scholarly
document it could point to in justifying the imminent invasion.
It seemed to many of the commissioners and staff that Zelikow was doing everything
in his power to find a connection that he later conceded simply was not there.
Even after Zelikow's connections to the White House were more fully
disclosed, Kean and Hamilton were unwilling to replace him. Even in the face of
protests from the 9/11_victims' families, serious complaints of misconduct from the
staff and urgings from the Commissioners themselves, the chairmen stood their
ground. Although Zelikow was allowed to maintain his position, he was not aHowed
to participate in the investigations of the NSC. Also, he was to have ended all contact
with his friends in the White House throughout the Commission's work, a condition
set forth from the beginning.
Disobeying the condition on which he was hired, Zelikow did not cease
contact with the White House. "The phone logs maintained by Karen Heitkotter
showed that there were several phone calls from Rove to Zelikow's office telephone
number over a four-month period in 2003- at least two in June and two more in
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· September" (Shenon 2008: 174). Furthermore, there were no records ofoutgoing
office phone calls and calls on Zelikow's personal cell phone. Heitkrotter also
maintains that on numerous occasions she had arranged a gate pass for the West Wing
for Zelikow to visit Rice in her offices. Another occasion involved lunch with Rice
and her staff at the NSC (Shenon 2008: 107). Shenon states that "for many ofthe
staff, it was just what they had suspected: Zelikow was some kind ofWhite House
mole, feeding information back to the administration about.the commission's
findings". (2005: 107).
The past and continued relationship ofthe Commission's executive director
with Bush administration officials ruined any chance ofa bipartisan investigation.
Due to his extensive control and authorship ofthe Staff Statements and the
Commission's final report, Philip Zelikow's influence permeates the government's
official account ofthe September l 1th terrorist attacks. In light ofhis refusal to obey
the Commission's orders to end contact with his friends at the White House,
Zelikow's loyalty appears clear. As such, the 9/11 Commission's investigations, and
especially their final report, must be held suspect.
Some major criticisms ofthe 9/11 Commission's report include the omission
ofkey pieces of evidence and the distortion ofincluded ones. An open letter to
Congress signed by 25 individuals who worked in government agencies which
provide national security and public safety including the FBI, CIA, FAA DIA and
Customs substantiates the claims ofomission. They state,
- omission is one ofthe major flaws in the Commission's report. We
are aware ofsignificant issues and cases that were duly reported to the
Commission by those ofus with direct knowledge, but somehow
escaped attention. Serious problems and shortcomings within
government agencies likewise were not included in the report. The
report simply does not get at key problems within the intelligence,
aviation security, and law enforcement communities. The omission of

such serious and applicable issues. and information by itself renders the
report flawed, and casts doubt on the validity of its recommendations.
(Letter 2004:1)
The contention that the 9/11 Commission excluded key issues and information further
emphasizes the need to evaluate its claims with caution.
Most significantly, the 9/11 Commission never sought to hold individuals or
agencies accountable for their actions and inactions. Instead, the commission stated,
"our aim has not been to assign individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the
fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons
learned" (National Commission 2004:xvi). Concerned that assigning blame might
send the Commission into partisan turmoil, Kean and Hamilton consistently
maintained that there would be no "finger-pointi_ng" in the final 9/11 report.
If it was not the goal of the Commission to assign blame and hold government
agencies responsible for their actions and inactions, who is charged with the task?
The insistence on learning how to prevent future attacks from occurring without
consequential ramifications for the failures of government actors establishes a pattern
of permissiveness that is sure to prevail. Despite its misguided goals, the 9/11
Commission's investigation is essential since it is the only "official" account of the
events of September 11th• Therefore its significance cannot be dismissed.
To the extent that it is possible, an attempt to salvage portions of the
Commission's investigation from the influence of Phillip Zelikow_must be made.
Rather than rely on the Staff Statements or official report penned by Zelikow,
transcripts from the public hearings of the 9/11 Commission archived online will be
used in an effort to attain a more 'objective' source of data.
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Methods
The National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) each played a
significant role in failing to prevent the September 11th attacks. Acting as a scapegoat
for the entire government, the intelligence community has been portrayed as
particularly responsible. Chalked up to barriers in information sharing, government
officials readily accept this excuse as the primary reason as to why the attacks were
not prevented. The FBI, for example, was responsible for domestic intelligence
gathering and federal law enforcement. Once the hijackers entered the United States,
their investigation was fully within the jurisdiction of the FBI. Moreover, the CIA
whose job entails collecting foreign intelligence was accountable for identifying and
, foiling the plans of al Qaeda.
Obviously, without the use of airplanes, the attacks could not have been
carried out. Therefore, the aviation community as well failed to prevent, and once in
progress stop the attacks from occurring. Within the Department of Transportation,
the FAA working in close connection with the airline industry also played a critical
role which must be examined. Additionally, NORAD was also responsible for
defending and protecting the air space of North America. Once a plane is identified
as hijacked by the FAA, NORAD then assumes responsibility for the threatening
aircraft. Thus, a failure to prevent hijacked airplanes from being used as missiles falls
within their jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Bush Administration and particularly the NSC's role in the
failure to prevent the attacks cannot be underestimated. Responsible for advising the
President on national security and foreign affairs, the domain of the NSC includes
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preventing foreign and domestic attacks from occurring. Howev�r, it must be noted
that some members of the NSC do overlap with other agencies. The Central
Intelligence Director, for example, serves both the NSC as well as the CIA. Due to
the NSC's vital role in providing national security, the actions and inactions of the
NSC's officials must be scrutinized.
Due to their significant failures, the 9/11 Commission devoted a great deal of
its investigation to the responses of the NSC, CIA, FBI, NORAD and FAA. As a
result, transcripts of the public hearings include numerous testimonies from officials
representing these five agencies. Narrowing down the data to fit within the
parameters of this project, public hearings which did not seem to be explicitly
... relevant were first excluded from consideration. Of the twelve public hearings, the
first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and_eleventh hearings were dismissed as irrelevant.
From the remaining hearings (the second, seventh, eight, ninth, tenth and twelfth),
panels were selected which dealt with events leading up to or during the attacks and
included witnesses from at least one of the five agencies of interest. From here,
individuals which occupied their position within each agency on or before September
11, 2001 were selected for inclusion in the analysis.
Even though this was the dominant approach for minimizing the amount of
. data to be analyzed it must be noted that some exceptions were made. For example,
NORAD officials also included members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
National
�'

Military Command Center and more generally the Department of Defense, who
contributed a great deai of information a�out NORAD's response. Additionally, the
testimonies of three FAA officials also went unevaluated due to abundance of FAA
officials testifying to the Commission. In this case, every effort was made to collect a
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sample of testimonies from both top level FAA officials, such as the administrator, to
lower level officials such as a member of the investigative Red Team.
Analytic Strategy
Identifying crimes of the state is an endeavor which begs for definitional
clarity. Although many state crime theorists have offered varying definitional
approaches, Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003) se�k to establish a definition
which " ... should precisely define and describe an existing phenomenon in such a way
that allows and assists the study of the phenomenon" (244). Rather than creating a
definition which seeks to limit state crime inquiries, Kauzlarich, Mullins and
Matthews introduce five criteria to help facilitate the study of state crime. A state
crime, they assert, must meet these gu�delines: (1) Generates harm to individuals,
groups, and property (2) Is a product of action or inaction on behalf of the state or
state agencies (3) The action or inaction related directly to an assigned or implied trust
and/or duty (4) Is committed, or omitted, by a government agency, organization or
representative and (5) Is done in the self interest of (a) the state itself or (b) the elite
groups controlling the state (2003:244-6).
Utilizing these criteria as a standard by which to judge the actions and
inactions of the United States government in the events surrounding 9/11 will provide
a definitive method by which to firmly conclude the culpability of the state.
Analyzing the transcribed testimonies of officials from each of the five agencies
. (NSC, CIA, FBI, NORAD and FAA) by the five criteria proposed by Kauzlarich,
Mullins and Matthews (2003) will aid in systematically establishing the role of each
government agency in the events surrounding September 11th• "

32
Generates Harm to Individuals, Groups, and Property
Quite obviously, the attacks of September 11, 2001 generated a great deal of
harm to individuals, groups as well as property. Allowing this criterion to go largely
unchallenged, the bulk of the analysis is devoted to determining the culpability of
each government agency in the harm resulting from the attacks.
Is a Product of Action or Inaction on Behalf of the State or State Agencies
If the data demonstrates the failure of a state agency to take action to prevent
the attacks from occurring, it will have fulfilled this criterion. Furthermore, if an
action was undertaken by a state agency which facilitated the attacks, this criterion
will also have been met. On the other hand, if the data fails to substantiate that the
attacks were the product of action or inaction on behalf of the agency in question, the
agency will be found to be lacking in responsibility and will therefore be excluded
from further analysis. · ··
The Action or Inaction Relates Directly to an Assigned or Implied Trust and/or Duty
Beyond merely establi�hing the actions or inactions of each agency, it must be
also be demonstrated that it was clearly the duty (i.e. responsibility) of each agency to
have done so. Declarations of implied responsibility will be admissible from either
�-- .

the agency itself or from other government officials. Demonstrating this criterion will
go above and beyond the implied trust which exists between any state representative
and the citizens of a democracy.

Is Committed, or Omitted, by a Government Agency, Organization or Representative
Since each ofthe objects ofinquiry are state agencies (with the exception of
the airline industry which will be examined in the context ofits.relationship with the
FM), this criterion will have largely been met from the outset. Once action or
inaction has been established (as demanded by criterion number two), this criterion
will also be fulfilled.
Is Done in the SelfInterest of(a) the State Itselfor (b) the Elite Groups Controlling
the State
Finally, and perhaps most challengingly, Kauzliarich, Mullins and Matthews's
definition ofstate crime requires that the action or inaction be done in the interest of
the state or elite groups controlling the state. • Essentially, this criterion seeks to
address the mens rea, or criminal intent ofthe state. Actions undertaken by
corporations, illegal or otherwise, can quite easily be chalked up to the pursuit of
organizational goals, chiefly the accumulation ofprofit. Due to the complexity of
"the state," its organizational goals are much more difficult to identify. As Friedrichs
. (2007) suggests, government negligence is often the result offavoring particular
policies, interests and constituencies over others. Thus, choosing to preference
certain policies or strategies while neglecting others·are the codified result ofstate
interests.
By its very nature government policy serves state interests in some
fundamental manner. The outcomes ofthese policies as implemented by state
agencies are not necessarily in accordance with the intentions oflaw makers:
Nevertheless, the failure to regulate and enforce policy implicates the government in
its outcomes. Therefore, choosing one policy over an alternative is a reflection of
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state interest regardless of the intended or unintended consequences that flow from
such a decision. In line with Henry's (1991) definition of state crime, harm resulting
from government policy need not be intentional in order for it to be classified as
criminal.
When considering the actions or inactions �f each of the five government
agencies (NSC, CIA, FBI, NORAD and FAA) in the events surrounding the attacks of
September 11th, it is not necessary to establish a causal link between the action and
the self interest of the state. Since the state and its interests are not so easily
identified, especially from the outside looking in, the interests of the state itself or
elite groups in control of the state can be broadly construed. Furthermore, the
decision of an agency to pursue a course of action or inaction is the most concrete
expression of the interests of state agencies. Therefore, the actions and inactions of
the agency as a whole, as well as its representatives, will serve to substantiate the
interests of the state;
Judged by the criteria put forth by Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003),
the actions and inactions of the United States government as documented by the
testimonies of officials from the NSC, CIA, FBI, NORAD and FAA will shed light on
to the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. If it is found that government agencies
failed to act when they had the clear responsibility to do so, then it must be concluded
that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a state crime.
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CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
According to the National Security Council's website,
The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for
considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior
national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception
under President Truman, the function of the Council has been to advise
and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The
Council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating
these policies among various government agencies.
Furthermore, regular attendees of the NSC include the President, who is the chair, the
Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of National
Intelligence and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National
Security Council website).
Testimony of Condoleezza Rice
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty

Role of the National Security Advisor
The National Security Presidential Directive 1 signed by President Bush on February 13, 2001 which became effective one month later, set forth the structure for
the National Security Council as well as the responsibilities of the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs (also known as the National Security Advisor);
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the role occupied by Condoleezza Rice from 2001-2004. One of the more significant
changes made by the __President in NSPD 1 was an expansion of the powers of the
National Security Advisor to include chairing the NSC Principals Committee. As
articulated by President Bush,
the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) will continue to be the
senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting
national security, as it has since 1989. The NSC/PC shall have as its
regular attendees the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall
serve as chair). (NSPD 1)
Thus, the meetings and the agenda of the NSC/PC in which the most urgent foreign
policy considerations are discussed were set at the behest of Rice in consultation with
the other members.
Amongst other NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) - which
are the center for interagency policy coordination- the National Security Advisor is
designated the chair of the Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness committee.
Further, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation
with the President and Vice President, also has the power to establish additional
· NSC/PCCs where necessary (NSPD 1). Finally, the more routine responsibilities of
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs include ensuring that
necessary papers are prepared and NSC actions and Presidential decisions are
recorded.
Overall, the position of the National Security Advisor in the Bush
administration, as dictated by the February 13, 2001 NSPD, serves as a coordinating
center for national security policy issues. As chair of the NSC/PC, Rice was in charge
of this powerful interagency panel. Further, by serving as the chair of both the NSC
Principals Committee as well as the Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness
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Committee, Rice was in a position to bring many of the concerns voiced by the
Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness Committee - which was directly
dealing with the heightened terrorist threat throughout the spring and summer of
2001- to the attention of the NSC/PC.
Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies

Bush Administration's Policy Towards al Qaeda
The threat posed by al Qaeda to American interests both at home and abroad
was well known by officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations. During the
transitory period between the administrations, both President Bush and National
Security Advisor Rice were briefed by CIA director George Tenet on terrorism and·
the al Qaeda network. Furthermore, Rice was also briefed by the outgoing NSC staff
on counterterrorism initiatives and the threat posed by al Qaeda. As expressed by
Rice, "because of these briefings and because we had watched the rise of al Qaeda,
over many years, we understood that the network posed a serious threat to the United
States" (p. 4). Aiming to ensure continuity while other al Qaeda policies were being
developed, the Bush administration decided to continue pursuing the Clinton
administration's policy towards al Qaeda, even going as far as to retain numerous
Clinton era officials including George Tenet (director of intelligence), Louis Freeh
-,_

(director of the FBI), Richard Clarke (national coordinator of counterterrorism at the
NSC) and the entire counterterrorism team on the NSC staff. Rice maintains that
" ...the decision that we made was to, first of all, have no drop off in what the Clinton
administration was doing because clearly they had done a lot of work to deal with this
very important priority. And so we kept the counterterrorism team on board" (p. 13).

Spring and Summer of2001
The threat posed by al Qaeda began to heighten in the spring and summer of
2001. As threat reporting increased, the NSC " ... moved the U:.S. Government at all
levels to a high state ofalert and activity'' (p. 7). The Counterterrorism Security
Group (CSG), chaired by Richard Clarke, also began meeting sometimes daily to
review threat reporting and coordinate actions and responses. Moreover, Rice also
met and spoke frequently during this time with the Director ofCentral Intelligence
· (DCI) George Tenet to discuss terrorism and al Qaeda. As Rice put it, "[an attack by
' al Qaeda] was on the radar screen ofany person who studied or worked in the
international security field" (p. 12). Thus, the National Security Council was well
aware ofthe increasing threat posed b)' al Qaeda during the spring and summer of
2001.
The possibility ofan attack inside the U.S. was plausible enough for Rice
along with ChiefofStaff Andy Card to meet with Clarke to ensure "that domestic
agencies were aware ofthe heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps
to respond, even though we did not have specific threats to the homeland" (p. 8).
Shortly thereafter, Clarke and the CSG convened to alert the Federal Aviation
. Administration (FAA), Immigration and N,aturalization Services (INS) and the Coast
Guard about the threats, urging them to increase security and surveillance.
Other agencies were issuing urgent warnings as well. The Defense
Department, for example, issued at least five warnings to U.S. military forces that
near term attacks by al Qaeda may take place. The State Department also issued at
least four worldwide warnings about the anticipated attacks, going as far to warn the
Taliban that they would be held responsible for any al Qaeda attacks. Moreover, the
FBI had issued at least three nationwide warnings to domestic law enforcement
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agencies stating that although most threats identified overseas targets, terrorist attacks
on U.S. soil were also possible. Additionally, at least five civil aviation security
information circulars were issued by the FAA to all U.S. airlines and airport security
which warned of the potential for hijackings.
August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing
Although much of the threat information had suggested a target overseas, both
President Bush and Rice were concerned about a terrorist attack U.S. soil. Composed
by the CIA, the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) is considered one
of the most specific warnings given to the Bush administration about the looming
terrorist attacks. Asserted by Rice to be in response to questions asked by the
President about al Qaeda's intentions to strike the homeland, the briefing has
generated a great deal of controversy as to how it came about. Initially, the CIA had
advised the 9/11 Commission in writing that the PDB was prepared and self generated
by a CIA employee. This version of events was later corrected by George Tenet,
reflecting Rice's assertion that the PDB was in response to questions asked by the
President.
At the time of Rice's testimony, only portions of the August 6, 2001 PDB
were made available to the Commission. It was not until April 10, 2004 that the
document was declassified. Titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US," the PDB
summarizes, according to Rice, some of the more "historic information" known about
bin Laden and his attempts to attack U.S. interests at home and abroad. Despite the
emphasis on attacks inside the United States, Rice maintains that the "[PDB] did not
warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old
reporting. There was no new threat information, and it did not, in fact, warn of any
coming attacks inside the United States" (p. 25).
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Contradicting Rice's position, the briefing conveys that although some of the
information may have been historical, a clear and present domestic threat existed.
Contrasting the historical and current threat information, the PDB states:
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of
suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparation for
hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of
federal buildings in New York. (Presidential)
In retrospect, the accuracy of the PDB in predicting elements of the attacks is
chilling. Nevertheless, Rice maintains that "there was nothing in this memo as to
�

J

time, place, how or where" (p. 27).
Even though the PDB notes the presence of al Qaeda operatives residing
inside the U.S. as well as the existence of support structures that could aid in attacks,
this was not the first time that Rice or_ the President had been alerted to the existence
of al Qaeda sleeper cells in the U.S. Rice confirms that
in the memorandum that Dick Clarke sent to me on January 25th, he
mentions sleeper cells. There is no mention or recommendation of
anything that needs to be done about them. And the FBI was pursuing
them. And usually when things come to me it's because I'm supposed
to do something about it, and there was no indication that the FBI was
not adequately pursuing the sleeper cells. (p. 57)
Further illustrating the awareness of the domestic threat, Rice asserts that " ...the
President was aware that there were issues inside the United States. He talked to
people about this. But I don't remember the al Qaeda cells as being something that
we were told we needed to do something about" (p. 24).
FBI Investigation of Threats
As indicated by the PDB, the FBI had 70 full field investigations of
individuals :which may be connected to bin Laden underway at the time. Moreover,
Rice asserts that "the country had already taken steps through the FBI to task their 56
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field offices to increase their activity'' (p. 27). As a result, Rice concluded that the
FBI was evaluating the threat and no further actions needed to be taken.
Despite her assertion, it is unclear whether or not the FBI had ever tasked its
field offices to increase their activity. After thousands of interviews to the 9/11
Commission, Commissioner Roemer concludes that "to date, we have found
nobody-nobody at the FBI who knows anything about a tasking of field offices" (p.
68). Had the FBI been tasked, information about an inordinate amount of young Arab
men attending U.S. flight schools may have raised red flags. For example, according
,

to Commissioner Kerrey, FBI Agent Kenneth Williams
...said that the FBI should investigate whether al Qaeda operatives
were training at U.S. flight schools. He posited that Osama bin
Laden's followers might be trying to infiltrate the civil aviation system
as pilots and security guards, other personnel. He recommended a
national program to track suspicious flight schools. (p. 54)
If the FBI was tasked to inform its field offices of the threat posed by al Qaeda, it is
unclear why information such as this was not made available to Rice and other
members of the NSC.
September 4, 2001 Memorandum
Further stressing the urgency of the threat posed by al Qaeda and the
government's inability to take action is the September 4, 2001 memo to Rice from
Clarke, which Commissioner Roemer claims that Clarke
...lays out his frustration that the military is not doing enough, that the
CIA is not pushing this hard enough in their agency, and he says we
should not wait till the day that hundreds of Americans lay dead.in the , ·.
streets due to a terrorist attack... (p. 69)
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Conversely, Rice contends that the memo was a warning not to get dragged down by
the bureaucracy. Written just before a Principals Meeting in which a strategy for
dealing with al Qaeda was to be considered, Rice claims that
.. .it would not be appropriate or correct to characterize what Dick
wrote to me on September 4th as a warning of an impending attack.
What he was doing was, I think, trying to buck me up so that when I
went into this principals meeting, I was sufficiently on guard against
the kind of bureaucratic inertia that he had fought all his life. (p. 70)
The difficulty in establishing the accuracy of these competing contentions is further
complicated by the fact that this memo has yet to be declassified, though portions of it
were made available to the Commission. In either case, the memo conveys the
frustration and fear felt throughout the government on the eve of the attacks.
Summary
The threat posed by al Qaeda to American interests was well known
throughout both the Clinton and Bush administrations. Although Rice maintains that
there was no "actionable intelligence" that indicated a domestic terrorist attack, the
actions taken by both the President and Rice demonstrate that the potential for a
domestic attack was real. Prompted by the President's concerns about al Qaeda's
intention to strike the homeland, the August 6, 2001 PDB confirms the potential for a
domestic attack. If it had not been made clear to Rice in the January 25th memo from
Clarke that al Qaeda sleeper cells where present within the U.S., the PDB again
stressed this warning. Startled enough by the possibility of an attack within the U.S. to
summon Clarke to alert domestic agencies of the heightened threat period, Rice
understood that an attack on the homeland was at least plausible.
Despite the abundance of evidence which suggested an attack within the
United States, Condoleezza Rice failed to take actions which could have prevented
the attacks. Clearly within her responsibilities as Natio·nal Security Advisor, Rice had
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the power to voice the concerns of Clarke and the CSG to the Principals Committee.
Cited as one of the primary reasons for the successful foiling of the 1999 Millennium
plot, frequent meetings by the Principals Committee, order.ed by Rice, could have
changed the outcome of September 11, 2001.
Testimony of Richard Clarke
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty
Role of the National Coordinator for the Countertetrorism
Richard Clarke, who served as the national coordinator for the
counterterrorism at the NSC throughout 2001, began his career in the White House at
the end of the first Bush administration in the fall of 1992 as head of the
Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG). Until 1998, Clarke's title" ...had
always been a special assistant to the President" (Clarke Testimony p. 111).
Thereafter, Clarke's title became the national coordinator for security, infrastructure
protection and counterterrorism, otherwise known as the"terrorism czar." He asserts
that"[the position] gave me all of the responsibility and none of the authority'' (p.
111). Once the Bush administration took office, the NSC was reorganized, therefore
shifting Clarke's position. The first National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 1)
- stipulated that
the Counter-Terrorism Security Group, Critical Infrastructure
Coordination Group, Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness,
Consequences Management and Protection Group, and the interagency
working group on Enduring Constitutional Government are
reconstituted as various forms of the NSC/PCC on Counter-Terrorism
and National Preparedness.·
Thus, Clarke's title went from the national coordinator for security, infrastructure
protection and counterterrorism to the national coordinator for counterterrorism (i.e.

the Counterterrorism Security Group).. Throughout both the Clinton and. secohd Bush
'
administrations, it was Clarke and the CSG principal responsibility to coordinate
counterterrorism policy.
Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies

Awareness of al Qaeda
Having worked for three administrations on counterterrorism operations·,
Clarke understood the threat posed by al Qaeda, perhaps better than anyone else.
Clarke asserts that al Qaeda came into existence sometime in 1988 or 1989. Although
members of the NSC had suspicions as early as 1993, it was not until former national
security advisor (1993-1997) Anthony Lake urged the CIA to investigate this
organization, which seemed to be centered around bin Laden, that the White House
was informed of al Qaeda's existence in 1995. Thus, it was duririg the Clinton era
that the U.S. government began deal with the threat posed by al Qaeda. However, the
Bush administration's decision to retain many members from the Clinton
administration, including Clarke, as well as to continue pursuing the Clinton
administration's policy towards al Qaeda meant that the implementation of Clarke's
strategy was left up to the new administration.
Bush Administration's Policy Towards al Qaeda
In comparison to the Clinton administration, Clarke notes that fighting
terrorism and al Qaeda were much lower priorities in the Bush administration.
Concerned about the administrations failure to treat al Qaeda as a high priority,
Clarke notes that
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George Tenet and I tried very hard to create a sense of urgency by
seeing to it that intelligence reports on the al Qaeda threat were
frequently given to the President and other high-level officials...But
although I continued to say it was an urgent problem, I don't think it
was ever treated that way. (p. 104)
Compared to the increased counterterrorism budget seen during the Clinton years, the
Bush administration demonstrated early on that the trend would not continue.
Although the Clinton administration had begun making efforts to deal with al Qaeda,
much of the work was left to the incoming administration.
One of the counterterrorism issues left on the table from the Clinton
administration was the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole on October 12, 2000. Since it was
not until January of 2001 that the CIA determined that the suicide bombing had been
done by al Qaeda- although Clarke maintains that he and his staff had enough
information to build a case against al Qaeda just two days after the attack- it was left
up to the Bush administration to decide whether or not to respond. A justifiable
reason to go after al Qaeda, Clarke laments that
unfortunately there was no interest, no acceptance of that proposition,
and I was told on a couple of occasions, well that, you know, that
happened on the Clinton administration's watch...! thought the Bush
administration, now that it had the CIA saying it was al Qaeda, should
have responded. (p. 145)
Urgent Wamings to the Bush Administration

--

Just five days after the Bush administration took office on January 25, 2001
Clarke sent a memo to National Security Advisor Rice urgently asking her to hold a
Principals Meeting on the pressing al Qaeda threat. Succinctly laying out the nature
of the threat posed and strategies for approaching it including whether or not to
respond to the Cole attack, the January 25th memo stresses the importance of
considering al Qaeda (or 'al Qida') as a threat in its own right:
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As we noted in our briefings for you, al Qida is not some narrow, little
terrorist issue that needs to be included in broader regional policy.
Rather, several of our regional policies need to address centrally the
transnational challenge to the US and our interests posed by the al
Qida network. By proceeding with separate policy reviews on Central
Asia, the GCC, North Africa, etc. we would deal inadequately with the
need for a comprehensive multi-regional policy on al Qida. (NSC
Memo from Clarke)
Moreover, the memo clearly identifies the decisions about al Qaeda that had been
deferred to the Bush Administration such as whether to fund the Northern Alliance
and increase assistance to Uzbekistan.
The response that Clarke received from the Bush administration was one he
was not expecting. Clarke states that
the response was that in the Bush Administration I should, and my
committee, the counterterrorism security group, should report to the
deputies committee, which is a sub-cabinet level committee, and not to
the principals, and that therefore it was inappropriate for me to be
asking for a principals meeting. Instead, there would be a deputies
meeting. (p. 106)
Accustomed to reporting directly to the principals throughout the Clinton
administration, Clarke and the CSG had in effect suffered a demotion in the current
administration. As a result of this bureaucratic shift, Clarke no longer had direct
access to Condoleezza Rice and the other principals. He therefore"... spent less time
talking about the problems of terrorism with the national security advisor in this
Administration" (p. 118).
Further delaying a meeting to address the threat, the Deputies Committee did
not convene until after February. "Then, when the deputies committee did meet, it
took the issue of al Qaeda as part of a cluster of policy issues ..." (p. 106); exactly
what Clar�rn had advised against. In contradiction of Clarke's urgings in the January
25th memo, al Qaeda was examined in the context of a myriad of other interrelated
issues, therefore diluting its significance. As the Deputies Committee prepared to

meet with the Principals, the meeting was initially put on hold due to a full calendar
and then due to summer vacations.
By June, Clarke was so frustrated by the failure of the Bush administration to
treat the al Qaeda threat as serious that he resigned. Recounting his feeling at the
time, Clarke reflects
and I thought, if the Administration doesn't believe its national
coordinator for counterterrorism when he says there's an urgent
problem, and if it's unprepared to act as though there's an urgent
· problem, then probably I should get another job. (p. 107)
Soon thereafter Clarke was reassigned to a new position he created involved with
cyber security.
September 4, 2001 Principals Meeting
One week prior to the attacks the principals committee finally met on
September 4th• Eight months after Clarke sent a m_emo to Rice on strategies for
dealing with al Qaeda, his recommendations were approved by the Principals
Committee. For such an urgent threat, Clarke found an eight month waiting period
for a Principals meeting ''unusual." Stressing that only the Principals, rather than the
Deputies, had the power to approve a change in policy towards al Qaeda, Clarke
contends that" ...all the right people to make those kinds of changes were represented
by the five or six people on the principals committee" (p. 128). However, he
continues on to say ''by law, in fact, many of the kinds of decisions you're talking
about can only be made by the President" (p. 129). The final approval of the change
in policy towards al Qaeda, needed by the President, did not occur until after
September 11th• Revealing his frustrations, Clarke says that
... all of the things we recommended back in January were those
things on the table in September. They were done. They were done
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after September 11 • They were all done. I didn't really understand
why they couldn't have been done in February. (p. 108)
Contingent on the completion of this policy development process, Clarke was
forced to wait to brief the President on counterterrorism and the threat posed by al
Qaeda despite numerous threat warnings. Clarke contends that
President Bush was regularly told by the director of Central
Intelligence that there was an urgent threat. On one occasion- - he was
told this dozens of times in the morning briefings that George Tenet
gave him. On one of those occasions he asked for strategy to deal with
the threat. (p. 109)
Once Rice relayed this information to Clarke, he responded by saying "well, you
know, we've had this strategy ready since before you were inaugurated. I showed it to
you. You have the paperwork. We can have a meeting any time you want" (p. 109).
But the meeting never came and as far as Clarke knows, the President never asked
agam.
Availability of Domestic Threat Information
Acknowledging that much of the threat reporting suggested an overseas target,
Clarke thought that an attack could occur inside the United States. He contends that·
the fact that we didn't have intelligence that we could point to that said
it would take place in the United States wasn't significant in my view
because, frankly, sir- - I know how this is going to sound, but I have to
say it- - I didn't think the FBI would know whether or not there was
anything going on in the United States by al Qaeda. (p. 120)-Although Clarke doubted the FBI's ability to id�ntify the presence of al Qaeda
members inside the U.S., this was not the case.
In actuality, the FBI had identified members of al Qaeda residing within the
U.S., though the information never made it to Clarke. Somehow, the FBI never
reported to Clarke that al Qaeda members al Hazmi and Mthdhar were residing in the
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U.S. Further, the Moussaoui case- in which FBI agents were investigating a young
Arab male with jihadist views attending flight school in Minnesota- had never been
relayed to Clarke and the CSG either. The fact that this information was available
within the FBI but was never been told to Clarke, he finds"absolutely
incomprehensible" (p. 120), especially in light of previous warnings given to the FBI
and CIA.
... I had been saying to the FBI and to the other federal law
enforcement agencies, and to the CIA, that because of this intelligence
that something was about to happen that they should lower their
threshold of reporting - that they should tell us anything that looked
the slightest bit unusual. (p. 120)
Had information about the Moussaoui case been provided to Clarke, in conjunction
with the pre-existing information about airplanes being used as weapons and the
potential for dome'stic hijackings, he believes that" ...even without the benefit of
20/20 hindsight, I could have connected those dots" (p. 121).
Summary
By the time the Bush administration took office, a strategy for dealing with al
Qaeda was already on the table. As articulated by the Jan�ary 25, 2001 memo from
Clarke to Rice an urgent principals level review was needed to determine how to go
about dealing with al Qaeda and whether to retaliate for the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
Instead of convening a Principals meeting as a result of the request, Clarke and the
CSG were instructed to report to the deputies committee rather than the Principals.
Considered amongst numerous other foreign policy issues- just as Clarke had advised
against- the strategy for dealing with al Qaeda was held up in the Deputies
Committee. It was not until September 4, 2001 that the Principals met to agree on a
strategy for dealing with al Qaeda. Eight months after Clarke had proposed his
strategy and urged for a Principals meeting to review it, it was approved by the
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Principals. Only after September 11 occurred was Clarke's strategy for dealing with
al Qaeda approved by the President and put into place.
In addition to Clarke's difficulties in informing the. Principals ofthe urgent
threat posed by al Qaeda, FBI information about al Qaeda operatives within the
United States was not relayed to Clarke. As the national coordinator for
counterterrorism, it was Clarke's responsibility to coordinate both foreign and
domestic intelligence. However, information about the FBI's investigation of ·
Zacarias Moussaoui and al Qaeda operatives·residing within the U.S. was never
conveyed to Clarke despite multiple warnings oflooming attacks.
National Security Council Summary
Many ofthe points ofcontention between Rice and Clarke's testimonies lie in
the urgency ofthe threat posed and the process in whi.ch the threat was addressed.
While Rice admits that there was an urgent and immediate threat posed by al Qaeda,
she maintains that there was no "actionable intelligence." On the other hand, Clarke
posits that the bombing ofthe U.S.S. Cole was justification enough to retaliate against
al Qaeda. As Rice repeatedly makes clear, the Bush administration did not want to
respond to al Qaeda "tit-for-tat" Instead, they waited until eight months in office to
approve a strategy for dealing with al Qaeda- the same one Clarke proposed in
January.
Rice asserts that the limited availability ofinformation indfcating a domestic
attack held the administration's focus oversees. Despite the January 25, 2001 memo
which indicated that al Qaeda sleeper cells were inside the U.S. and the August 6,
2001 Presidential Daily Briefing which summarized bin Laden's historical and
continuing desires to strike within the U.S., Rice maintains that "there was nothing in
this memo as to time, place, how or where" (Rice Testimony p. 27). Even so, Clarke
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is confident that in addition to older information about planes being used as bombs
and the current potential for domestic hijackings, ifhe had been informed ofthe cases
being pursued by the FBI on al Qaeda operatives inside the. U.S., that " ... even without
the benefit of20/20 hindsight, I could have connected those dots" (Clarke Testimony
p. 121).
CSG Reporting to Deputies Committee
The biggest disagreement between Rice and Clarke's testimony concerns the
Principals meeting. With one thwarted attack under his belt, Clarke, amongst many
others, consistently notes the difference between the Clinton administrations handling
ofterrorist threats and the Bush administrations. As Commissioner Fielding asserts,
...we've heard testimony about the coordination that took place during
the Millennium threat in 1999, where there were a series ofPrincipal
Meetings and a lot ofactivity, as we're told, which stopped and
prevented incidents. It was a success, it was an intelligence success.
And there had to be domestic coordination with foreign intelligence
and everything, but it seemed to work. (Rice Testimony p. 33)
In spite ofRice's claims that the structural and legal impediments to sharing
information between domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies inhibited
the prevention ofthe 9/11 attacks, the successful response to the Millennium threat of
1999 suggests otherwise.
The primary difference between the two administrations handling ofterrorist
threats resided in the structuring ofthe NSC. The restructuring ofthe NSC that took
place in the Bush administration was largely designed and implemented by Phillip
Zelikow who was a member ofRice's 2000-2001 NSC transition team. In the Clinton
administration, Clarke and the CSG reported directly to the Cabinet-level Principals
Committee. Under the new administration, Clarke was to meet with the Deputies
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Committee despite his urgent request for a Principal level review of the al Qaeda
network.
Rice, however, asserts that the CSG was in frequent contact with the
Principals.
The CSG was made up of senio� not junior people, but the top level
counterteriorism experts. Now, they were in frequent contact with
their principals. Dick Clarke was in contact with me quite frequently
during this period of time. When CSG would meet, he would come
back usually through e-mails, sometimes personally, and say here's
what we've done. (P. 34)
• Although Rice acknowledges that Clarke presented her with a series of decisions that
needed to be made by the new administration, she maintains that " ...by no means did
he ask me to act on a plan" (p. 72).
Laid out in the January 25, 2001 memo to Rice, Clarke begins by asking Rice
to act: "We urgently need such a Principals level review on the al Qida network"
(NSC Memo from Clarke). Additionally, Rice approached Clarke after the request by
the President to see a strategy for dealing with al Qaeda, as he was unaware that there
was one in the works. Clarke states that he
...came back to her and said, well, there is a strategy; after all, it's
basically what I showed you in January. It's stuck in the deputies
committee. She said she would tell the President that and she said she
would try to break it out of the deputies committee then. (Clarke
Testimony p. 129)
On more than one occasion, it appears that Clarke had made attempts to spur Rice
into requesting a Principals meeting, something that Rice had been granted the power
to do by the NSPD 1.
Rice's failure to convene a Principal level review of al Qaeda early on in the
Administration despite Clarke's repeated warnings implicates her in the September
11th attacks. Since it was w�thin her capacity as the National Security Advisor to1
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dictate when the Principal Committee would meet, Rice must be held accountable for
her failure to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
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CHAPTERV

C�NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Although the Untied States has been conducting intelligence activities since its
incarnation it was not until World War II that intelligence gathering became a
government-wide effort. In 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act
which created the Central Intelligence Agency. "The National Security Act charged
the CIA with coordinating the nation's intelligence_ activities and correlating,
evaluating and disseminating intelligence affecting national security'' (History of the
CIA). In 1952 the Director of Intelligence (DI) was formed within the CIA to "help
the President and other policymakers make informed decisions about our country's
national security. DI analysts look at all the available information on an issue and
organize it for policymakers to give them more ideas on how to think about it"
(Intelligence Analysis). However, the practice of giving daily briefings to the
president (Presidential Daily Briefings), was not established until 1964 by President
Johnson.
Even though members of the CIA claim that they 'are not policymakers' their
role in shaping policy is significant. Having hands-on experience with the
intelligence used to shape policy, members of the CIA have the best understanding of
'

.

.

, national security threats. Thus, their role in informing the President and other
policymakers is of quintessential importance.
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Testimonies of George Tenet and John McLaughlin
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty

Role of the Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
Following presidential approval of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act on December 17, 2004, the positions of both the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCQ and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligences (DDCQ were
abolished. John McLaughlin had worked within the CIA since 1972, but it was not
until 2000 that he was appointed by President Clinton to serve as DDCI, a position
which he continued to occupy until 2004.
Tenet was appointed to serve as DCI by President Clinton in July 1997 and
continued to occupy the position until July 2004. As Commissioner Hamilton
summarizes,
the director has a responsibility to carry out some of the most sensitive
matters in the United States government. He has an obligation to find
out information people don't want to give us, to carry out a lot of
clandestine operations, to protect the lives of a lot of people who carry
out those missions, and, of course, to inform policymakers. (Tenet
---Testimony 1:15)
Despite Tenet's frequent assertions that he is "not a policymaker," he
acknowledges that " .. .I obviously have an input into the policy process with the data I
provide" (Tenet 1 :49). Additionally, Tenet agrees that his principal role as DCI is to
inform government officials, but maintains that it is not his job to generate activities
based on that information.
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In addition to their roles within the CIA, both Tenet and McLaughlin also
served on the National Security Council. DCI Tenet served as a statutory advisor to
the National Security Council. When issues were discussed at Principals Meetings
pertaining to Tenet's responsibilities and expertise, he was mandated to attend (NSPD
1). Furthermore, McLaughlin served on the NSC Deputies Committee and was in
regular attendance at NSC/DC meetings (NSPD 1). Although attention is focused
primarily on Ten�t and McLaughlin's roles within the CIA,their positions within the
NSC Principals and Deputies committees cannot be overlooked.
Action or Inaction on BehalfofState or State Agencies
Due to the secretive nature ofintelligence gathering, Tenet and McLaughlin
were granted a great deal ofleniency on what information they divulged to the
Commission. As a result, a lot ofinformation was given to the Commission behind
closed doors and was not made available to the public. The authority granted to Tenet
to select what will be publicly discussed is reflected by exchanges such as:

Commissioner Gorelick: "Thank you for that elaboration. And
because-we have sort ofleft in your hands, actually, the degree to
which you talk about this."
· Tenet: "And I think this is the right way to talk about it."

Commissioner Gorelick: "Fine. And we"will pursue it in private. But I
appreciate both your answer and the elaboration on the answei::" (Tenet
1:29).
Therefore, much ofwhat was publicly revealed about the actions or inactions
occurring within the CIA or even the NSC were left to the discretion ofTenet and
McLaughlin.
.

.
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CIA Efforts to Address al Qaeda Threat
The CIA's efforts to gather intelligence on Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda
began in the early 1990s. From as early as 1996, the CIA identified bin Laden"...as
one of the most active financial sponsors oflslamic fundamental terrorism" (Tenet
1: 17). Their concern over bin Laden grew after he was asked to leave Sudan and then
moved to Afghanistan. Tenet asserts that
During his years in Sudan, Bin Laden was not yet the center for·
terrorist operational planning that he became in Afghanistan, but we
created a dedicated component in the Counterterrorism Center, the Bin
Ladin Issue Station, that was staffed by officers from multiple
agencies, with the mission ofdisrupting his operations. We also issued
the earliest of what turned out to be a long series of warnings about
· Bin Laden and al Qaeda, and I believe those warnings were heeded.
(Tenet 1: 17)
Tenet clearly argues that the CIA was well aware of the threat posed by al Qaeda and
bin Laden and had been working for years gathering information and thwarting
numerous attacks.
As early as 1997, bin Laden and al Qaeda's interest in striking the homeland
were known by policymakers. Tenet refutes the assumption that because information
about bin Laden's increasing capabilities was not included in the National Intelligence
Estimate of 1997 that it was not well known to government officials. Noting that the
Staff Statement written by the Commission excluded information about the '97 NIE,
McLaughlin states that
1

...the staff statement failed to note that in the '97 [National
Intelligence Estimate] update we included information that Bin Ladin
had been surveilling; people associated with Bin Ladin had been
surveilling institutions in the United States and that, therefore, we
concluded the likelihood was growing that he would attack in the
United States. That was, I think, the most significant finding in the '97
NIE. (Tenet 2: 24)

Therefore, policymakers were informed about bin Laden's intentions to perpetrate
attacks within the U.S. The failure of the Commission's staff statement to reflect 'the
most significant finding in the '97 NIE' is puzzling.
In 1999 the CIA had developed what they called "the plan." Focused on
developing both human and technical sources geared towards disrupting terrorists and
their plots, "the plan" succeeded in developing a network of human intelligence which
grew dramatically from 1999 to 200.1. On the more technical side of "the plan" the
CIA worked to develop the Predator, an unmanned aircraft which is capable of firing
missiles and was intended to hunt and kill bin Laden. In the fall of 2000, the CIA
began flying the Predator in reconnaissance mode, though its ability to fire a missile
was uncertain. Unable to fly during the winter, it was not until after an extensive test
period that in the fall of 2001 that the Predator was ready to be flown armed.
Contact with President Bush
In comparison to his interactions with President Clinton, Tenet asserts that the
primary difference between the two presidents "... is that I would see [President
Bush] every day to conduct the daily brief with our briefer- - usually six days a week.
So this president wanted a face-to-face contact, and so I was in the Oval Office with
him or at Camp David every day of the week" (Tenet 1: 22). Similarly, Tenet also
had daily phone contact and weekly meetings, in addition to seeing h_er at the morning
briefings, with.National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Furthermore, Tenet
states that "at the working level, our chief CTC and our terrorism experts had almost
daily contact with Mr. Clarke, and I'd have periodic contact with him as I bumped
into him at meetings" (p. 23).
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From early on, Tenet contends, the Bush administration was well aware of the
threat posed by al Qaeda. He states that "...the new group also immediately
understood what we were talking about here, and bin Ladin and al Qaeda became an
agenda item early on with the national security advisor and the President" (Tenet 1:
23). More specifically, Tenets argues that
...I gave the President very intimate understanding of what we were
doing operationally around the world, particularly as we got into a
high-threat period, in terms of disruption operations, countries I was
contacting, things I might need from other policymakers to aid and
abet my efforts. So there was a clear understanding of what we were
doing around the world to deal with this problem. (p. 24)
Due to his frequent contact with President Bush and other members of the
administration, Tenet was able to relay a detailed understanding of the threat posed by
al Qaeda and efforts to address the problem.
Despite Tenet's frequent contacts with the President throughout the spring and
summer of 2001, Tenet had no contact with the President at all in August. Tenet
contends that even with such a high threat period, he did not see the President nor talk
to him on the phone. It was not until sometime after the September 4th Principals
Meeting, which Bush was not present at, that Tenet had contact with the President.
He maintains that "I didn't see the President. I was not in briefings with him during
this time. He was on vacation. I was here" (Tenet 2: 42).
Urgency of Threat
In addition to the frequency of contact with the Bush administration about the
threat, Tenet makes clear, that the sense of urgency throughout the rest of the
government was widespread. Numerous agencies began taking actions to prevent the
anticipated attacks, largely due to Tenet's efforts.

...by spring and summer, everybody was seized with the urgency of
this nature by virtue of what I was telling them, and by this time period
the CSG is meeting every day. We're taking actions to undertake
disruptions. The Defense Department is taking security precautions at
its facilities, the State Department is taking security precautions at
facilities overseas. The CSG is issuing advisories to the FAA ... All I
can tell is that the policymakers got it because I talked to all of them
about it and they understood the nature of what we were dealing with.
(Tenet 1 :32).
Even though the government was in a high-state of alert, the entire nature of the threat
was not understood. Tenet declares that "warning was well understood, even if the
timing and method were not" (Tenet 2:18).
Principals Meetings
Even though policymakers understood the high threat level that characterized
the spring and summer of 2001, neither the NSC Principals Committee nor the
Deputies Committee held meetings around the threat. Tenet disagrees with the
suggestion made by Richard Clarke that regular Principals Meetings could have
prevented the September 11 attacks. Urging a focus on future prevention rather than
on mistakes of the past, Tenet argues that more frequent meetings wouldn't have
made a difference.
With respect to everybody, going to more meetings isn't necessarily
going to help, okay? And different policymakers are going to basically
. communicate in different ways. So one size doesn't fit all, and you
have to judge. I can only give you personal perspectives from where I
-sat. (Tenet 1 :34)
Agreeing with Tenet's assertion that more frequent meetings wouldn't have prevented
9/11, Commissioner Gorelick goes on to specify what the meetings could have
accomplished, despite systemic problems.
The purpose of the meetings was to use essentially brute force to break
through walls and barriers and seams and processes that were
broken ... in the absence of those systematic fixes, all you can do is use
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brute force to bring everyone to the table and say: What do you know?
(Tenet 1:34)
Bringing together key officials through a Principals Meeting would have conveyed the
magnitude ofthe threat at hand and provided a forum by which to coordinate a
response. Despite the success ofregular Principals Committee meetings during the
Millennium threat period, Tenet maintains that more meetings would not have helped.
Nature ofthe Threat
Although it was clear throughout the government, Tenet claims, that attacks
were imminent, many anticipated that the attacks would occur abroad. When asked
by Comm.issioner Gorelick whether the CIA limitedits reporting to overseas targets,
Tenet replied
we did not have the same kind ofgranularity inside the country, nor
did the reporting take us, in a tactical sense, to give us the kind of
specificity we needed to give us opportunities to do things that would
have led us to conclude that the plot was inside the United States now.
(Tenet 1: 31)
It was not a matter oflimited report ofdomestic threats, instead the level ofdetailed
information was just not available to the CIA. Regardless, Tenet asserts that "we all
understood Bin Laden's attempt to strike the homeland, but we never translated this
knowledge into an effective defense ofthe country'' (Tenet 2: 19).
August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing
The origins ofthe August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) titled
"Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the U.S.," which suggested the possibility ofa
domestic attack, raised question as to whether the document was generated internally
. by the CIA or was in response to questions by the President. In response to
Commissioner Kerrey' s contention that "the President was worried about the
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possibility of a domestic attack, and that produced the presidential daily, the famous
presidential daily brief on the 6th of August, 2001. And- - you look confused ..."
Tenet replies, "I don't think that's how it happened, but go ahead, sir" (Tenet 1: 41).
Commissioner Ben-Veniste makes poignant that although Condoleezza Rice has
maintained that the PDB was in response to questions by the President, "the authors
of this piece, and others familiar with it, say they have no information to suggest that
this piece was written in response to a question from the President. And indeed, it
goes on to say that it was prompted by an idea from the CIA" (p. 44). Once the
contradiction of the origins of the PDB is highlighted, Tenet firmly holds that "I just
don't know. I don't know what we've responded or what the origin is. I just don't
know" (p. 43).
In Tenet's latter testimony, the confusion over the origins of the August 6th
PDB is clarified. Responding to a series of events, the President raised questions
about al Qaeda's interest in striking the homeland. Although there was no formal
tasking for the PDB to be generated, questions raised by the President were discussed
at a PDB planning meeting. Tenet therefore concludes in a document submitted to
the Commission that "in summary, although the August 6th PDB piece was
technically self-initiated, it was prompted by the President's questions and interest"
(Tenet 2:38).
Summary
The elevated threat period was quite evident throughout the government.
Within the CIA, both Tenet and McLaughlin were at the pulse of the agency. As early
as 1997, policymakers were informed by the NIE that bin Laden and his associates
were surveilling domestic targets, which led the CIA to believe that the possibility of
a domestic attack was increasing. Even though the NSC Principals were not regularly
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convening, Tenet stresses that communication nevertheless occurred through informal
interactions. With the exception of the entire month of August and sometime into
,''

September, Tenetwas in daily phone contact andweekly meetingswith the President.
If information about bin Laden and al Qaeda's intention to strike the homeland had
not been made clear to the President through these frequent interactionswith Tenet, as
he claims itwas, the August 6th PDB further stressed those concerns. As Tenet
clarified, the PDBwas technically self initiated, though prompted by the President's
questions.
Testimony of Cofer Black
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty
Role of the Director of the Counterterrorism Center at CIA
From 1999 to 2002 Cofer Blackwas the Director of the Counterterrorism
Center (CTC)within the Central Intelligence Agency. Reporting principally to the
CIA, Black describes his position as director of the CTC as
reporting to the director of Central Intelligence, but also I reported to
the deputy director for operations on a dotted line aswell as a dotted
line to the deputy director of intelligence ...it's one of these unfortunate
jobswhere you have lots of bosses, and you get lots of advice. (Black
Testimony 133)
After his position at the CTC, Blackwas appointed by President Bush to head State
Department Counterterrorism.
Created in1986 by William Casey, the CTCwas ": ..established under the
Directorate of Operations to help combat international terrorist threats. [Director of
Intelligence] officers serve in its analytic components to provide regional and
functional expertise .: the first permanent unit combining analysis and operations"
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(CIA website). The CTC coordinates both the intelligence analysis and the tactical
operations, thus a crucial point between knowledge and decision. Following 9/11, the
CTC significantly expanded its analytic component and was renamed the Office of
Terrorism Analysis.
In its broadest capacity, the CTC works to counter terrorist threats. Similar to
the NSC's Counterterrorism Security Group (which the CTC had regular participation
in), the CTC's primary role within the CIA was to be the nerve center for terrorist
activities. Black elaborates that "most importantly, we worked to develop our own
operations to advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives by penetrating terrorist safe
havens and collecting intelligence that would both inform policy and enable our own
operations" (Black Testimony p. 98). Illustrating the dynamics of the CTC, and. the
power they had within the agency, Black asserts that
...what mattered to me and the men and women I led in the
counterterrorist center did not depend on the flavor of the
Administration, but rather was driven by what WE thought needed to
get done and our attempts to protect American citizens, property and
interests. (p. 98)
The CTC, at the direction of Black, produced a great deal of information
which shed light onto growing international jihadist networks, including al Qaeda.
Relaying this information to policymakers, Black asserts that "I believe that the record
shows that the U.S. government understood the nature of the threat" (p. 101).
Products produced by the CTC which included " ...personal interactions via
participation in the Counterterrorism Security Group; periodic stand-back assessments
on [bin Laden] and Sunni extremist-related topics; contributing to the annual 'Patterns
of Global Terrorism" (p. 101); each worked to inform government officials of the
threat.
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Action or Inaction on BehalfofState or State Agencies
Throughout Black's co-testimony with Thomas Pickard, former acting director
c ofthe FBI (Pickard's testimony will be analyzed within the FBI section), the
dismissal ofblame is emphasized. Black's opening remarks make clear he's " ...not
here to testify as part ofa political process, or to create another political firestorm
over some perceived allegation ofnegligence or inattention or error by somebody
else" (p. 98). Furthermore, Commissioner Lehman assures both Black and Pickard,
that assigning blame is not a priority; "and please understand that the questions I am
posing to you have nqthing to do with the blame game or finger pointing. Our high
responsibility is to draw the right lessons and to make real achievable
recommendations for change" (p. 103). Focused on preventing future attacks instead
ofthe mistakes ofthe past, the failure ofgovernment officials lay beyond scrutiny.
Bombing ofthe U.S.S. Cole
It was obvious from early on, Black asserts, that the bombing ofthe U.S.S.
Cole in 1999 was undertaken by al Qaeda members. As early as January 2001, in a

report titled "The Intelligence Case," the CTC had made the intelligence case (which
requires a higher burden ofproofthan a law enforcement case) that people associated
with al Qaeda were behind the attacks. However, Black states that
the area that we felt we needed to explore more was proofthat there
was a �lear command/control relationship between the leadership ofal
Qaeda - - Osama Bin Ladin or Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, some one
like that- - that we could actually track to these individuals that
actually executed the attack. (p. 109)
Black continues on to note, however, "we actually did get that, lmight point out, but
that was something like a year, a year and a halflater. So we could say to you
absolutely this is proof positive ofthe intelligence case" (p. 109). As the testimony

proceeds, Black firmly asserts that "...we were able to prove, even in the intelligence
case, there's a direct link between Osama Bin Ladin and the Cole attack" (p. 124).
However, Black makes clear that there was never any discussion within the Bush
Administration of retaliating against al Qaeda or the Taliban for the attack.
Nature of Threat
By the summer of 2001, the increased amount of chatter suggested a near-term
massive terrorist strike. This information was also corroborated by human
intelligence, detentions and disruption efforts. Sources appeared to indicate that the
attack would possibly occur in the Middle East, Europe or quite likely Saudi Arabia.
However, Black states that "none of this, unfortunately, specified method, time or
place" (p. 100).
Even if the CTC was unaware of the timing and location of the threat, those
behind the threat were well known. Black stresses that "...the single issue that
overwhelmingly occupied our attention was Osama Bin Ladin and al Qaeda" (p. 98).
The operations developed by the CTC to address this �hreat included attempting to
track, disrupt and capture bin Laden, gathering intelligence and developing operations
against al Qaeda's chief lieutenants, creating a global counterterrorism network and
developing the Predator. Furthermore, Black makes clear that the Predator was of
high priority to the CTC, despite debates over how to proceed.
Appearing quite uncomfortable, Black carefully addresses the question of
what went wrong, ominously stating, "Well, I'll tell you, I would start from the
standpoint that when I started this job in 1999, I thought there was a good chance I
was going to be sitting right here in front of you. And I was mentally prepared for it
all along" (p. 119). As Black's response continues his uneasiness is portrayed
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through the excessive use of the phrase"you know" (conversely, the phrase was rarely
used until this point in the testimony) and his choppy line of dialogue.
Black makes obvious that CTC did everything it could to prevent the attacks.
He states that"in CTC we heard our director's call. I've heard some people say this
country wasn't at war. I want to tell you, Mr. Chairman, the counterterrorism center
was at war, we conducted ourselves at war" (p. 102). From his perspective, the
people at the CTC were doing everything in their power to thwart the threat posed by
al Qaeda. The nature of the threat was clearly understood.
You'll never hear from us, 'Oh, you know, we didn't get it.' Oh, we
got it all right. We knew what we were up against. We gave it all we
had ...The bottom line here, I got to tell you- - and I'll take part of the
blame on this- - I kind of failed my people despite doing everything I
could. We didn't have enough people to do the job, and we didn't
have enough money by magnitudes. (p. 119)
Although the CTC was well aware of the nature of the threat, it simply was not
enough. A shortage ofjobs and inoney hindered their ability to execute their plans.
,

I

Black concludes" .. .it would have been better if we as a country had made the
commitment to provide our counterterrorist warriors the resources and the numbers so
they could do the best job they could" (p. 120).
Black continues on to reveal how the CIA dealt with a shortage of funds
during the Millennium plot threat period and how that interfered with funding to
prevent September 11th• As funds began to run short, Black approa��ed Tenet about
the situation.
I said, 'Mr. Tenet, you know, we're spending money here; we're not
going to make it to the end of the fiscal year. We're going to make it
to the end of the fiscal year. We're going to be three months short.
We're going to stop and- - you know, we won't be able to operate.' (p.
120)

Black claims that Tenet responded by stating, "Well, you know, do what's right for
the .country; blow it out.' So we did. So we spent- - you know, after the money threat
was over, we spend our time trying to get the money to make up for that which we
spent" (p. 120). When Commissioner Fielding asked Black ifhe requested funds
from Tenet, he replied that he did. He makes clear that "He was aware ofour resource
needs. And he did- - we were the first among equals ofall his highest priorities" (p.
133). Black concludes that it was the CIA that ultimately lacked the funding.
August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing
A reflection ofthe heightened threat period, though not a warning, Black
states that the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) was intended to raise
the possibility ofa domestic attack. Black contends
I think the PDB piece is basically a place marker that is a reminder to
the principals that read these materials that, whereas the tactical
intelligence is pointing to locations overseas, that it is good to be
mindful ofwhat [bin Laden's] ultimate objective is, that is to strike
hard against the United States. (p. 103)
Aware of bin Laden's historical intentions ofstriking the United States on multiple
fronts, Black and the CTC felt it important to remind the President ofthe potential for
a domestic attack.
While questioning how the accuracy ofinformation received by the FBI is
assured, Commissioner Fielding unveils the process by which PDBs come about.
Black explains that
there's an elaborate vetting process. Information is received, raw
intelligence is received, it comes in to personnel that review it, that do
the analysis function. And there are those that write articles for
numerous publications, including the PDB. This particular employee
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was home-based in the Directorate of Intelligence and was serving in
the Counterterrorism Center. (p. 132)
Unsatisfied with Black's response, Commissioner Fielding presses on as to the
accuracy of the information contained in the PDB. Although Black had not
IJersonally talked to the author of the PDB, he asserts that " .. .I understand that this
officer was in contact with the FBI. In this instance I think that the assumption would
be that the FBI would have confidence in the information that it provided" (132).
Therefore, it appears that the source of the information gathered about bin Ladin's
intentions to strike domestically came from the FBI.
Summary
As director of the Counterterrorism Center in the CIA, Cofer Black was at the
heart of the terrorist threat. Following the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October of
1999, the CTC was tasked with discovering the perpetrators. Once a clear link to bin
Laden and al Qaeda had been established in "The Intelligence Case" as early as
January 2001, the Bush administration had been made aware of al Qaeda's
involvement. Viewed largely as a relic of the Clinton era, the new Administration
decided not to retaliate against al Qaeda or the Taliban for the attack of the U.S.S.
Cole.

From Black's account, the CTC was acutely aware of the nature and the
urgency of the threat posed by al Qaeda. So certain that a threat was going to occur, it
seemed as though it were just a matter of time. In spite of the urgency of the threat,
the CTC was unable to decipher when, where and how. This failure was due largely
to a lack of funds not just within the CTC, but within the CIA. Despite Black's
requests for funding and the CTC's priority within the CIA, Tenet did not have
enough funds to allocate for the looming threat. It is less clear, however, how much
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more funding was needed or what the funds were needed before. Presumably, this is
classified information.
Originating from within the CTC though relying
on information from the FBI,
'
'

the August 6th PDB is argued by Black to be a reminder for President of the historic
potential for a domestic attack by bin Laden. Although Black seems to downplay the
significance of the PDB, amidst such a high threat period a warning to the President
coordinated by both the FBI and the CIA demonstrates its importance.

Central Intelligence Agency Summary
The Central Intelligence Agency was at the forefront of the battle against bin
Laden and al Qaeda. No one understood the nature of the threat better than the CIA.
Fulfilling their role of informing policymakers, Tenet and Black claim to have done
all they could to prevent the attacks. Unfortunately, it was not enough. Even so, the
sense of urgency which engulfed the agency is evident in both Tenet and Black's
testimonies.
Tenet firmly that informal communications about the threat were taking place
regularly, even if NSC Principals Meetings were not being held. Frequent, often daily
interaction (with the exception of the entire month of August 2001) between Tenet
and President Bush and also Condoleezza Rice, illustrates these informal channels of
communication.
Unmentioned in the 9/11 Commission report orin Tenet or Black's
testimonies, was another example of this form of communication. On July 10, 2001,
Black laid out the fragmented case to Tenet that there was an increasing likelihood
that al Qaeda would soon strike the U.S. Sensing that the threat was imminent, Tenet
called National Security Advisor Rice from his car requesting to see her immediately.
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This meeting stood out of the minds of both Tenet and Black as the starkest warning
that they had given to the White House about the looming threat. Also in attendance
at this briefing were Rice's deputy Stephen Hadley and her top counterterrorism aid
Richard Clarke (Landay, Strobel and Walcott 2006).
"For months, Tenet had been pressing Rice �o set a clear counterterrorism
policy, including specific presidential orders called "findings" that would give the
CIA stronger authority to conduct covert action against bin Laden" (Two Months).
By convening an 'out-of-cycle' meeting with Rice, Tenet and Black hoped to.convey
the urgency of the threat at hand and set the government in action. Black stressed that
the threat" ...amounted to a strategic warning, meaning the problem was so serious
that it required an overall plan and strategy'' (Two Months) and that action needed to
be taken immediately. To further authenticate the warnings being received by the
CIA, Tenet had the National Security Agency confirm them. Concluding that the al
Qaeda communications were in fact genuine, "on June 30, a top-secret senior
executive intelligence brief contained an article headlined "Bin Laden Threats Are
Real" (Two Months). Despite their urgent warning to Rice, both Tenet and Black
walked away from the July 1 0the meeting feeling frustrated and brushed off. It
appeared to them that Rice was not heeding their warnings. As "Black later said,

)

'The only thing we didn't so was pull the trigger to the gun we were holding to her
head" (Two Months).
Within a week of the briefing given to Rice by Tenet and Black, both
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Attorney General John Ashcroft received
a similar briefing about the urgent threat. Although Tenet had outlined the briefing
given to Rice, Rumsfeld and Ashcroft to members of the Commission including
Commi.ssioner Ben-Veniste and executive director Philip Zelikow in a secret
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testimony, no mention of the briefing was included in the 9/11 Commission's report.
Affirming the seeming omission, "the State Department confirmed that the briefing
materials were 'made available to the 9/11 Commission, and Director Tenet was
asked about this meeting when interviewed by the 9/11 Commission" {Landay,
Strobel and Walcott 2006).
Tenet's assertion that "going to more meetings isn't necessarily going to
help ... And different policymakers are going to basically communicate in different
ways" {Tenet 1:34) is quite accurate. However, the effectiveness of these types of
informal communications is questionable. Even though Tenet maintains that holding
regular NSC Principals Meetings would not have made a difference, the need to hold
separate, informal meetings with Rice, Rumsfeld and Ashcroft(all members of the
Principals Committee) seems to indicate otherwise.
In light of such urgent meetings by top-level officials, the CIA's August 6,
2001 PDB appears to be a much greater warning of the coming attacks than
acknowledged by either Tenet or Black. As clarified by Tenet, even though the PDB
" ...was technically self-initiated, it was prompted by the President's questions and
interest" {Tenet 2:38). In contradiction of Tenet and Rice's assertions that the PDB
was composed in response to questions from the President, further investigation by
the 9/11 Commission's staff revealed otherwise. The senior CIA analysts who
authored the document claim that it was not ordered by the Preside!!_t, but instead was
completely self-initiated. Furthermore, their intention in writing the PDB was not to
convey 'historical information' as Rice claims, but rather to " ...remind President
Bush that al-Qaeda remained a dire threat in August 2001 and that a domestic threat
was a distinct possibility, no matter what he was hearing elsewhere" (Sherron 2008:
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378). Nevertheless, Tenet and Black maintain that the PDB was not a warning,
instead it was merely a reminder that the potential for a domestic attack existed.
As early as January 2001, the CIA had developed a strong intelligence case
linking al Qaeda and bin Ladin to the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. Although Black
claims that there was never any discussion within the Bush administration of
retaliation for the bombing, such an act was nevertheless justification for a response
to the threat posed by al Qaeda. Even though plans such as the Predator and other
strategic responses were being developed, efforts came too little, too late.
From the testimonies of both Tenet and Black, it appears as though the Central
Intelligence Agency was keenly aware of the threat posed by bin Laden and al Qaeda.
Nevertheless, when, where and how the attacks would occur remained a mystery. A.
major impediment to action, Black cites that lack of funds, not only within the CTC,
but within the CIA as a whole, as the main reason for their failure to prevent the
attacks. Relieving Tenet of responsibility for this failure, Black makes clear that
Tenet did everything in his power to provide the CTC with funding. Even so, it was
just not enough.
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CHAPTER VI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Housed within the Departme°'t of Justice and created by the Attorney General
in 1908, the Federal Bureau of Investigation grew out of a group of Special Agents
made up of detectives and former Secret Service people. Having jurisdiction over
violations of more than 200 categories of federal law, the FBI's duties include
protecting civil rights alongside providing security from international and domestic
terrorism. After September 11th the }:"BI undertook a whole new role with a belated
emphasis on counterterrorism efforts.
Working both domestically and internationally with one another, the FBI
relied heavily on the Central Intelligence Agency, amongst other intelligence
organizations, to provide information about international terrorist threats. At the
1

direction of the CIA, FBI agents were able to identify, track and begin taking lega1
actions against members of al Qaeda living inside the United States. Although
communication might not have been effective enough to prevent the attacks, the FBI
and the CIA were able to work with one another on a variety of counterterrorism
efforts including the East African and U.S.S. Cole bombings (Freeh Testimony p. 30)

__/

As the supreme law enforcement agency in the United St�tes, the FBI is
clearly charged with providing national safety and security. Once the hijackers
entered the country legally and begantraining at flight schools, their illegal operations
fell under the jurisdiction of the FBI.
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Testimony of Louis J. Freeh
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty
Role of the Director of the FBI
Nominated by President Clinton, Louis J. Freeh was the director of the FBI
from September 1, 1993 until June 25, 2001 when he was replaced by his deputy
director Thomas Pickard as acting director. Prior to serving as director of the FBI
Freeh had been an assistant U.S. attorney as well as a federal district court judge both
in the Southern District ofNew York. In his capacity as director of the FBI it was
Freeh'sjob to oversee the Bureau. Thus, the actions and inactions which occurred
throughout the agency during his eight year tenure until the months before September
11th happen�d under his supervision.
Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies
The Federal Bureau of Investigation had been aware of the threat posed by al
Qaeda for a number of �ears, so much so that FBI headquarters had an al
Qaeda/Osama bin Laden unit which was operated out of the New York City office.
As Freeh points out, "...the investigation of al Qaeda was centralized in New York
City. That's were the primary office and the three squads that were established.
ultimately in New York City dealt with the Cole bombing, the East African bombing
as well as the al Qae�a organization in general" (Freeh Testimony p. 20). The New
York City office, Freeh notes, was involved in investigation, intelligence and analysis.
As Freeh puts it "they were the whole embodied knowledge of the United States
government at that time with respect to al Qaeda and its principals" (p. 21).
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With full support of Attorney General Janet Reno, the FBI established a
Counterterrorism Division in 1999 with the mission of controlling and supporting
terrorism cases while also being supervised by headquarters. In addition to the New
York City office, the Counterterrorism Division also h�d a great deal of expertise,
notably the director Dale Watson as well as Debbie Stafford and Mike Rolince.
Through special agent in charge (SAC) conferences and seminars, Freeh states,
information about al Qaeda was disseminated from headquarters and the
Counterterrorism Division to the rest of the field. Freeh makes clear, however, that
the al Qaeda case was being directed out of FBI headquarters and the
Counterterrorism Division, even though it was run out of the New York City office.
Planes as Weapons
Spanning as far back as the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, the FBI had
considered the threat of planes used as weapons in 'special event' planning. Part of
the security planning for events such as the Olympics or Bush's visit to the G-8
Summit, using planes as weapons whether packed with explosives or otherwise
during a suicide mission had been discussed within the FBI and the larger intelligence
community as early as 1996. Successfully thwarting a plot is made easier in these
contexts since the time and the place of the event are known. Although this threat had
been incorporated into standard special event planning, Freeh notes, a set procedure
for how to deal with hijacked airplanes in suicide missions had not been integrated
into domestic protection.
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Interagency Communications
One of the most notable demonstrations of cooperation between the FBI and
other agencies was during the Millennium threat period. Both Freeh and the Attorney
General " ...worked very closely with the National Security Council, with the director
of Central Intelligence, the CIA, military component, civilian components. This was
an integrated and long-term planning operation with respect to the Millennium
threats ..." (p. 30). Furthermore, during their overlapping tenure, Freeh along with
Attorney General Reno, met with National Security Advisor Sandy Berger on a
biweekly basis for 14 or 15 months. During their hour to two hour long meetings
Reno, Berger and Freeh " ...went over every piece of counterterrorism,
counterintelligence case that we had" (p. 48). As a result of these frequent contacts,
Freeh discounts the notion that information wasn't being shared between the FBI and
the NSC. However, Freeh mentions very little about his contacts with Bush
administration officials, particularly National Security Advisor Rice.
Furthermore, Freeh contends that cooperation between the FBI and the CIA
was not unique to the Millennium threat. He states that
my experience in eight years is that there was extremely good
' cooperation between the FBI and the CIA, and that goes back to
matters such as the Cole bombing, the East African embassy bombings
cases. The Alex Station, which you know from your staff was set up
in 1997, the CIA and the FBI together in a station dedicated to al
Qaeda investigations and disruption activities overseas. FBI agents
would regularly accompany CIA officers overseas to exploit al Qaeda
cells and disrupt them. (p. 30)
For years the FBI and the CIA had worked hand in hand to address the threat posed by
al Qaeda. Contrary to popular assertion that the FBI and CIA did not communicate
with one another, Freeh states that "I think cooperation, in my view, was a very
outstanding one for many years" (p. 30).
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Phoenix Memo
Within the bureau, information was not always disseminated effectively. In
contrast to Freeh's contention that" ...the coordination between headquarters and the
field, in my view, was very, very good" (p. 21), information in the field was not.
always given the full attention of headquarters. The Phoenix Memo, as it came to be
known, was sent to the New York City office from the Phoenix office on July 10,
2001. After observing that an inordinate number of individuals supportive of Osama
bin Laden were attending aviation universities and colleges in Arizona, agent Kenneth
Williams became concerned that it was"more than a coincidence." Williams wrote in
the memo that this," ...gives reason to believe that a coordinated effort is underway to
establish a cadre of individuals who will one day be working in the civil aviation
community around the world. These individuals will be in a position in the future to
conduct terror actiyity against civil aviation targets" (Phoenix Memo p. 2)..
In addition to assessing the situation in Arizona, Williams offered
headquarters a plan of action to address the issue. Williams wrote that
Phoenix believes that the FBI should accumulate a listing of civil
aviation universities/colleges around the country. FBI field offices
with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate
liaison: FBIHQ should discuss this matter with other elements of the
U.S. intelligence community for any information that supports
Phoenix's suspicions. FBIHQ should consider seeking the necessary
authority to obtain visa information from the USDOS on individuals
obtaining visas to attend these types of schools and notify tlie
appropriate FBI field office when these individuals are scheduled to
arrive in their area of responsibility. (Phoenix Memo p. 2)
Unfortunately, Williams' suggestions were not carried out before September 11,
2001. When asked about the Phoenix memo, Freeh states that
...my understanding of the memo, mostly what I've read in the
newspapers, is that it was sent to headquarters; it was not decentralized
in the sense that it never made it to headquarters. It was looked at
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there. It was analyzed. People took what they thought was the
appropriate action at the time. (p. 23)
Although all of the leads were allegedly pursued after September 11th, Freeh asserts
that"there was nothing about the information contained in that memo, as far as I've
.read, or as I understand it, that would have led you to September 11th" (p. 23).
When asked by Commissioner Roemer why Williams' suggestions were not
carried out, Freeh points to the difficulties in overcoming federal statutes preventing
educational institutions from providing the FBI with information without a subpoena
or a grand jury request. Commissioner Roemer notes, however, that agent Williams
did not have to overcome these statutes in order to uncover the trend in Phoenix.
Even so, Freeh maintains that" ... I'm not privy to the information your staff is privy
to. From what I've read and heard and talked to, I don't see how that memo
unfortunately gets you to prevent the horror of September 11th• I just don't see it in
any logical, nonspeculative way'' (p. 47).
Hijackers Contact with FBI Informant
Even though Freeh is unable to see how the Phoenix memo could have
prevented the attacks from occurring, he grudgingly admits that contact between two
hijackers and an FBI informant could potentially have prevented 9/11. In the year
prior to September 11th two of the nineteen hijackers had regular contact with a long
time active FBI informant in San Diego. In the best of all circumstances, Freeh
admits, the contacts between the informant and the hijackers could have prevented the
attacks. However, this could only have been possible if the FBI and its informants
had been tasked to find out more information about the two hijackers. Stipulating the
conditions under which prevention of the attacks would have been possible, Freeh
states that

80
... it would have been helpful for the FBI at that particular point in
time to know the names of those two individuals; that the information
which was generated in the January 2000 physical surveillance, not by
the CIA but by a liaison agency- - if that information and the initiation
for that surveillance, which were phone calls to a central number,
which you're well aware of, which plays an integral role not only in
the East African bombings case but also in the Cole investigation; the,
you know, June meeting when three but not all of the photographs of
those events- - if all of that had worked the way it-could have worked,
and that informant , as well as informants all of the FBI' s domain;
were tasked to find out information about two specific people, you
could have had a completely different result. (p. 46)
Although it is unclear exactly what the FBI had known about the hijackers and the
information provided to the informant, Freeh makes clear that surveillance of the
hijackers and their connections to the East African and Cole investigations was
ongomg.
Summary
As the director of the FBI from 1993 to June 2001, actions and inactions taken
by the agency happened under the supervision of Louis Freeh. Despite frequent
regular contacts with administration officials throughout the Clinton era, Freeh
mentions very little about his interactions with Bush administration officials. During
the Millennium threat period the FBI worked in conjunction with the CIA and other
agencies to successfully neutralize the threat. As early as the 1996 Olympic Games in
Atlanta the FBI had conceptualized and planned for the possibility of airplanes being
used as weapons against U.S. targets even incorporating this threat into standard
special event planning. These special events, however, had the added advantage of
knowing the time and the place of a potential attack; elements which could not be
determined in the 9/11 attacks. Even though hijacked planes used in suicide missions
was incorporated into the threat planning for special events, it had never been
integrated into domestic flight protection.
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Although Freeh maintains that the Phoenix memo could not have led to the
prevention of September 11th, its predictive potential is startling. After being
reviewed by FBI headquarters and the al Qaeda/Osama bin Laden unit in the New
York office, the warnings that a coordinated effort by bin Laden to send his followers
to flight schools in the U.S. went unheeded. Disregarding the suggestions for action
by FBI headquarters made by agent Williams, the FBI was unable to make the
connections in time to prevent the attacks. Further demonstrating the need for agency
wide action were the frequent contacts between an active FBI informant and two of
the nineteen hijackers.
Even though it seems that the FBI and other intelligence agencies were
keeping a close watch onthe individuals at the time, Freeh maintains that their names
were unknown and an agency wide tasking was needed to discover the missing links.
In contrast to Freeh's assertions that communication within the FBI as well as with
other agencies was quite good, cooperation between the FBI and the CIA, internal and
interagency coordination was not adequate enough to prevent the attacks of
September 11th•
Testimony of Thomas J. Pickard
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty

Role of the Acting Director of the FBI
Beginning his career in the FBI in 1975 as a Special Agent, it wasn't until the
resignation of Louis Freeh as director of the FBI that Thomas Pickard was appointed
by Attorney General John Ashcroft to the role of acting director on June 25, 2001
(Federal). His tenure as acting director ended on September 4, 2001 when Robert

Mueller took over as director of the FBI. Prior to his new assignment, Pickard had
occupied the number two position of deputy director since November 1999.
Throughout his tenure as both the deputy director and then the acting director
of the FBI, Pickard had worked first-hand with the threats posed by al Qaeda. For
example, when Director Freeh had been out of town, Pickard was in charge of
coordinating the FBI's response to the African embassy bombings. Moreover, as
deputy director he also had the opportunity to brief White House officials on
counterterrorism issues including the Vice President, the National Security Advisor
and the Attorney General. In both of his capacities within the FBI, Thomas Pickard
had been keenly aware of al Qaeda and the growing threat that they posed.
Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies
Some of the best information on al Qaeda, Pickard asserts, came from the
FBI's investigation of the bombings of the U.S.S. Cole and the U.S. African
embassies. Those arrested in connection with the bombings provided valuable
information and resources by which to identify other members of al Qaeda. Pickard
explains tha_t "we also exploited their pocket letter, cell phones, calling cards, credit
cards and hotel registrations to links to other members" (Pickard Testimony p. 95).
As a result, the FBI was able to identify members of al Qaeda who were inside the
United States and obtain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act coverage on them.
Throughout the spring and summer of 2001, the FBI was well aware of the
heightened threat period. Noting the increased volume of threat reporting, Pickard
makes clear that "many of these threats had great specificity and others were very
general in nature ...There was no specificity as to what, where and when. We knew
the who, but only that it was al Qaeda" (p. 94).

,
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Interagency Coordination
Contrary to assertions that a bureaucratic wall between CIA and the FBI
prevented the sharing of information, there was a great deal of contact between the
two agencies in the months leading up to 9/11. As Pickard illustrates,
I had.regular conversations with the director of the CIA and his deputy,
and the attorney general and his deputy about the threats we were
receiving and to learn if there was anything more that would help us
understand the fragmentary information we had. (p. 94)
Furthermore, much of the chatter seemed to indicate that an attack would occur
overseas, though a domestic attack could not be ruled out.
Acknowledging the assistance of the CIA for the approximately 70 full-field
FBI investigations on suspected members of al Qaeda that had been mentioned in the
August 6th PDB, Pickard makes clear that
...credit has to be given very greatly to the CIA for giving us the
information and for the other members of the intelligence community
that they provided us with information to direct us to look at these
individuals. Otherwise, we're operating in a vacuum, where we don't
know who to be on" (p. 104).
Contesting assertions, similar to the ones made by Rice, that the '70 full-field
investigations' gave the impression that the FBI had the threat covered, Pickard states
that" ...especially with the experience I've had in counterintelligence and
counterterrorism, you can never say you have it covered" (p. 121). As Pickard
repeatedly makes clear throughout his testimony 'you can only know what you know.'
In addition to meeting with members of the CIA, the FBI was also in contact
with Vice President Dick Cheney about the threat. Although Pickard was never given
the opportunity to brief the President or the Vice President on counterterrorism issues,
he asserts that the Vice President was briefed on March 16, 2001 by Director Freeh
and Assistant Director Watson on counterterrorism and al Qaeda's presence inside the
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U.S. As a follow-up, the Vice President met with Freeh at a later meeting prior to his
resignation in late June, though Pickard was not present.
On January 26, 2001, Pickard and Freeh both briefed National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley on counterintelligence and

.

counterrorism issues including bin Laden and al Qaeda. Again in February, Pickard
met with Rice to briefher on the Khobar Towers bombing, since the end ofthe statute
oflimitations on it was approaching. However, bin Laden had not come up at the
second meetings. In total, Pickard states that he had at least two meetings with Rice.
One week after Pickard took over as acting Director ofthe FBI on June 22nd,
he began to briefAttorney General John Ashcroft on terrorism. Meeting somewhere
between seven and eight times with Ashcroft, Pickard would begin each meeting
discussing either counterterrorism or counterintelligence, though at least three
meetings specifically pertained to counterterrorism. After the FBI's director of
counterterrorism Dale Watson had informed him that the CIA was concerned that an
attack would soon occur, Pickard relayed this information to Ashcroft on at least two
occasions. Surprisingly, after hearing this warning about a potential terrorist attack,
Ashcroft told Pickard that he 'did not want to hear about this anymore' (p. 136).
Ifit was not evident from his verbal responses, Pickard got the impression that
terrorism was not a top priority for the Attorney General in another way. Pickard
makes clear that "[terrorism] was a top tier for the FBI. The attorney general on May
10th issued a budget guidance for us, and I did not see that as the top item on his
agenda" (p. 116). Following the issuance ofthe budget guidance, Pickard sought to
appeal the decision in hopes ofgaining more funds for counterterrorisni. After
discussing the issue with Ashcroft in August and gaining his approval for appeal, it

was not until September 12, 2001 that Pickard received the denial for increased
funding for counterterrorism from the Attorney General.
Communication within the FBI
Communicating information about the threat down the chain of command
within the FBI, Pickard".'..spoke both collectively and individually with each of the
special agents in charge (SAC) of the FBI's 56 field offices and with the assistant
directors at FBI headquarters about what we knew and what we should be doing" (p.
94). In greater detail, Pickard asserts that
I spoke to each of the 56 SACs during the month of July, between July
and July 31tst, each of them individually. I had them on the phone,
secure conference call with the assistant directors from the
Counterterrorism, Dale Watson; Counterintelligence, Neil Gallagher;
and the assistant director of the Criminal Division, Rubin Garcia. We
discussed their performance, and in addition to that hour-and-a-half
discussion of their performance in their field office and their
commitment to the counterintelligence and counterterrorism efforts,
we also discussed during that phone call the threat level. (p. 111)
9tli

Despite Pickard's assertion that he had talked personally with each of the 56
SACs about the threat, there were still SACs who were not informed. Somehow,
neither the SAC in Miami or in New York (six blocks away from FBI headquarters,
Commissioner Roemer points out) were informed of the heightened threat period,
even though the al Qaeda/bin Laden unit operated out of the New York office. In his
"defense, Pickard maintains that he talked to the SAC in Miami on July 18th, and
further explains that"I don't know why they didn't hear it. I spoke to them each
individually, as I said. And in addition I had communications out to them. I don't
understand what more I could have done" (p. 111).
However the breakdown in communication occurred, information had not
been moving up the chain of command as well. As Commissioner Kean points out,
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"during the spring and summer of2001 the Minneapolis office had Moussaoui
detained and they were concerned that he might be part ofa larger plot" (p. 117).
Pickard had not been informed ofthe Moussaoui case· until September 11th even
though the people working on the case reported to the Commission that " ...they were
desperate to get the attention ofheadquarters" (Commissioner Gorelick p. 129).
Commissioner Gorelick furthers states t�at " ...they went to the SAC, and they said
"Would you please call Mike Rolince," the international Terrorism Section chiefin
headquarters, and the SAC wouldn't do it" (p. 129).
In addition to the Moussaoui case, Commissioner Kean points out that "the
New York office began searching for al Hazmi and al Mihdhar, knew that they were
in the country and were searching for them that same summer" (p. 117). It was not
until a few days after September 11, 2001 when the hijackers were being identified
that Pickard was informed that the New York office had been pursuing two ofthe
suspected hijackers. Swamped with information about the threat, the FBI was unable
to identify the most crucial pieces ofinformation needed to prevent the plot.
Immediately following the attacks, the pieces began to slowly come together.
Interestingly enough, Pickard notes that "on the afternoon of September 11th, we had
reports all over the map. We had situations where_ we thought the Department of
State had been bombed. We thought bombs were going off. We thought the Sears
Tower was evacuated, and things like that" (p. 131). As a result, Pickard
contacted all
�-.
56 SACs again in an attempt to gather as much information about the attacks as
possible. Shortly thereafter Pickard was informed ofthe Moussaoui case and the
investigations by the New York office.
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Summary
Serving as deputy director of the FBI from 1999 until he became acting
director following Louis Freeh's tenure from June 25, 2001 until September 4, 2001,
Thomas Pickard was at the center of the bureau's struggle to uncover the 9/11 plot.
. Illustrating the amount of coordination between the CIA and the FBI, Pickard credits
the CIA for directing the FBI's attention to members of al Qaeda within the U.S.
Having regular contact with Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisors
Sandy Berger and Condoleezza Rice and Attorney General Ashcroft, Pickard
frequently briefed the Cabinet members on the threat posed by al Qaeda. When faced
with repeated warnings that an attack by al Qaeda's would soon occur, Attorney
General Ashcroft informed Pickard that he 'did not want to hear about this anymore'
(p. 136).
Demonstrating his role in disseminating information about the heightened
threat period to the 56 field offices, Pickard maintains that each office had been
informed despite claims by the SACs in Miami and New York that they had not
received word. If information was having a difficult time flowing down the chain of
command, it also had difficulty flowing up. Field agents in the Minneapolis office
were having difficulties gaining the attention of FBI headquarters about the
Moussaoui case, fearing that he was part of a larger plot. Despite significance of the
case in such a heightened threat period, Pickard was not made aware of Moussaoui
until September 11th• In addition to Moussaoui, the FBI was also tracking two of the
hijackers, al Hazmi and al Mihdhar, throughout the year prior to 9/11. However,
Pickard had not been informed of the FBI's interest in the hijackers until September
11th• Though the reason remains unclear, information about the urgent threat posed
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by al Qaeda was known on multiple levels throughout the bureau but was not
effectively communicated.between FBI headquarters and the field offices.
Federal Bureau of�vestigation Summary
Considering the testimonies of both Louis Freeh and Thomas Pickard helps to
reconstruct the actions and inactions of the FBI in the months leading up to 9/11.
Both admitting their awareness of the heightened threat period, Freeh and Pickard
reveal different elements of a discombobulated story. In comparison to Freeh's vague
testimony, Pickard's account provides great detail and specificity about the flow of
information down and chain of command within the FBI as well as with other
agencies.
As Pickard makes clear, he had been in contact with each of the 56 SACs as
well as FBI headquarters throughout July 2001 and had discussed the increased threat
period as well as their performance on counterterrorism issues. Despite assertions
that neither the Miami office nor the New York office (which housed the al Qaeda/bin
Laden unit) were informed of the increased threat period, Pickard maintains that "I
don't know why they didn't hear it. I spoke to them each individually, as I said. And
in addition I had communications out to them. I don't understand what more I could
have done" (Pickard p. 111).
Throughout 2001 both Pickard and Freeh were in frequent contact with
members of the Bush administration. Shortly after the new administration took office
in January 2001, Pickard and Freeh met with newly appointed National Security
Advisor Rice and her predecessor Berger t� discuss counterintelligence and
counterterrorism issues including al Qaeda and bin Laden. Briefed by Freeh at least
twice, Vice President Cheney had been informed of al Qaeda's presence inside the
U.S as early as March 21, 2001. As the threat began to escalate throughout the
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summer, Pickard began to inform Attorney General Ashcroft of the imminent nature
of the attack. Shockingly, Ashcroft responded by stating that 'he didn't want to hear
anything more about this.'
The FBI investigations of the U.S.S. Cole and African embassy bombings
yielded a wealth of information about al Qaeda and its operatives. The FBI relied
heavily on the CIA to inform them of the nature of the threat and draw their attention
to al Qaeda members inside the U.S. Dispelling the contention that the FBI and CIA
didn't communicate with one another, Freeh states,"I think cooperation, in my view,
was a very outstanding one for many years" (Freeh p. 30). Pickard also takes this
position, recognizing that"...credit has to be given very greatly to the CIA for giving
us the information and for the other members of the intelligence community that they
provided us with information to direct us to look at these individuals. Otherwise,
we're operating in a vacuum, where we don't know who to be on" (Pickard p. 104).
Stemming from these efforts, the FBI was able to identify members of al
Qaeda inside the U.S. and even obtain PISA coverage to begin tracking two of the
nineteen hijackers, al Hazmi and al Mihdhar, in the year prior to 9/11. Even more
startling, the hijackers rented a room from and lived under the same roof as an active
FBI informant, who supplied information about Islamic terrorist groups such as
Hamas and Hezbollah to the FBI. Additionally, the FBI also admits that a San Diego
case agent was at least aware that the two Saudis were renting a room
--- from the
informant (Bash, Arena and Ensor 2002). Although the hijackers were living right
beneath the noses of the bureau, the FBI failed to task its field offices and informants
to gather more information about them. Had this occurred, Freeh admits that
September 11th could have possibly been prevented.

On July 10, 2001 agent Kenneth Williams sent a m�mo to the New York
office as well as FBI headquarters detailing his observation that a large number of
followers of bin Laden were attending aviation schools in Arizona. Based on his
observations, Williams feared that a coordinated effort was underway to place these
individuals into positions where they might undertake terrorist activities against civil
aviation targets. In the Phoenix memo, Williams laid out a recommended plan of
action including discussing the matter with other intelligence agencies, tasking the
bureau for any information that might support these suspicions and faking necessary
steps towards gaining visa information from the U.S. Department of State on
individuals attending flight schools throughout the U.S.
Even amidst a heightened threat period, both .FBI headquarters and the New
York office failed to follow any of Williams' recommendations. Knowing only what
he had read in the newspapers, Freeh contends that the Phoenix memo was received
and the appropriate actions were taken. Despite its chilling accuracy, Freeh maintains
that "there was nothing about the information contained in that memo, as far as I've
read, or as I understand it, that would have led you to September 11th" (Freeh p. 23).
Zacarious Moussaoui was taken into custody by the FBI after overstaying his
visa on August 15, 2001. The decision to take Moussaoui into custody after
overstaying his visa was done deliberately in hopes of neutralizing the terrorist threat
he was believed to have posed. Drawing attention to himself at a ¥inneapolis flight
school due to his interest in flying a Boeing 767 without having any previous
experience flying, Moussaoui's jihadist beliefs further raised the FBI's suspicion
about his intentions. Within days following his arrest, suspicions were confirmed
when the French Intelligence Service reported that Moussaoui had affiliations with
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radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama bin Laden
(Rowley 2002).
As agents from the Minneapolis office approached their supervisory special
agent in charge about the case urging him to contact counterterrorism experts at the
· New York office and headquarters, they faced resistance. Disputing the probable
cause necessary to obtain a warrant to search the contents ofMoussaoui's laptop, FBI
headquarters refused to approve the request. A FBI division legal advisor for 12 years
and an FBI agent for over 21 years Colleen Rowley, who was involved in the case,
contends that personnel at FBI headquarters"...continued to, almost inexplicably,
throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis' by-now desperate efforts to obtain a
FISA search warrant, long after the French intelligence service provided its
information and probable cause becanie clear" (2002). In what Rowley calls"a
desperate 11th hour measure to bypass the FBIHQ roadblock," the Minneapolis
division went directly to the CIA's counterterrorism center and was later scolded by
FBI headquarters personnel. Unfortunately, it was not until September 11, 2001 that
the FISA warrant was granted.
Disregarding the frequently offered excuse that 'hindsight is 20-20,' Rowley
notes that
...the only main difference between the information being submitted to
FBIHQ from an early date which HQ personnel continued to deem
insufficient and the actual criminal search warrant which a federal
district judge signed and approved on September 11th, was the fact
that, by the time the actual warrant was obtained, suspected terrorists
were known to have highjacked planes which they then deliberately
crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. To say then, as
has been iterated numerous times, that probable cause did not exist
until after the disastrous event occurred, is really to acknowledge that
the missing-piece of probable cause was only the FBl's (FBIHQ's)
failure to appreciate that such an event could occur. (Rowley 2002)

Therefore, the evidence of probable cause provided to FBI headquarters to obtain
PISA coverage on Moussaoui neither improved nor changed from mid-August·until
September 11. The only failure was FBI headquarters' inability to conceive the
attacks.
Even though they had received the Phoenix memo just three weeks earlier,
FBI headquarters did not disclose to the Minneapolis office that there were other
reports of individuals connected to bin Laden training at aviation schools in the U.S.
Likewise, headquarters also did not disseminate information about the Moussaoui
case to other offices. In congruence, both Pickard_ and Freeh claim that they were not
informed of the Moussaoui case before 9/11.
Further criticizing the actions of the FBI in her whistle blowing letter to
director Robert Mueller, Rowley expressed her shock and disappointment that the
supervisory special agent who was blocking Minneapolis' agents attempts to gain a
warrant, his unit chief and other responsible headquarters personnel were not
investigated but rather remained in their positions and were promoted. She argued
that this supports the notion that individuals occupying lower ranks within the bureau
are aggressively investigated for misconduct while those at the top often escape
scrutiny.
Rowley's notion that those at the highest ranks within the FBI often escape
serious investigation for their misconduct is evident in both Freeh and
---- Pickard's
testimonies. As the director of the FBI in the months leading up to 9/11, Freeh's
actions and inactions went largely unexamined by the Commission. Claiming
ignorance about many of the issues raised by the Commission, it is surprising that the
highest ranking official within the agency can know so little about the internal
functioning of the FBI. Ironically, much of what is known about Freeh's interactions
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with members of the Bush administration is revealed through Pickard's testimony
rather than his own. Even though Pickard reveals greater detail about the highest
levels of the FBI than does Freeh, both officials escaped accountability for their
failures.
Had FBI headquarters acted on the suggestions of agent Williams, the events
of September 11th might have turned out differently. Pieci�g together elements of the
Phoenix memo, the Moussaoui case and the tracking of al Hazmi and al Mihdhar, a
number of clear warnings emerges. A formal tasking issued by top level FBI officials
could have helped to connect each of the isolated cases to a larger coordinated plot.
As director and acting director of the FBI, both Freeh and Pickard bore the
responsibility for such a directive. Alleging ignorance, the highest ranking officials
in the FBI were not informed of the Moussaoui case or the Phoenix memo until after
9/11, despite the imminent threat posed by al Qaeda.
Regardless of the efforts of FBI field agents including Kenneth Williams and
Colleen Rowley, detailed information which could have prevented the attacks was
overlooked by personnel at FBI headquarters, including both director Freeh and acting
director Pickard. For whatever reason, FBI headquarters was not fully considering
cases brought forth by the field offices. Although the lower ranking members of the
FBI were taking actions to disrupt and prevent the attacks, it appears that FBI
headquarters not only neglected information within the bureau, but --.
in the case of
Moussaoui intentionally blocked the means to pursue crucial leads. Perched at the top
of the FBI bureaucracy, both director Freeh and acting director Pickard were
responsible for ordering a bureau wide assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda.
Freeh and Pickard's failure to task the agency, a responsibility clearly within their
domain, implicates them in the resulting terrorist attacks.
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CHAPTER VII

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
A joint organization between the United States and Canada, the North
American Aerospace Defense Command was established in 1958. Located in
Colorado, NORAD's headquarters are lodged within the Cheyenne Mountain
Operations Center. NORAD is divided into three subordinate regional headquarters
located at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska, Canadian Forces Base in Winnipeg,
Manitoba and Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida which receive orders from the
commander (NORAD).
"A component of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the
Continental NORAD Region (CONR) provides airspace surveillance and control and
directs air sovereignty activities for the continental United States (CONUS)"
(NORAD). Of its two defense sector the Western Defense Sector is located at
McChord Air Force Base in Washington and is responsible for defense of the Western
region of the U.S. The Eastern Defense Sector, headquartered in Rome, New York,
was in charge of handling the events that unfolded on 9/11. "Co-located with
Headquarters First Air Force (Air Forces Northern) at Tyndall, FL., a Combined Air
Operations Center coordinates CONR sector activities and executesJhe NORAD air
sovereignty mission for the continental United States" (NORAD).
On the morning of September 11, 2001, it was the responsibility of the North.
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to protect the United States and
its citizens against air attack. General McKinley elaborates, stating that"...our
mission was to defend North America, to surveil, to intercept, to identify, and if
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necessary to destroy, those targets which we were posturing were going to come from
outside our country'' (McKinley et al. no page number).
A remnant of the Cold War era and the threat of Soviet long-range bomber
penetration, NORAD's main focus was on the 'air defense identification zone' which
extends 100 to 200 miles off of the coast. Therefore, NORAD was positioned around
the perimeter of the United States, granting little attention to the central regions.
Even though NORAD's responsibilities included protection from domestic threats,
much of its attention was directed outwards at threat coming from overseas.
Nevertheless, it was NORAD's responsibility to defend the North American air space
from both internal and external threats.
As Commissioner Gorelick points out, NORAD's foundational documents
clearly establish its domestic jurisdiction over the United States. Even though
NORAD's attention may have been directed to threats coming from overseas, its
responsibility also included threats from within. Gorelick ·states that
it has two missions, and one of them is control of the airspace above
the domestic United States, and aerospace control is defined as
providing surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the
United States. To me that air sovereignty concept means that you have
a role which, if you were postured only externally you defined out of
the job. (Myers et al. p. 50)
Although assertions abound that NORAD was postured outward on 9/11, Gorelick
makes clear that their mission nevertheless included protection from domestic threats.
---,

In contrast to the frequent assertions that NORAD's defense was focused
outward on threats coming from abroad, Commissioner Lehman points about that the
breakdowns in communicatic;m that morning had little to do with this distinction. As
Lehman makes clear
...what disturbs us most is that the glitches in command and control
are glitches that had really nothing to do with the fact that it was an

internal rather than external, because in the justification for
maintaining NORAD, of course, the possibilities of intercepting
hijacked airliners was part of the justification from the beginning,
although the expectation was that they would be foreign airliners and
incoming. (p. 43)
Be it foreign or domestic, intercepting both types of hijacked airliners falls within
NORAD's mission and procedures were in place to deal w:ith both threats.

Testimonies of Major General Craig McKinley, Major General Larry Arnold, and
Colonel Alan Scott
Held on the second day of the twelfth public hearing of the 9/11 Commission
on May 23, 2003, the panel titled "Milit ary Aviation Authorities on September 11,
2001" hosted a number of prominent military officials responsible for airspace
defense. Questioned simultaneously, the testimonies of Major General Craig
McKinley, now retired Major General Larry Arnold and Colonel Alan Scott are
interwo_ven. As such, their testimonies will be examined collectively rather than
independently. It is important to note that none of these officials were placed under
oath.
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty
Roles and Responsibilities
Acting as a representative for NORAD, Major General Craig McKinley
became the commander First Air Force, continental U.S. NORAD on 1 st August 2002.
After examining the nature of the questions the Commission proposed to ask of him,
McKinley invited Major General Larry Arnold (now retired), commander of the First
Air Force on the morning of September 11, 2001, to join him. As McKinley explains,
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First Air Force is a subordinate command of Air Combat Command,
and is responsible to the North American Aerospace Defense
Commander for the execution of the air defense mission to protect our
nation. First Air Force, as NORAD's continental United States
NORAD region, is responsible for the air defense of the continental
United States under the NORAD agreements. (no page number)
As the commander of First Air Force on 9/11, Larry Arnold was at the center of the
NORAD's response to the attacks. Additionally, Colonel Alan Scott (also now
retired), who was recruited as the best expert on the chronology of NORAD's
timeline of events, was working alongside Arnold that morning.
NORAD's defense was broken down into three sectors on September 11th;
NORAD continental region located in Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs,
the air operations center at Tindel Air Force Base in Florida and the Northeast Air
Defense Sector at Rome, New York. That morning, both Arnold and Scott were
working to coordinate NORAD's response at Tindel Air Force Base. McKinley, on
the other hand, was directly experiencing the attacks while he was at the Pentagon.
· Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies

Awareness of Threat
According to General McKinley, there was no available intelligence
information within NORAD or DOD which indicated a threat to commercial aviation
- -.

prior to the attacks. He further articulates that "information from the daily Joint
Chiefs intelligence report on the morning of September 11th indicated no specific
threats within the country." When asked about whether NORAD had considered the
use of airplanes as weapons by terrorists, McKinley responds by stating that that
information was not available to them at the time.
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Commissioner Ben-Veniste goes on to remind McKinley of multiple well
known instances in which terrorists used or planned to use airplanes as weapons
including: the crash of a small plane onto the White House lawn on September 12,
1994, in December 1994 an armed Algerian Islamist terrorist hijacked an airliner
threatening to crash it into the Eiffel Tower, 1996 planning for possible airplanes
flying into the stadium of the Olympic games in Atlanta, intelligence information
from October 1996 about an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and
crash it into Tel Aviv,: intelligence information from August 1998 about a group of
unidentified Arabs planning to fly an explosives laden plane from overseas into the
World Trade Center, September 1998 intelligence.information that bin Laden might
be planning to fly an aircraft with explosives on board into a U.S. airport, intelligence
information from August 2001 about a plot to either bomb the U.S. Embassy in
Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it, and in July 2001 information
about possible attacks using airplanes during the G-8 Summit.
Following Ben-Veniste's overview of available information, McKinley
concedes that "it's obvious by your categorization that those events all took place and
that NORAD had that information." In retrospect, McKinley agrees that there could
have been better preparedness by NORAD to meet the threat of terrorist using
airplanes as weapons based on available information at that time.
War Games
Even if NORAD had not been aware of the threat to civil aviation prior to
9/11 or the use of planes as missiles, it regularly coordinated exercises to help prepare
for hijacking scenarios. Prior to September 11th NORAD ran multiple exercises
which simulated varying hijacking scenarios. For example, Amalgam Virgo 01

conducted June 1-2, 2001, " ...was an exercise·created to focus on peacetime and
contingency NORAD missions. One of the peacetime scenarios that is and has been a
NORAD mission for years is support to other government departments. Within this
mission falls hijackings" (McKinley). Even though McKinley maintains that
NORAD's mission was not geared towards domestic threats, the routine exercises
within Amalgam Virgo provided experience in cooperating with domestic agencies,
such as the FAA, in handling hijacked aircraft.
In fact, on the morning of the attacks NORAD was in the process of running
an exercise. As Gen. Arnold makes clear, "...we were in the middle of a NORAD
exercise at that particular time, which means that basically our entire staff was
'

'

'

focused on being able to do the air operations center mission, which was our job to
do." As a result, there was a great deal of confusion as to whether or not the attacks
were part of the exercise. Even Arnold himself was uncertain:
And I was upstairs in our facility, immediately went downstairs, picked
up 'the phone, asking on the way to my staff, 'Is this part of the
exercise?' Because quite honestly, and frankly we do do hijacking
scenarios as we go through these exercises from time to time. But I
realized that it was not. This was real life.
Although it had been a long time since a hijacking had last occurred, Arnold claims
that the exercise actually helped to prepare NORAD for the attacks. He maintains
that " ...we had reviewed the procedures of what it is we do for a hijacking, because
we were in the middle of an exercise. So we were pretty well familiar with those
procedures, and of course we have our own checklist that we follow."
NORAD Timeline
Laying out NORAD's timeline of the events of September 11, 2001, Colonel
Alan Scott walks the Commission through a chronology of the attacks. As Gen.
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McKinley makes clear, "...this is the North American Aerospace Defense Command
and continental NORAD region timeline. Other agencies may have other logs that
may have different times." Thus, NORAD's timing and version of events that
occurred that day may differ from the Federal Aviation Administration's timeline.
At 8:02 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, American Airlines flight 11 (AA 11)
departed from Logan International Airport in Boston headed to Los Angeles. Shortly
thereafter at 8:16, United Airlines flight 175 (UA 175) also left Logan, headed
towards Los Angeles. Three minutes later at 8:19, American Airlines flight 77 (AA
77) to Los Angeles took off from Dulles International Airport in Washington D.C. At
8:43, United Airlines flight 93 departed out of Newark, New Jersey to San Francisco
from Liberty International Airport
Only eighteen minutes after take off (8:20), AA 11 displayed the first sign of
trouble when its transponder was turned off and ceased contact with air traffic control.
· However, it was not for another twenty minutes that the FAA contacted NORAD
about a potentially hijacked plane at 8:40. Once NORAD received notification, F-15
alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts, about 153 miles away from
New York City, were immediately ordered to battle stations by Northeast Air Defense
Sector (NEADS) commander Colonel Robert Marr.
Scramble Orders
Once AA 11 hit the South Tower at 8:46, it became clear that the hijackings
were not part of an exercise and it was necessary for NORAD to issue a scramble
order. As Col. Scott makes clear, "at that minute is when the Otis F-15s were
scrambled." Resulting from a discussion with Col. Marr, Arnold disregarded the
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bureaucratic chain of command and took it upon himself to issu� the scramble order.
Normally, Arnold asserts that
the route, if you follow the book, is they go to the duty officer of the
national military center, who in turn makes an inquiry to NORAD for
the availability of fighters, who then gets permission from someone
representing the secretary of Defense.
Nevertheless, Arnold contends that "I told them to go ahead and scramble the
airplanes and we'd get permission later." Following this, Arnold states that "I picked
up the phone, called NORAD, whose battle staff was in place because of the exercise,
talked to the deputy commander for operations. He s�id, you know, I understand, and
we'll call the Pentagon for those particular clearances."· It only took six minutes for
the F-15s to get airborne making primary radar contact by 8 :53, quickness attributable
to the battle stations order issued by Col. Marr thirteen minutes earlier.
Absent any warning to NORAD about a second hijacked plane and without
turning off its transponder, UA 175 struck the North Tower at 9:02, sixteen minutes
after the first impact at which time F-15s had been scrambled from Otis. "The
distance of those fighters which had been scrambled out of Otis, at that particular
point they were still 71 miles away; about eight minutes out, and going very fast"
claims Scott. Only three minutes later, the FAA reported a possible hijacking of UA
175. Nine minutes after the second impact, the FAA reported the crash at 9:11. At
9:09, F-16s were placed on ba�tle stations at Langley Air Force Bas_e in Virginia;
however, scramble orders are not given at this time. Around this same point, AA 77
turned off its transponder and began to tum back around headed east.
At 9:16, the FAA reports the hijacking of the fourth plane UA 93 which was
veering off course in the Ohio area. Even though AA 77 had turned off its
transponder around 9:09, it was not until 9:24 that the FAA reported its possible
hijacking to NORAD. "And at this moment as well is when the Langley F-16s are
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scrambled out ofLangley'' Scott contends. Only a minute later, AA 77 is reported to
be headed towards Washington D.C. Even though its transponder had been shut off,
primary radar contact had been maintained with AA 77 as it continued towards the
Pentagon.
Coining it the 'first red herring ofthe day', a report from Boston FAA at 9:27
indicated that a fifth plane, Delta Flight 89, was also missing. Scott explains that "we
call that the first red herring ofthe day because there were a number ofreported
possible hijackings that unfolded over the hours immediately following the actual
attacks." However, Delta Flight 89 turned out not to be highjacked and landed at
9:47.
By 9:30, twenty one minutes after being placed on battle stations and six
minutes after the scramble order, the Langley F-16s were airborne and were 105 miles
away from the Washington area. Even though F-16s can fly a maximum speed of
about 1,500 mph at high altitudes and 915 mph at low altitudes, the planes flying out
of Langley did not use this advantage. Without 'going into burner,' McKinley
explains that the "[F-16s], based on their configuration, traveled at .98 Mach, roughly
575 knots, 660 miles per hour, about 10 nautical miles per minute." With two planes
already having impacted the World Trade Center and another plane reported hijacked
and headed towards Washington, the F-16s flew at least 250 mph slower than their
highest potential speed.
Had the F-16s from Langley traveled faster, it may have been possible to
intercept AA 77 before it reached the Pentagon. Confirming this position, Arnold
maintains that
I think that ifthose aircraft had gotten airborne immediately, ifwe
were operating under something other than peacetime rules, where they
could have turned immediately towards Washington, D.C., and gone

103
into burner, it is physically possible that they could have gotten over
Washington, D.C.
At 9:34, the FAA was unable to precisely locate AA 77 and at 9:37 radar data
is lost near the Pentagon. Three minutes later, UA 93 also turned off its transponder
and began to go off course. In response to growing concerns that AA 77 and UA 93
might be heading towards Washington D.C., the closest available fighters stationed at
Langley Air Force Base were sent to cover the air space above the capital. General
Arnold elaborates on the attention of NORAD at the time, stating that "our focus- you have to remember that there's a lot of other things going on simultaneously here,
was on United 93, which was being pointed out to us very aggressively I might say by
the FAA."
On the day of the attacks, NORAD reported that AA 77 impacted the
Pentagon at 9:43. About two weeks later, NORAD changed AA 77's impact time to
9:37- six minutes earlier. Scott explains that
it took about two weeks to discover in the parking lot of the Pentagon
this entry camera f�r the parking lot, which happened to be oriented
towards the Pentagon at the time of the impact and the recorded time is
9:37. And that's why the timeline went from 9:43 to 9:37, because it
is the best documented evidence for the impact time that we have.
Like many of the estimated times contained in NORAD's official chronology of the
attacks, the actual events were reconstructed after the fact and were therefore subject
to alteration.
In the urgency to do something about UA 93 the Secret Service had contacted
Andrews Air Force Base, located ten miles south of the Pentagon, and " ...asked them
to get anything they could airborne, and I think the quote was 'to protect the House"
(Arnold). Arnold maintains, however, that by this time the fighters were in the area
intending to intercept the plane. He states that
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it was our intent to intercept United Flight 93. And in fact my own
staff, we were orbiting now over Washington D.C. by this time, and I
was personally anxious to see what 93 was going to do, and our intent
was to intercept it. But we decided to stay over Washington, D.C.,
because there was not that urgency ...So we elected to stay over D.C.
until that aircraft was definitely coming towards us.
At 10:02 UA 93's radar data is lost. Estimating its impact time at 10:03, UA
93 crashed into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania over forty five minutes after it
was reported hijacked, as it headed towards Washington, D.C. Raising questions
about the flow of information within the FAA that day, at 10:07 the FAA reports that
there may be a bomb on board UA 93, which NORAD estimates had crashed four
minutes earlier. Twelve minutes after its impact, the FAA reports that UA 93 had
crashed.
Shoot Down Orders
Although General Arnold had authority to intercept the plane, he had not
received orders to shoot down the plane prior to its crash. He clarifies that
...we intended to intercept that aircraft at some point in time,
attempted to deviate that aircraft away from the Washington, D.C.
area. There was discussion at that particular time whether or not that
aircraft would be shot down. But we, I did not know of presidential
shoot down authority until after that aircraft had crashed.
Instead, NORAD was informed about five minutes after the crash of the pres1dential
authority.
Passed down from NORAD headquarters at Cheyenne Mountain, Arnold is
unclear as to who authorized the shoot down orders.· He contends that "I do not know .
who issued it. It is my understanding that it was issued by the president, or the vice
president in his stead, that that order was issued. And it was issued around the time
that we decided to put all the aircraft on the ground..." Clarifying the responsibility,
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Commissioner Hamilton states that "as of September

11th,

only the president had the

authority to order a shootdown of a commercial aircraft," since the vice president had
)

no position in the military chain of command. Despite the significance of a
presidential shootdown order, the time the notification was received was not included
in NORAD's timeline of events.
Alongside the shootdown order was a declaration of a no-fly zone over the
Washington D.C. area. Arnold elaborates, stating
that particular declaration that I am referring to is a class bravo
airspace within the Washington, D.C. area that was shut down to
aviation, except for military or for law enforcement emergency
response aircraft at that particular time.
If an aircraft could not be determined to be friendly, then NORAD had the authority.
to bring it down.
VP Cheney Orders Overheard by Mineta
Referencing testimony from Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta heard
immediately prior, Commissioner Roemer inquires about a shootdown order of M
77 issued by Vice President Cheney sometime between 9: 15 and 9:20. Mineta admits
that he was not in the room to hear Cheney issue the shootdown order, but inferred
that orders had been given after entering the room. He states that
there was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president,
'The plane is 50 miles out. The plane is 30 miles out.' And when it
got down to, 'The plane is 10 miles out,' the young man also said to
the vice president, 'Do the orders still stand?' And the vice president
turned and whipped his neck around and said, 'Of course the orders
still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?' Well, at that
time I didn't know what all that meant. (Mineta testimony, no page
number)
From Mineta's recount, it is not clear what orders had been given. It is only in
retrospect that he realizes that the Vice President had issued shootdown orders. He
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states that "And then later I heard ofthe fact that the airplanes had been scrambled
from Langley to come up to DC, but those planes were still about 10 minutes away''
(Mineta testimony, no page number).
Mineta's contention that a shootdown order had been issued by the Vice
President for M 77 contradicts NORAD's official timeline of events. According to
NORAD's version, no shootdown orders had been issued prior to the crash ofUA 93over twenty-five minutes after M 77 had struck the Pentagon. Affirming NORAD's
account, Arnold maintains that "I was never aware ofany order given to shoot down
American Airlines 77."
Contact with FM
According to NORAD's timeline, the FM first made 'documented' contact
with NORAD at 8:40 to report the possible hijacking ofM 11. Even after both
planes had hit the towers, Arnold claims that NORAD did not have an open line of
communication with the FM. As Arnold firmly asserts "the continental United
States NORAD region, my headquarters, responsible for the continental United States
air defense, did not have an open line with the FM at that time." As McKinley
explains, however, even if there wasn't contact between continental NORAD region
on Tindal Air Force Base in Florida, the FM's Boston center had open lines of
communication with the Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, New York. When
asked by �ommissioner Ben-Veniste if there was regularly a tape recording made of
these types of open line communications, both McKinley and Arnold asserted that
they were unaware of any such recordings.
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Summary
According to their official timeline, NORAD had not been notified that AA 11
was hijacked until 8:40, at which point Colonel Marr placed the F-l 5s at Otis Air
Force Base at battle stations.' Even though AA 11 had turned off its transponder
almost twenty minutes earlier, the FAA had failed to notify NORAD about the
situation. Once the first plane struck the North tower, Marr consulted General Arnold
about issuing scramble orders. Disregarding the chain of command requiring him to
get consent from higher authorities, Arnold ordered the scramble and then proceeded
to obtain authorization. Sixteen minutes after the scramble order was issued, UA 175
struck the South tower at 9:02 without ever being reported to NORAD as hijacked.
Still an estimated eight minutes away, the F-15s from Otis were 71 miles
oµtside ofNew York. Stationed 153 miles away from NYC, the fighters had only
traveled 82 miles since their departure at 8:46. Accounting for the six minutes that it
took them to get airborne, the F-15s had only traveled 82 miles in 10 minutes, or
about 8.2 miles per minute. Based on this information, it can be concluded that the F15s were traveling around 492 miles per hour (8.2 miles per minute multiplied by 60
minutes equals 492 mph). What remains a mystery is why the Otis F-15s were
traveling less than 500 mph, despite their capacity to travel at maximum speeds of
1,650 mph at high altitudes and 900 mph at low al�itude. It is worth noting, however,
that after the second plane impacted the South tower the F-15s began traveling about
534 miles per hour (71 miles away divided by 8 minutes outside ofNew York City
equals 8.9 miles per minute, multiplied by 60 minutes equals 534 mph).
At 9:09, F-16s were placed on battle stations at Langley Air Force Base in
Virginia. However, it was not until 9:24 that the F-16s were scrambled after
American Airlines 77 was reported as potentially hijacked and headed towards
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Washington, D.C. Even though F-16s can fly a maximum speed of about 1,500 mph
at high altitudes and 915 mph at low altitudes, the planes flying out of Langley did not
use this advantage. Without 'going into burner,' McKinley explains that the "[F-16s],
based on their configuration, traveled at .98 Mach, roughly 575 knots, 660 miles per
hour, about 10 nautical miles per minute." With two planes· already having impacted
the World Trade Center and two planes reported hijacked and headed towards
Washington, the F-16s flew at least 250 mph slower than their highest potential
speed.
On September 11th, M 77 was reported to have impacted at 9:43 after radar
data was reported lost around the Pentagon. Two weeks later, however,.a camera
located at an entrance to the Pentagon was discovered to have captured the collision
on tape. Since this was the best documentation available, the official impact time was
changed from 9:37 to 9:43, a difference of six minutes, to reflect the time indicated by
the camera.
Scrambled at 9:24, the F-16s from Langley were airborne by 9:30. Stationed
105 miles away from the Pentagon and traveling 660 miles per hour, the F-16s were
still 77 miles away when the M 77 hit the Pentagon at 9: 37. At this rate, they were
traveling about 11 miles per minute. However, going by the original impact time of
9:43, the F-16s would have arrived at the Pentagon with minutes to spare (11 miles
per minute multiplied by 13 minutes between being airborne and the_ impacMime
equals 143 miles>105 miles).
Even if the F-16s had made it there in time, it is debatable whether or not the
shootdown orders had been issued. Requiring authorization from the President or
Vice President, Arnold claims that he had not been informed of order to shootdown
M 77. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta, however, claims to have
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overhe�d an exchange between Vice President Cheney and a young aide in which
Mineta inferred that shootdown orders had been given between 9:15 and 9:20. If this
was in fact the case, it is unclear how Cheney was informed of the hijacking before
NORAD at 9:24.
According to NORAD's official timeline, the FAA reportedUA 93 as
potentially hijacked at 9:16. However, it was not until 9:40 that the aircraft turned off
its transponder and began to veer off course. Opting to remain positioned over
Washington, D.C. in anticipation ofUA 93, Arnold makes clear that fighter jets were
in place and had intended to intercept the plane if it came near. Crashing into a
vacant field in rural Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10:02, the situation never made it to
that point. Presidential shootdown orders, Arnold claims, were finally received
around 10:05 three minutes after the impact ofUA 93.

Testimonies of General Richard Myers, Admiral-SelectCharles Joseph Leidig,
General Ralph Eberhart and General Larry Arnold
Similar to the previous testimonies, Myers, Leidig, Eberhart and Arnold were
all questioned simultaneously rather than separately. As a result, their testimonies
will also be evaluated collectively. In contrast to the first set of testimonies by
NORAD officials, the Commission made certain to place Myers, Leidig, Eberhart and
Arnold under oath.
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty

Roles and Responsibilities
Beginning on October 1, 2001, General Richard Myers became the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As such, he was the highest ranking military officer and
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the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the
National Security Council. Thus, Myers was not actually in the military chain of
command that day, but rather an advisor. His responsibilities included strategic
planning, contingency planning and readiness of the armed forces. Additionally, he
was also the former Commander of NORAD from 1998 to 2000.
Admiral-Select Charles Joseph Leidig served as the deputy director of
operations at the National Military Command Center on 9/11 and was the senior
watch officer on duty at the time. Asked a day earlier to fill in for the deputy director
of operations, General Montague Winfield, on the morning of September 11th, Leidig
assumed Winfield's duties at 8:30 a.m. until Winfield took over later in the morning
during the Air Threat Conference call.
Furthermore, General Ralph Eberhart was commander of NORAD and the
U.S. Northern Command that morning. Appointed by and responsible to both the
President and the Canadian Prime Minister, the commander's headquarters are
located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado. Additionally, Major General Larry
Arnold was the commander of the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) on
9/11.
Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies
By June 2004, the Commission had grown frustrated dealing with NORAD.
Commissioner Ben- Veniste specifically notes the st_aff s difficulty i�obtaining
accurate and complete information from the agency. Convinced that NORAD was
trying to hide something, the 9/11 Commission issued its second of three subpoenas
(the first was to the FAA while the third was the New York City government).
Referencing General Arnold's earlier testimony in May 2003, Commissioner
Ben-Veniste charged that General Craig McKinley and General Larry Arnold failed to
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notify the Commission about key information about events that day. Ben-Veniste
states that
'

...it is disturbing to see that there were efforts at after-action reports
which were available shortly after 9/11. There were communications
which our staff has received with respect to emails that reflect some of
the facts on nearly a contemporaneous basis with the 9/11 catastrophe
that reflect a story which unfortunately is different.from the one which
was presented to this commission earlier. (p. 41)

The information uncovered by the Commission's staff as well as subsequent
testimonies provided by NORAD officials dramatically differ from the assertions
made to the Commission over a year earlier in May. Acute attention must be given to
the discrepancies between NORAD official's testimonies in May 2003 compared to
accounts presented below.
Misinformation
Initially, both McKinley and Arnold denied the ex�stence of the tape
recordings of the open-line communications between NORAD's Northeast Air
Defense Sector and the FM's Boston sector at the testimony in May. It was
subsequently revealed, Arnold contends, that
the Northeast Air Defense Sector apparently had a tape that we were
unaware of at the time. And your- - to the best of my knowledge, what
I've been told by your staff is that they were unable to make that tape
run. But they were later able to- - your staff was able, through a
contractor, to get that tape to run. · (p. 42)
However, Arnold maintains that at that time he was unaware of any tapes. It was
through these tapes that the Commission's staff was ultimately able to provide
detailed and accurate information about NORAD's response, which had been missing
from the earlier testimony. Crediting the Commission, Arnold admits that " ... a lot of
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the information that you have found out in your study of this 9/11, the things that
happened on that day, helped us reconstruct what was going on" (p. 39).
Another example contrary to the earlier testimony, NORAD apparently had
not received reports from the FAA that AA 77 was hijacked. Complicating their
official timeline, it becomes unclear how NORAD was able to track AA 77 until radar
contact was lost just before the plane hit the Pentagon without ever being made aware
that it was potentially hijacked. If AA 77 had never been reported to NORAD as
hijacked, Secretary Mineta's testimony that the vice president had issued a shootdown
order of AA 77 between 9:15 and 9:20 even further confuses the reality of that
morning.
As Arnold tries to explain his earlier testimony, the matter becomes even more
unclear. At that time, he asserts, he did not know those facts. Reflecting back to his
earlier testimony, the uncertainty of Arnold's original and current testimonies
becomes evident. Attempting to recall why the F-16s out of Langley Air Force Base
had been scrambled in the first place, Arnold asserts that he thought it had been in
response to United 93, not AA 77 as others �ad claimed. Demonstrating his
confusion, Arnold reflects on his earlier assertions and states
I was trying to remember in my own mind what was it that persuaded
us to scramble those aircraft. · And I thought at the time that it was
United 93. But as I was able to - - we did not have the times when
these things were- - when we were notified of this. I did not have that
information at that time. I didn't have it. (p. 41)
Much of NORAD's story, Commissioner Kerrey observes, gives the
appearance that NORAD took the bullet for the FAA's failure to respond effectively
to the attacks. Kerrey explains that
if you look at what you all did on that day, it's hard to find fault. And
we really haven't uncovered this stuff, it was readily available, the
facts were all there. So it leaves the impression that there is an attempt
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to create a unified story there, and has you all, as I said, taking a bullet
for the FAA, because the FAA should have told you what was going
on - - it seems to me. (p. 53)
Kerrey seems to imply that the FAA, not NORAD, was responsible for failing to
effectively respond to the attacks since they failed to swiftly notify NORAD once it
became clear hijackings had occurred. Even with delayed notification from the FAA,
NORAD was still unable to intercept or shoot down any of the four hijacked planes.
Suggesting a deliberate attempt to create a unified story of the actions and
inactions of NORAD and the FAA, Kerrey specifically points to a White House
briefing on September 17, 2001. He states that "it feels like something happened in
that briefing that produced almost a necessity to deliver a story that's different than
what actually happened on that day'' (p. 53). Unfortunately, General Myers- the only .
witness who attended the briefing- had left the hearing early due to a scheduling
conflict just prior to Commissioner Kerrey's questions. General Eberhart, however,
assures the Commission that "first of all, there's no scheme here or plot to spin this
sfory to try to cover or take a bullet for anyone" (p. 54).
Awareness of Threat
Beginning at the end of May and continuing through August 2001, General
Myers and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs received intelligence information about
the heightened threat period and al Qaeda preparation for an attack against the U.S.
More specifically, Myers· and the chairman both reviewed the August 6, 2001
presidential daily briefing. Despite suggestions within the memo including its title
("Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US") that a domestic attack could occur, Myers
maintains that attention was primarily centered overseas; specifically the Saudi
Arabian peninsula. Moreover, he contends that information about the FBl's
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investigation of Moussaoui was never shared with him. However, he dismisses the
idea that information about the Moussaoui case in combination with the August 6th
PDB might have produced some sort of training scenario to help prepare for such a
threat.
Myers makes clear that "in most of the threat reporting leading up to 9/11, it
was hijacking an airplane and in the normal hijack mode, not in the mode of a
weapon" (p. 48). Even so, both the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as NORAD had
considered integrating suicide hijackings into training exercises. Interestingly, a
positive force training scenario had been proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2000
which simulated a hijacked plane flying into the Pentagon. However, it was rejected
as too unrealistic. In response to the eleven different intelligence reports widely
circulating about the potential for al Qaeda to use airplanes as weapons,
" ...NORAD's own planning staff proposed to include exercises dealing with hijacked
suicide aircraft" (p. 48). This proposal, however, was also rejected.
War Games
On the morning of September 11th, NORAD was involved in a training
exercise called Vigilant Guardian. As a result, both NORAD headquarters as well as
the regional sectors were postured for 'wartime conditions.' Whether being in a
training position helped or hindered NORAD's ability to respond is uncertain.
. Illustrating some of the confusion caused by the ongoing exercise, Commissioner
Roemer reads an excerpt from the Staff Statement:
the FM says at 8:38 in the morning, 'Hi, Boston Center, TMU, we
have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New
York and we need you guys to - - we need someone to scramble some
F-16s or something up there. Help us out.' NEADS says, 'Is this real
world or an exercise?' (p. 75)
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As Eberhart contends, however, only 30 seconds were lost during this particular
interaction. Nevertheless, situations similar· to this one undoubtedly occurred
throughout NORAD amounting to many delayed reactions.
On the other hand, Eberhart feels as though preparation for the exercises
helped to hasten NORAD's response. He maintains that
my belief is that it helped because of the manning, because of the
focus, because of the crews- - they have to be airborne in 15 minutes.
And that morning, because of the exercise, they were airborne in six or
eight minutes. And so I believe that focus helped. (p. 75)
What Eberhart fails to mention is that there is a six minute lapse time between the
battle stations command and the scramble order in addition to six minutes for the F15s to get airborne, thus bringing the time closer to twelve minutes. To be sure, the
response time still fell within appropriate boundaries.
Phantoms
Complicating NORAD's response to the events that morning, a number of
phantom aircraft appeared on NORAD's radars. Although these nonexistent
phantoms appeared r�al to individuals monitoring the radars, none of the officials
elaborate on what exactly a phantom aircraft is and why they were appearing on
NORAD's radars. In their first round of testimonies to the Commission, NORAD
officials failed to mention the miscommunication between the FAA and NORAD that
a 'phantom' American Airlines flight 11 appeared on the radar heading south away
from New York City even after the actual aircraft had impacted the WTC.
In his first testimony, Arnold made clear that the F-16s from Langley were
scrambled in response to UA 93. He later admits, however, that he was wrong. As
Commissioner Gorelick reminds Arnold, the scrambling was actually done in
response to a phantom AA 11.
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...you said that the reason that you were wrong was'that you hadn't
had an opportunity to listen to the tapes, or the tapes weren't
accessible. But, I mean, we have- - I'm just holding four of them - that clearly reflect that the scrambling was done in response to this
phantom American 11, which didn't exist anymore; (p. 68)
As a consequence of NORAD's original contention that F-16s had been launched in
response to UA 93, " ... senior policymakers reassured the_American public that our
military was on it and would have- - would have addressed this threat to the White
House or the Capitol before the threat arrived. And that may or may not have been
the case" (Gorelick p. 69).
Chalking his forgetfulness up to old age, Arnold explains that reviewing the
tape recorded logs (which he had not done prior to his first testimony in May) helped
to refresh his memory.
So, I guess in the way the human mind works, unfortunately, is we try ·
to put things into some kind of category. And then, as we heard this
log, or this log was presented to me, it made more sense to me then
that that's what had occurred. It occurred to us - - we have now had
two airplanes that hit, and we got a call that this, another airplane,
because it was another airplane to me, had been hijacked. (Arnold p.
69)
After being presented with the flight log, Arnold's memory was refreshed. As
Arnold's statement 'because it was another airplane to me' confirms, the nonexistent
phantom aircraft took on the appearance of an actual airplane. Concurring with the
C�mmission's findings, the F-16s were not launched in response to UA 93, but
instead a phantom AA 11, Arnold admits.
A phantom American Airlines 11 was not the only phantom aircraft appearing
on the radar that morning. Revealing the confusion created by the phantoms, amongst
otlier false reports, General Myers states that
in fact, as General Arnold said, we fought many phantoms that day.
There were many phantoms. I remember getting to the NMCC, and we
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got the call that a bomb had gone off in front of the State Department.
So you think, 'Oh, my goodness, what else is happening in this town?'
We got many aircraft calls inbound that morning that turned out to be
phantoms. (p. 46)
Even more startling, at 10:37 the Vice President reported through the National
Military Command Center conference call to have received an anonymous threat that
Air Force One, codenamed Angel, was to be the next target. This too was later
discovered to not only be a phantom, but a myth altogether. As Commissioner Ben
Veniste states "the information, according to the staff, that that was another phantom
report, that there was no anonymous call, there was �o use of the code name Angel for
Air Force One or a statement that Air Force One was to be next, and yet that
mythology was perpetuated for some weeks, if not months, thereafter" (p. 77).
Chain of Command
According to Myers, who spent much of September 11th working alongside
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center
(NMCC), Rumsfeld was in frequent contact with both the President and the Vice
President throughout the day. Although Rumsfeld was in contact with the President
several times throughout the day and at least once through a video teleconference,
Myers particularly stresses, that Rumsfeld had " .. .lots of conversations with the vice
president" (p. 43).
Vice President Cheney had in fact issued shootdown orders the Commission
confirmed. Even though Cheney h.ad apparently issued this shootdown order,
Commissioner Roemer reveals "and this is so surprising, so shocking to some people,
that I believe it's Colonel Marr decides not to convey the vice president's order to the
pilots that are circling around Washington" (p. 61). Even so, according to Roemer by
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this time United 93 had already crashed and it is highly unlikely that anything could
have been done.
Nevertheless, it is unclear exactly why Colonel Marr had not delivered
· Cheney's shootdown orders to the F-15 pilots. As Eberhart explains, Marr's
reluctance to relay the order was due to a great deal of concern about accidentally
shooting down the wrong airliner. Eberh� states "so that was at the forefront of Bob
Marr's concern, is we don't have a confirmed hijacking right now. Let's make sure
we clearly understand this order, convey it properly, so that in fact we do not make a
mistake" (p. 62).
Detailing the difference between intercepting an aircraft and shooting it down,
Arnold makes clear that shooting down a plane is a method of last resort. He explains
"But it's very typical in an intercept, you try to get that airplane, get to the side of
them, get their attention, see if they will respond to you..." (p. 64). Unfortunately,
NORAD was unable to even reach any of the hijacked planes to perform an
interception. While awaiting presidential shootdown authority, Arnold was forced to
consider whether he would issue a shootdown ofUA 93 without first receiving
authorization. Fully expecting to receive presidential authority, Arnold affirms that
he would have issued the order. Luckily, it never came to that point.
National Military Command Center: Significant Event Conference
Once the first plane had hit the WTC, the NMCC was the primary means to
notify senior policy makers that a significant event had occurred. After the second
plane hit, the NMCC became the center of information. At that point, Admiral
Charles Leidig established a Significant Event Conference call, which later was
upgraded to an Air Threat Conference. As Leidig explains, "and what that does is
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that brings senior leadership and combatant commanders into the conference to start
discussing what actions should be taken or might be taken" (p. 71). The significant
event conference " ...is on a special phone circuit and its classified to be able to pass
.information, relay information between very senior leadership all the way to the
White House" (Leidig p. 71).
Throughout the conference call that morning there was a great deal of
difficulty establishing open lines of communication with the FAA. Unsure of exactly
how long the FAA wa� left out of the conference call, Leidig states that "I know that
they were in intermittently. Most of the time they were not in the conference" (p. 72).
As Leidig understands it, " ...there were some compatibility issues between their
secure phone and ours in the Command Center that caused them to drop out of the
conference" (p. 73).
In an attempt to bring the FAA into the crucial decisions being made, a
separate line was arranged.. Communications, however, were distorted. Leidig
admits,
I can say that it did hamper information flow because we were getting
information in a more roundabout way from the FAA. Sometimes it
would come from a local commander to NORAD back to us, or
sometimes it would come on an open line to the operations center. (p.
7, 2 )
Since NORAD was included in the conference call, effectively integrating the FAA
into the communications would have allowed information to flow directly between
the two agencies.
SCATANA
Relinquishing control of the airspace from civilians to the military,
SCATANA was one option which became viable after the second plane had hit the
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towers and it appeared that orchestrated attacks were unfolding as early as 9:03.
NORAD, however, did not execute the procedure until sometime around 11:00.
Another remnant of NORAD's cold war posture, SCATANA was intended to take
control of the airspace in the event of a Soviet bomber attack. Under this procedure,
all navigational aids are turned off and the NORAD assumes control of the airspace.
As Eberhart asserts, " ...and as people approached me with "declare SCATANA" the
problem was that we could not control the air space that day with the radars we had
and all the aircraft that are airborne- - four to five thousand airplanes airborne" (p.
69). Eventually executing a modified version ofSCATANA, navigational aids "Yere
left on, the FAA remained in control while the planes were being grounded and law
. enforcement and rescue aircraft were allowed to traverse the airspace.
Summary
Held over a year after NORAD's official timeline had first been presented to
the Commission, a wealth of information about NORAD's response had later been
uncovered by the staffs investigation. Complicating a thorough understanding of the
events that day, much of Myers, Leidig, Eberhart and Arnold's testimony to the
Commission consisted of distinguishing the truth of what actually occurred that day.
One notable failure, NORAD never bothered to notify the Commission that a
'phantom' AA 11 which continued to appear on the radar traveling south away from
New York even after the actual plane had hit the first tower. As a r;sult, the entire
timeline of events that day, including the Air Force's official report, was skewed.
The phantom AA 11 was only one of the many phantoms that appeared on
NORAD's radars that day. Both Arnold and Myers make clear that NORAD battled
numerous phantoms that day. The source and nature of these phantoms goes
unexplored by the Commission. One thing is clear; the phantom aircraft were a
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source of confusion which plagued NORAD's response. Although they are not
expressly acknowledged as such within the testimony, there is reason to believe that
the phantoms aircraft were a product of the numerous war games being executed by
the military on September 11th•
Even though NORAD officials readily admit that they were running training
exercises (commonly referred to as war games) that morning involving hijacked
aircraft, the Commission was reluctant to aggressively investigate what the exercises
entailed and how they impacted NORAD's response. Just prior to General Myers
departure, someone from the audience interjects, shouting "Ask about the war games
that were planned for 9-11 ...Tell us about the 9-11 war games" (p. 50). To which
Commissioner Gorelick replies "Could you please be quiet, we only have a few
minutes with General Myers, and I would like to ask a question" (p. 50). But the
member of the audience persists, repeating "Tell us about the war games" (p. 50).
What the transcript fails to include, but is evident in the video recording of the
testimony, is that the member of the audience also specifically mentions "Vigilant
Guardian." Commissioner Kean then requests that the audience member be quiet if
he wishes to stay there. The audience member submits and their request was not
honored to interrogate Myers about the military war games that morning.
NORAD maintains that the war games actually helped to better prepare them
for the attacks. Failing on four separate occasions in one day, it is difficult to see how
they were prepared at all. Considering the many instances where employees were
forced to question, 'is this real world or exercise?' the war games likely slowed and
obfuscated a swift and effective response �o the attacks.
Initially, both McKinley and Arnold posited that tape recordings of the phone
(

calls between the FAA's Boston Center and NORAD's sector in Rome, New York

_
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did not exist. Upon further investigation the Commission found that tapes, which
revealed a different version of events that day, were in fact made. For example, the F16s scrambled out of Langley were not launched in response to UA 93 or AA 77 but
instead phantom AA 11. What is more, AA 77 had apparently never even been
reported to NORAD as hijacked.
As Commissioner Kerrey suggests, there seemed to be an attempt to create a
unified story which had NORAD taking a bullet for the FAA. Pointing to a White
House briefing on September 17, 2001, Kerrey comments that "it feels like something
happened in that briefing that produced almost a necessity to deliver a story that's
different than what actually happened on that day'' (Myers et al. p. 53). Although
what those differences were is uncertain, the inconsistencies between testimony by
NORAD officials in May 2003 and later in July 2004 warrant suspicion.
As implied by many of Commissioner Kerrey's statements, there seemed to be
a general consensus that much of NORAD's inability to respond was attributable to
the F AA's failure to promptly notify them of a hijacking. Thus, the FAA bore the
blame, not NORAD. To suggest that NORAD's response to the attacks was even
adequate is to ignore the fact that they did not intercept or shootdown any of the four
hijacked airplanes. Even if the FAA had given NORAD such delayed notification,
NORAD's response was still insufficient.
By June 2004, the Commission had concluded that the Vice_President had in
fact issued shootdown orders. NEADS commander Colonel Bob Marr, however, had
decided not to relay the Vice President's orders to the F-15 pilots, fearing that the
wrong airliner might accidentally be shot. Despite Marr's commitment to following
the chain of command to authorize a scramble, he nevertheless took it upon himself to
disregard Cheney's instructions and in effect issue a stand down order by way of
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om1ss1on. In the end it did not matter since UA 93 had already crashed by the time
the orders were issued.
The National Military Command Center was the coordinating organization
between senior policymakers and military officials including members of the White
House, the Department of Defense and NORAD on September 11th.• After relieving
his superior General Montague Winfield as the director of operations at the NMCC of
his duties at 8:30 that morning, deputy director Charles Leidig convened the Special
Conference call, later to be upgraded to an Air Threat Conference call, between top
level officials. He was relieved from these duties after Winfield's return later that
morning. The FM, however, was left out of the conference due to technical
difficulties. Instead, the FM was getting information to the NMCC indirectly
through an outside line in a roundabout way. This, Leidig makes certain, hampered
information flow. Establishing a direct line of communication between the FM and
NORAD would have helped facilitate a more appropriate response to the attacks.
After the first two planes had hit the towers, the third had hit the Pentagon and
the fourth had crashed in Pennsylvania, NORAD decided to implement a modified
version of SCATANA sometime around 11:00. Once both planes had hit the towers
at 9:03 and it became clear that orchestrated attacks were under way, civilian control
of the airspace could have been commandeered by the military under a provision
known as SCATANA. Under this modified version, the FM remained
in charge of
�-�,
safely landing all commercial aircraft; only military and life support aircrafts were
allowed to remain in the air. To their credit, the FM safely landed over 4,000
.
\· '
·
aircraft without incident by 12:00.
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North American Aerospace Defense Command Summary
A consideration of the testimonies of NORAD officials in May 2003 and later
in June 2004 raises a number of critical questions. To begin, the discrepant
alterations in NORAD's official timeline of events over almost three years after
September 11th begs the question as to why it took so long for NORAD's official
timeline to be straightened out. Moreover, NORAD's failures to even reach one of
the planes in time to intercept them requires an explanation of why standard operating
procedures were tossed aside that day.
The day before NORAD publicly released its first official timeline on
September 18, 2001 a White House briefing was held at which Commissioner Kerrey
notes that "it feels like something happened in that briefing that produced almost a
necessity to deliver a story that's different than what actually happened on that day"·
(Myers et al. p. 53). For the most part, this timeline remained the basis for NORAD's
presentation to the Commission. One notable difference, however, is that UA 175
was reported to NEADS as hijacked at 8:43 and the Otis F-15s were scrambled in.
response to this notification by the FAA. According to Col. Scott's presentation of
the timeline to the Commission, NORAD had never been informed that UA 175 was
hijacked. Furthermore, the September 18th timeline also reflects that AA 77 was
reported hijacked at 9:24, F-16s were scrambled in response by 9:30 and the official
impact into the Pentagon was 9:37. Additionally, by this timeline, UA 93 had never :
been reported as hijacked. By the May testimony, however, it was revealed that UA
93 had been reported hijacked as early as 9:16, over forty minutes before its crash.
Shortly after September 11th, NORAD's story had begun to chang�. Initially,
AA 77 was reported to have struck the Pentagon at 9:43. Not true, it was later
reported. Rather, a camera in a nearby parking lot documented the impact time to be
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six minutes earlier at 9:37. The timing of this event is crucial, as the six minute
difference would have determined whether or not the F-16s airborne at 9:30 from
Langley Air Force base 105 miles away, traveling 660 miles per hour would have
been able to make it to the Pentagon in time to intercept the plane.
Even after two planes had hit the towers and two other planes were reported
hijacked and headed towards Washington, D.C., McKinley reports that the F-16s
traveled about 660 miles per hour even though their maximum capacities allow for
upwards of 1,500 mph at high altitudes and 915 mph at low altitudes. Launched at
9:24 in response to the PM's report that M 77 may be hijacked, the jets never
bothered to 'go into burner' and flew nearly 300 miles per hour slower than they were
equipped to handle. Had the fighters traveled at their full capacity, it is likely that
they would have arrived in time to intercept either UA 93 or M 77.
Similarly, the F-15s launched from Otis Air Force Base also traveled
significantly below their potential. Scrambled at 8:46 after already being on battle
stations, the fighters took six minutes to get airborne. They had only traveled 82
miles of their 153 mile journey to New York by the time UA 175 struck the South
tower. According to Colonel Scott, the F-15s were 71 miles· out, or eight minutes
away. At this rate, the F-15s were only traveling about 492 miles per hour until the
second plane hit, and then accelerated to an estimated 534 miles per hour thereafter.
Even though the maximum capacity of a F-15 is 1,650 mph at high altitudes and 900
mph at low altitudes the fighters hurried to New York at least 300 miles per hour
below their capacities.
It remains unclear why the fighter jets from Otis and Langley were flying at
speeds significantly below their maximum capacities despite the urgent events
unfolding around them. The negligence of these aircraft, whether the result of the
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individual decisions of the pilots or orders from above, contributed to NORAD's
failure to fulfill their mission of domestic air defense.
At the top levels of the chain of command, Secretary Norman Mineta's
testimony reveals that the Vice President was aware of the flight headed towards the
Pentagon and was tracking its trajectory. As he recalls,
there was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president,
'The plane is 50 miles out. The plane is 30 miles out.' And when it
got down to, 'The plane is 10 miles out,' the young man also said to
the vice president, 'Do the orders still stand?' And the vice president
turned and whipped his neck around and said, 'Of course the orders
still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?' Well, at that
time I didn't know what all that meant. (Mineta testimony, no page
number)
From Mineta's recount, it is not clear what orders had been given. General Arnold
maintains that he was never made aware of any shootdown order for AA 77.

It was

not until later that Mineta discovered that shootdown orders had been issued by the
Vice President. "And then later I heard of the fact that the airplanes had been
scrambled from Langley to come up to DC, but those planes were still about 10
minutes away," Mineta explains. If the Vice President was aware that a plane was
headed towards the Pentagon, why wasn't the building evacuated to minimize
casualties?
In the second rendition of NORAD's official timeline, AA 77 was never even
reported to NORAD as hijacked. If AA 77 had never been reported,hijacked, then the
F-16s could not have been launched in response at 9:30, as previously stated. To
make sense of this discrepancy, Arnold reviewed the tape recordings between the
FAA's Boston Center and NEADS based in Rome, New York. Despite initially
denying their existence with McKinley, the tape recordings, �old asserts, show that
the fighters were not launched in response to AA 77 or even UA 93, but instead a
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phantom flight AA 11 heading south. The actual AA 11 had already hit the tower
over forty minutes earlier. This phantom flight also went unreported to the
Commission in the first testimony.
Even though shootdown orders therefore could not have been issued for AA
77, as Mineta's testimony indicated, the Commission revealed that the Vice President
had in fact issued shootdown orders, but instead in response to UA 93. Without first
obtaining the approval of the President, the Vice President had no authority to issue a
shootdown order since he is not part of the military chain of command. Despite
Cheney's frequent public assertions that the orders were made in consultation with the
President, the 9/11 Commission found that " ...there was no evidence to suggest that
Bush had weighed in on the shoot-down order before Cheney had issued it. And there
was pl�nty of evidence to suggest that ·Bush knew nothing about it" (Shenon
2008:265). Therefore, Vice President Cheney had authorized an unconstitutional
shootdown order. In this context, NEADS battle commander Colonel Bob Marr's
decision not to relay the orders to the F-15 pilots circling Washington, D.C. makes
sense.
One explanation that has been· offered for the delayed response of both the F15s from Otis and the F-16s from Langley as well as NORAD's failure to intercept
any of the hijacked·airplanes, is that stand down, rather than shoot down, orders had
been authorized by the Vice President that morning as early as 9:15Jo 9:20.
Reflected in the situation observed by Secretary Mineta, stand down orders could
have very well been issued. Still, a stand down order was something the Vice
President did not have the power to authorize. It must be noted that none of the
witnesses affirm that the Vice President issued stand down orders.

128
As a significant portion of their mission, NORAD was responsible for
surveilling, identifying, intercepting and, if necessary, destroying hostile aircrafts. It
is important to keep in mind that intercepting aircraft is a regular procedure at
NORAD, while shooting down an aircraft is clearly much more serious. On 9/11
however, NORAD failed to even reach any of the four hijacked planes to intercept
them. Not once was NORAD able to intercept any of the planes. Whether or not any
of the fighters could have made it to the scene on time depends on which timeline of
events one subscribes to. No matter the version of events, be there no mistake,
NORAD failed on four separate occasions to defend the U.S. air space on 9/11.
Why NORAD was unable to effectively execute its air defense mission is
puzzling in light of the numerous war games that were proposed and conducted
regularly. Although both McKinley and Myers absurdly claim that neither NORAD
nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered the potential for suicidal hijacJdngs,
evidence suggests the opposite. Ironically, a positive force training scenario had been
proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2000 which simulated a hijacked plane flying
into the Pentagon. It was later rejected as unrealistic.
Similarly, Amalgam Virgo 01 which was conducted June 1-2, 2001, " ...was
an exercise created to focus on peacetime and contingency NORAD missions. One of
the peacetime scenarios that is and has been a NORAD mission for years is support to
other government departments. Within this mission falls hijackings'' (McKinley
testimony, no page number). The routine exercises within Amalgam Virgo, rehearsed
just three months prior, provided experience in cooperating with domestic agencies,
such as the FAA, in handling hijacked aircraft.
Furthermore, CNN reports that sometime between the years of 1991 and 2001,
NORAD ran a training exercise involving a plane crashing into a building. "Military
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officials said the exercise involved simulating a crash into a building that would be
recognizable if identified, but was not the World Trade Center or the Pentagon ...The
identity of the building named in the exercise is classified". (Starr 2004). Contrary to
the claims of NORAD, the threat of using airplanes as weapons was real enough to
plan and practice exercises with this potential in mind.
What the government describes as a "bizarre coincidence," on t];ie morning of
September 11, 2001, "officials at the Chantilly, Va.- based National Reconnaissance
Office had scheduled an exercise that morning in which a small corporate jet would
crash into one of the four towers at the agency's head quarters after experiencing
mechanical failure" (Lumpkin 2005). The National Reconnaissance Office employs
both personnel from the military as well as the CIA and operates many of the nation's
spy satellites. Additionally, the agency was located just four miles from Washington
Dulles International Airport where M 77 departed only fifty minutes before the
exercise was to begin. However, the intelligence agency stresses that this exercise
involved a simulated accident that was not caused by terrorism (Lumpkin 2005).
Annual exercises involving coordination between multiple branches of the
military and intelligence agencies are common. Regular training exercises such as
Global Guardian and its various components including Northern Vigilance and
Vigilant Guardian, all integrate hijacked aircraft into their exercises. NORAD admits
that on the morning of September 11th they were in the middle of a Jr_aining exercise,
though officials are reluctant to disclose much information about it.
According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, on 9/11 NORAD was
several days into its semiannual exercise known as Vigilant Guardian,
NEADS was fully staffed, its key officers and enlisted supervisors
already manning the operations center 'battle cab". ..Senior officials
involved in Vigilant Guardian were manning Norad command centers
throughout the U.S. and Canada, available to make immediate
decisions. (Scott, W.B.)
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Both Arnold and Eberhart agree that the exercise helped rather than hindered
NORAD's response. Although though senior officials may have been ready at their
positions, immediate decisions were not made.
The multiple war games being conducted on 9/11 were one of the many issues
that went unexplored by the Commission. Regardless of the urgings of the frustrated
audience member to ask acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Myers about the
war games planned for that day, the Commission failed to recognize the relevance of
these activities to NORAD's response. More than just Vigilant Guardian, Ruppert
(2004:336) contends that
as it turns out, on September 11th, various agencies including NORAD,
the FAA, the Canadian Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office,
and possibly the Pentagon were conducting as many as five war game
drills- in some cases involving hijacked airliners; in some cases also
involving blips deliberately inserted onto FAA and military radar
screens which were present during (at least) the first attacks; and which
in some cases had pulled significant fighter resources away from the
northeast US on September 11. In addition, a close reading of key
news stories published in the spring of 2004 revealed for the first time
that some of these drills were "live-fly'' exercises where actual aircraft
were simulating the behavior of hijacked airliners in real life; all of this
as the real attacks began.
A truly jarring scenario, if multiple war games similar to these were being
conducted on 9/11, then this would help to explain at least some of the missing
elements of NORAD's multiple versions of the events that day. Just as Arnold and
Myers both confirm, there were many phantom aircraft appearing on the radar that
morning including a phantom AA 11 that continued on a southbound trajectory even
after the actual aircraft had hit the North tower. A product of the exercise, the
deliberately inserted 'blips,' 'injects' or phantoms all appeared as indistinguishable,
from real aircraft on the radar that day.
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Furthermore, many of NORAD's bases were left short on aircraft due to the
drills. Although the northeastern United States is one of the most populated regions,
the closest air force bases with available aircraft to defend the airspace over New
York and the Capitol were Otis Air Force Base (153 miles away) and Langley Air
Force Base (105 miles away). Closer bases such as Andrews Air Force Base, home to
Air Force One, located just ten miles south of the Pentagon did not have any fighter
jets available that morning to guard the Capitol. If the jets had been pulled away from
their normal stations at Andrews Air Force Base to participate in an exercise, than this
would explain why NORAD was forced to rely on fighters located significantly
farther away, therefore slowing their response time.
Although the specifics were not aggressively pursued by the Commission and
remain undisclosed, it appears evident that the war games being conducted that day
significantly stifled and confused NORAD's ability to respond to the attacks. As .
Arnold himself admits, he was forced to ponder whether the attacks were part of the
exercise or where occurring in real life. Similarly, the communications between the
FM's Boston Sector and NEADS also display similar confusions. When the FM
indicates that F-16s might need to be scrambled, the NEADS employee asks "is this
real world or exercise?" (Myers et al. p. 75). Even though much of NORAD's senior
leadership had been at battle stations that day due to the exercise, the countless
instances where employees where forced to distinguish between the military exercise
and 'real life' effectively blurred the reality of events that morning. Despite Arnold
and Eberhart's claims that the exercise actually helped NORAD's response, there
appears to be no evidence to support this claim.
NORAD's difficulty in establishing a conclusive timeline of events gives
pause to the accuracy of the testimony of its employees. Since General Larry Arnold
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was present at both the first testimony in May 2003 and a year later in June 2004, his
change in testimony raises questions about its accuracy. Furthermore, as the
commander of NORAD's CONR sector on 9/11, Arnold was undoubtedly in charge
of defending the airspace of the U.S. from the attacks.

9n the whole, NORAD was unable to fulfill its mission of defending the U.S.
from airborne attack. The reasons for this failure are difficult to concretely establish
since three varying versions of the events that day have been released by NORAD.
The degree to which NORAD acted negligently largely depends on which timeline of
events one subscribes to. Even so, the response times put forth to the Commission by
Scott, Arnold, McKinley, Myers and Eberhart confirm that the F-15s launched from
Otis and the F-16s from Langley were traveling at speeds significantly below their
maximum capacity. No explanation, however, is given for this. Furthermore,
contrary to Eberhart and Arnold's testimony, the war games being conducted on 9/11
seemed to confuse and inhibit an effective response by NORAD. Make no mistake,
NORAD failed on every level to prevent, intercept and/or shootdown even one of the
four hijacked aircraft. As a result of their negligence, over three thousand lives were
lost.

133

CHAPTER VIII

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
On September 11, 2001, the responsibility of providing aviation security was a
joint effort between the FAA and the air carriers. Providing the basic standards to
screen individuals as well as ensuring compliance with these standards, the FAA had
the duty of guaranteeing that all air carriers followed the uniform standards put forth
in the Air Carrier Standard Security Program. Further, it was the job of the FAA to
assess terrorist threats and implement_ security measures and equipment to most
effectively thwart th,em (General Accounting Office 2000).
Administrator Garvey also affirms that on 9/11 the "government's role, that is
the FAA' s role, was regulatory. By rulemaking, the FAA set the security standards
for U.S. airports, for U.S. airlines worldwide, and for foreign air carriers flying to the
United States. The FAA also ensured compliance with those standards" (Garvey
Testimony� no page number).
Air carriers, on the other hand, were responsible for overseeing screening
operations including passengers, baggage and cargo whether they were preformed by
their own employees or through independent security firms. In either scenario, air
carriers were mandated to ensure compliance with FAA standards. Air carriers who
fell short of overseeing and monitoring the effectiveness of screening operations
could be reprimanded through the imposition of fines (General Accounting Office
2000).
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A collective assortment of shared responsibilities, the FAA worked hand in
hand with the aircraft carrier industry to provide aviation security. Inspector General
Kenneth Mead asserts that "industry provided and paid for the security, that is, the
airlines and the airports. The FAA's role was to establish se_curity requirements and
ensure comp!iance with those requirements" (Mead Testimony, no page number).
From the beginning, government involvement in civil aviation has been
exemplified by a dual mandate of both regulating and promoting the airline industry.
As best described by former Inspector General of Transportation (1990-1996) Mary
Schiavo,
the [FAA's] identity, its character ana'its raison d'etre formed over
decades, so that the jet age began with a government agency keenly
interested in fostering the business of flying ...The roots of its mission
go back to aviation's first real champion, the military, and its first
business partner, the federal government. (1997:45)
As directed by the 1958 Federal Aviation Act "the Administrator is
empowered and directed to encourage andfoster the development of civil aeronautics
and air commerce in the United States and abroad" (Title III Sec. 305 as cited in
Thomas 2003:42). Therefore, it was the legal obligation of the FAA to promote the
economic development of the airline industry while simultaneously regulating it as
well.
Testimonies of Jane Garvey and Kenneth Mead
Assigned or hnplied Trust or Duty

Roles and Responsibilities
Jane Garvey's tenure as the Administrator of the FAA began in August 1997
and continued through August 2002. Breaking rank from previous FAA ·
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Administrators, Garvey was the first to be appointed to a five year term, the first to
not hold a pilots license, and the first female Administrator. Garvey also served as
acting administrator ofthe FM and had spent many years working for the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) as deputy director. Prior to joining the FHWA in
1993, Garvey had been the director ofBoston's Logan International Airport which
two ofthe hijacked planes departed from on the morning of9/1 l . As the
Administrator ofthe FM in the four years prior to the attacks, many ofthe actions
and inactions ofthe FM occurred on her watch.
Kenneth Mead was the Inspector General ofthe Department ofTransportation
on September 11th• In this capacity, Mead was responsible for inspecting and
reporting on the federal aviation system. Having testified on aviation security and the
FM in 1987 while working at the General Accounting Office, his appearance in front
ofthe 9/11 Commission not the first time Mead discussed the weaknesses ofthe
system. His testimony" .. .is based on audits and criminal investigative work
'spanning a number ofyears, covering a broad range ofaviation security subjects"
(Mead, no page number). Mead's intimate knowledge ofthe U.S. civil aviation
security system makes him a valuable asset for assessing the state ofaviation security
on 9/11.
Action or Inaction on BehalfofState or State Agencies

A History ofCommercial Airliner Hijackings
Commercial aviation has long been a desirable target ofthose aiming to make
a political statement. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a rash ofhijackings occurred
where commercial aircraft were diverted to Cuba and other locations. In response, the
U.S. government implemented harsher penalties for hijacking and the use ofairport

metal detectors· increased. According to Garvey, "those measures helped to stem the
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domestic hijacking epidemic." Hijackings such as these" ... in which the hijacker
seizes control of the aircraft for transportation, or in which passengers are held as
hostages to further some political agenda," (Garvey, no page number) remained the
anticipated form of air piracy on 9/11.
In the 1980s, a number of bombings initiated changes in airport security. To
begin, the bombing of TWA 847 in 1985 led to a reauthorization of the Federal Air
Marshal program for overseas flights as well as the establishment of the PM's first
intelligence division to assist American carriers in foreign countries. Moreover, the
bombing of Pan Am 103 in 1988, which resulted from an explosive device in checked
luggage, " ... stimulated the most significant changes in aviation security since the
1970s " (Garvey). As a result, aviation security was made a top priority by Congress
and the FM took on the additional responsibilities of research, intelligence and threat
assessments.
Another significant consequence of the explosion of Pan Am 103 and the
subsequent commission in 1990 was the development of an investigative Red Team
group. As Garvey explains,
this red team augmented the work being done by the inspectors, and
reported to the top FM security official. Red team findings
influenced screener training, led to changes in the computer-assisted
profiling program, and helped direct changes in the protocol for
positive bag match. In effect, they helped shape the policy and
direction for security programs.
However, accusations had surfaced charging FM headquarters of ignoring, down
playing and in some cases covering up Red Team findings which reflected poorly on
civil aviation security.
Perhaps one of the PM's most laudable accomplishments in aviation security
was successfully blocking Ramzi Yousef's 1995 plan to simultaneously bomb 12 U.S.
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commercial aircraft over the Pacific. Coordinating alongside Philippine authorities,
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials worked to uncover the plot which was
discovered to be connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Garvey states
that "at this time, the FAA initiated discussions with the executive branch, Congress
and the industry on the greater domestic threat to aviation."
Just as the government and outside experts began to decide what changes
needed to be made, TWA Flight 800 crashed into the Atlantic in July 1996. Initial
suspicions pointed to terrorism, though that was not the case. Acting swiftly, Clinton
established the White House Commission on Aviation Security and Safety, commonly
referred to as the Gore Commission. Garvey contends "that commission's security
recommendations centered on improving screening and countering the effects of
explosive devices." Moreover, for the first time significant federal funding in the
form of$ I00 million annually was made available to purchase security equipment,
specifically explosive detection equipment, for civil aviation. Of the 27
recommendations made by the Gore Commission in 1997, 24 had been implemented
by September 11, 200 I.
Mead points out that prior to 9/� I, advancements in aviation security were
implemented reactively rather than preventatively. Therefore, the air carriers were
only prepared for what they had experienced. Mead makes clear that
security underlining that model and the assumptions on which the pre9/11 aviation security model were predicated did not envision a
scenario of commercial airliners being used as a weapon, or the use of
box cutters by individuals who were prepared to die in the commission
of their terrorist acts.
Whether the hijackers were willing to die in the process of their attacks is beside the
point. Aviation security consisted of measures to prevent hijackings, not to stop them
after they had already begun.
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Weaknesses in Aviation Security
The competing responsibilities of both regulating the airline industry while
also promoting their economic interests compromised aviation security. Since
implementing costly security fe�tures infringed on profit, resistance on behalf of the
airliners was great. Mead notes that "in our opinion, those counterpressures in tum
manifested themselves as significant weaknesses in security that we, the GAO, others
including the FAA, repeatedly found during audits and investigative work."
One weakness was the lax performance of screeners. Meeting the
requirements put forth by the FAA to screen passengers and their carry-on luggage,
the airliners would award contracts to the lowest bidding screening company. Poorly
trained and under paid, screeners received only 15 hours of training which was
instituted after a FAA regulation. Mead states that
our work has shown that it wasn't unusual for these screeners to be
getting less money than the starting wage for an employee iri a fast
food restaurant right down the concourse. And those conditions,
among others, resulted in screener turnover rates at some airports were
running about 400 percent a year.
As a result, screener performance was low and ite�s such as firearms and mock
explosives would frequently go unnoticed by screeners at security checkpoints during
investigative tests.
As early as 1997 the GAO recommended implementing performance
standards for screeners. Additionally, "the FAA reauthorization act of 1996 directed
FAA to issue a rule on the certification of the screening companies, which in tum
would result in standards for the screeners" (Mead). However, due to delays in the
rule-making process, these standards had not been enacted by September 11 th•
Background checks for screeners were also sorely in need of regulation. Mead
reveals that "in October 2000, one of the nation's largest private security companies
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pied guilty to a felony, paid more than $1 million in fines and restitution for actually
falsifying the criminal history checks and screening qualification records.at one of our
nation's major airports. This was not an isolated incident.'.'
Mead reveals that the explosive detection devices purchased with federal
funds were being significantly underutilized by the airliners. He makes clear that
the machines cost the government about $1 million a copy. These
machines were capable of screening 125 bags an hour. They were
certified by the FAA at that rate. We routinely were finding that the
vast majority were screening between 250 and 700 bags a day.
Absent air carrier willingness to pay for expensive security upgrades, the federal
government generously footed the bill for screening devices to help prevent
explosions on board planes. None the less, the air carriers neglected to use the
machines to their full potential, allowing hundreds of bags daily to go unchecked.
Awareness of Threat
Although there was intelligence information received by the FAA and passed
onto the airliners about the growing terrorist threat, much of it was focused overseas.
Garvey stressed "again, the threats we received, particularly in the months before, the
summer months before September 11th, were very focused on overseas targets,
concerns about American interests overseas, but primarily overseas."
Concerned that the information was not credible or 'solid' enough, Garvey
states that. she had
repeatedly gone back to the staff and said, "Where those run to the
ground?" And that's exactly why I said solid, because those were run
to the ground by the intelligence community, by our own folks with the
intelligence community, and for various reasons were discounted as
not credible.
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One intelligence report discounted as not credible, involved the use of
airplanes as weapons. Garvey contends that "I was not aware of any information of it
being used as a weapon that was credible. I'm saying that correctly'' (emphasis
added). Similar to NORAD, the FAA also claims that there was no consideration of
planes being used as weapons.
Drawing on his experience from the Joint Inquiry, Commissioner Roemer
reminds Garvey of the numerous pieces of intelligence between January 1995 and
August 2001 in which planes were used as weapons. Roemer states that
the CIA disseminated several of these reports to the FBI and to the
agencies, and one of the agencies it disseminated this to was the FAA.
Now, I know that. .. since the counterterrorism unit was set up in 1986,
the FAA had an intelligence liaison officer full-time with the CIA, FBI
and State.
Garvey agrees, stating that the FAA has a very active intelligence branch. Even so,
she states that "we are dependent on the information we get from the CIA, and with a
close examination of that information with the CIA, with the FBI. We do depend on
them for the raw intelligence."
Timeline of Hijackings and Notifications to NORAD
As Commissioner Cleland no�es, published accounts of the attacks argued that
Boston flight controllers knew as early as 8:13 that American Airlines flight 11 had
been hijacked. By 8:21 two flight attendants on board AA 11 hadcalled American
Airlines confirming the hijacking. "Yet, according to the FAA official time-line,
NORAD was not notified until 8:40, about, what, 20-some-odd minutes later"
(Commissioner Cleland in Garvey Testimony).
In dispute, Garvey states that it was not until 8:20 that Boston sector realized
that there was a problem with AA 11. She believes that three or four different
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attempts were made by air traffic control to raise the aircraft to a higher altitude
without response. After this, "at about 8:34, based on the good initiative of the
controller and his supervisor, NORAD was actually - - that was the first notification
from the controller and the supervisor to Otis" (Garvey). It is important to note that
Garvey goes out of her way to recognize the extraordinary response and initiative
taken by the controller and his supervisor in notifying NORAD. FAA protocols for
handling hijacked aircraft, it seems, were appropriately followed.
Explaining the six minute difference between this time and NORAD's official
notification time, Garvey explains that "It was - - the official one is 8:40, as you've
suggested. After they did that, they then called up to headquarters, and then the
official notification." Rather than being the fault of the FAA, NORAD was
responsible for an unaccounted six minute delay which went unmentioned in their
official timeline of events.
Commissioner Ben-Veniste contends that by 8:55, the FAA received
information that American Airlines 77 had turned off its course. He states that
"according to our information, NORAD was not notified until 9:24, approximately
half an hour" after it displayed signs that it was hijacked. In contention, Garvey
maintains that is not consistent with her understanding. She states "the timeline that I
have, that I remember, is one that had a notification twice before the time that you
mention, so that there had been three notifications."
Protocols and Procedures
Once the FAA �ontacts NORAD about a hijacked aircraft there is nothing
more for the FAA to do, Garvey maintains. Rather, ''NORAD's procedures would
rule at that point, would prevail" over the FAA's. After Boston contacted NORAD,
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Garvey expected they would respond to the hijacking by sending up planes, as they
had done many times before, but the fighters never made it.
When asked whether protocols for that day were followed, Garvey confirms
that they were, stating "You know, was it observed for that day? I think so, yes. Yes.
I mean, the protocols before that did not anticipate anything of that magnitude. The
protocols that were in place pre- 9/11 anticipated some crises, but not of that
magnitude."
Summary
Historically, commercial aviation has remained a consistent target for
terrorists hoping to get their political point across. In contrast to the claims that the
FAA had never fathomed hijackings in which the perpetrator was willing to die
during the course of the attacks, intelligence information provided to the FAA dating
backto the 1995 plot to blow up twelve commercial aircraft over the Pacific suggests
otherwise. Even so, as Garvey makes clear, "the threats we received, particularly in
the months before, the summer months before September 11th, were veryfocused on
overseas targets, concerns about American interests overseas, but primarily overseas."
Concerned that the information provided to the FAA by the intelligence
community, including its own intelligence division, was not credible enough, Garvey
ordered her staff to 'run those sources into the ground' to ensure their validity. Even
though the FAA was heavily reliant on the CIA for the intelligence information they
received, Garvey was hesitant enough to have her staff scrutinize CIA intelligence
about the looming terrorist threat. 9ne piece of information that was deemed
inad�quate involved the use of planes as weapons. Garvey carefully contends that "I
was not aware of any information of it being used as a weapon that was credible. I'm
saying that correctly'' (emphasis added). In other words, a great deal of information
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about the immediate threat posed to civil aviation, including airplanes being used as
weapons, was dismissed by Garvey as not credible enough.
On September 11, 2001, the U.S. civil aviation security system was in
shambles. Operating reactively rather than proactively, aviation security was only
able to protect against threats which it had already encountered. According to Mead's
experience, it took an aviation disaster to initiate the sorely needed advancements in
security. As a result, the system was plagued with deficiencies that had yet to be
made significant issues absent a catastrophic event.
The poor performance of security screeners was one persistent problem.
Meeting the requirements put forth by the FAA to screen passengers and their carry
on luggage, the airliners would award contracts to the lowest bidding screening
company. Equipped with only 15 hours of training (provided only after a FAA
mandate) and paid minimum wage, screener turnover reached as high as 400 percent
annually at some major airports. As air carriers and security screening companies
failed to invest in the training and wages of their screeners, the screeners in turn
neglected to invest their time and efforts into preventing dangerous contraband from
boarding commercial aircraft.
Background checks of screeners were also needed. Although it is not clear if
he is referring to any of the airports or screening companies involved in 9/11, Mead
reveals that "in October 2000, one of the nation's largest private secl,!rity companies
pied guilty to a felony, paid more than $1 million in fines and restitution for actually
falsifying the criminal history checks and screening qualification records at one of our
nation's major airports." Even more startling, he contends that "this was not an
isolated i�cident." The lax policies of private security clearly contributed to the
weaknesses in aviation safety. In 1997, the GAO recommended that the FAA
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implement performance standards for screeners. These recommendations were still
caught up in the rule-making process on 9/11.
Recommendations stemming from the Gore Commission sought to address
many of the inadequacies of aviation security. These recommendations were backed
for the first time by significant federal funding in the form of $100 million annually to
purchase security equipment, specifically explosive detection equipment, for civil
aviation. With a price tag of $1 million a piece, explosive detection machines were
not being used to their full potential. Although the FAA had certified these machines
as capable of scanning upwards of 125 bags per hour, Mead found that only 250 to
700 bags were being scanned daily. Even though the federal government went as far
as to foot the bill for the much needed security equipment that the air carriers "7here
responsible for providing, they still failed to use them. The air carriers were never
reprimanded for their negligence.
The firs1 sign of trouble that morning, the pilot of AA 11 failed to respond to
n�merous requests to climb to a higher altitude at 8:20 a.m. Then, according to
Garvey, "at about 8:34, based on the good initiative of the controller and his
supervisor, NORAD was actually - - that was the first notification from the controller
and the supervisor to Otis." The official notification, however, did not come until
Otis contacted NORAD headquarters at 8:40, thus leaving NORAD responsible for
this six minute gap, not the FAA.
At least in the case of AA 11, it seem� that the air traffic controller and his
supervisor at the FAA' s Boston center reacted swiftly and appropriately, even
garnering the praise of Garvey and the Commissioners. A full fourteen minutes after
it started to become clear that AA 11 might be a hijacking, the FAA contacted Otis to
investigate the situation. At that point, responsibility for AA 11 shifted to NORAD.
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Garvey makes clear that after the FAA contacts NORAD about a hijacked aircraft,
''NORAD's procedures would rule at that point, would prevail at that point."
Although they may have ruled, NORAD's procedures certainly did not prevail during
the attacks.
Testimony of Bogdan Dzakovic
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty

Role of the Red Team
Following the 1988 bombing of PanAm Flight 103, the FAA created the Red
Team to identify security weaknesses by replicating tactics that terrorists could
potentially use. Composed of former security officials, the red team would use
methods available to the general public (such as obtaining false law enforcement
credentials) to breech security checkpoints during unannounced inspections. Red
Team members were able to successfully smuggle contraband, including guns and
simulated explosive devices, past security checkpoints and into secure areas without
proper authorization in the overwhelming majority of cases.
On September 11th, Bogdan Dzakovic's was a 14 year veteran of the Security
Division of the FAA. Reaching the position of Team Leader, his seven year tenure
with the Red Team began in 1995. Articulating his position as Team Leader in the
FAA's hierarchy, Dzakovic explains that his immediate boss reported directly to the
Associate Administrator for Aviation Security, who reported directly to the
Administrator of the FAA.
The extraordinary success of the Red Team in breaching aviation security
yielded numerous reports about the defects of the system. However, the Red Team's
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warnings went unheeded and even covered up by the FAA. The Red Team's
warnings were finally vindicated on 9/11. A reward for his successes with the Red
Team, Dzakovic states that "later, I was removed from my position as a Red Team
Leader with no explanation and placed in a career limbo" (Dzakovic submitted
· statement, no page number).
Action or Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies

The Culture of the FAA
It didn't take Dzakovic long to see the flaws in the commercial aviation
system. "And it took me about two years, between one and two years, to realize that
there was a very serious problem in how FAA conducts its business" he states.
While continuing to test aviation security regulated by the FAA, Dzakovic
approached senior officials in the .Inspector Generals Office and then the General
Accounting Office about the flaws which plagued the system. He soon found that
" ...the GAO has their own long history of reports going back 20 years documenting
how poor aviation security is." The problem was not new.
With no effective responses, he then authored a letter to Administrator Garvey
in August 1998 " ...trying to explain to her that there's a serious culture of gross
mismanagement in civil aviation security." Despite his efforts to speak up about the
problems, he states "...I started trying to work within the system, and I saw that was a
pointless effort, because criticism is not accepted in FAA. That's part of the culture."
Furthermore, Dzakovic felt that the problems in aviation security which the Red Team
uncovered were downplayed, dismissed or covered up.
As Dzakovic continued to test aviation security, he began to realize that
"...while I was doing my testing, what I found out over the years is that the Red Team
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was basically working its way out ofa job." Each success ofthe Red Team revealed a
flaw ofthe FM and aviation security. He states,
although we breached security with ridiculous ease up to 90% ofthe
time, the FM suppressed these warnings. Instead we were ordered not
to write up our findings (in some cases) and not to retest airports where
we found particularly egregious vulnerabilities to see ifthe problems ·.
had been fixed. Finally, the agency started providing advance
notification ofwhen we would be conducting our 'undercover' tests
and what we would be checking for. (Dzakovic submitted statement)
Rather than fix the deficiencies in aviation security, the FM sought to conceal them
first by downplaying the.Red Team's reports, then by diminishing their investigative
powers.
At Boston's Logan International Airport, where both M 11 and UA 175 took
off from on 9/11, there had long been failures to comply with FM regulations.
Dating back to May 1999, Logan was in a critical state ofnoncompliance with FM
aviation security regulations. In his whistle blower complaint, an FM agent at
Boston's Logan Airport stated that the_security problem was so serious that" ...the
only thing that is holding security together at this airport are the tenuous threads of
luck" (Dzakovic Testimony). Giving way on 9/11, the tenuous threads ofluck were
not enough to prevent the nineteen hijackers from penetrating the civil aviation
security system and executing their plan.
After a year long period ofintensive testing in 1998 which yielded horrendous
results for screening checkpoints, the.Red Team was prohibited from �creening
checkpoints anywhere through September 11th• Restrictions such as these continued
-and by 9/11 the Red Team was only testing explosives detection systems
domestically. Dzakovic asserts in his submitted statement to the Commission that,
"the managers in the FM (including the highest offices in FM) deliberately choose
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to ignore our findings. This is particularly grievous in light of the ever growing
terrorist threat of which they were also aware."
Awareness of Threat
In his opening remarks to the Commission, Bogdan Dzakovic makes clear that
" ...I would like to just say that I will always be held in s.hock and awe when I hear
people who work in this field say that 9/11 was a totally unpredictable situation" (no
page number). One reason for this, dating back to the 1960s the aviation field has
historically been the target of terrorism. Secondly, the Red Team regularly
demonstrated that the FM was not enforcing the standards it put forth. Third, he
points to the abundance of intelligence information indicating an attack.
Stressing the urgency of the situation he states that "...the intel_ligence
information was so great that something was going to happen, and I acknowledge the
fact that we didn't know when or where, but something was going to happen,
something in the near future." Referencing a statement made on April 6, 2000 by a
former associate administrator of FM security to the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation Security, Dzakovic quotes,
"moreover, members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state
sponsors of terrorism are present in the United States. There is evidence that a few
foreign terrorist groups have well established capability and infrastructure there."
Therefore, intelligence information available to the FM indicated that the threat
posed by terrorism was pressing and that there was a domestic support network to
assist foreign terrorist groups inside the U.S.
Even without this information, Dzakovic claims that protecting civil aviation
is rather simple. He asserts that "there are basically two threats against aviation, and
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that's a hijacking or a bombing, and all you have to do is focus on those to issues:
how to minimize a hijacking and how to minimize a bombing." From a security
standpoint, the hijackings on September 11th were no different than the many
hijackings that had came before it. Dzakovic argues that
...from a security point of view there is no difference between
defending against a hijacker that wants to do a September 11th thing or
a hijacker who wants to go to Miami. The key word is you are
defending against a hijacking, and you worry about his motivations
later.
A point of departure from other officials who claim that September 11th was radically
different than anything they could have conceived of, Dzakovic maintains that
defending against all hijackings, whether suicidal or not, involves the same basic
procedures. He notes that " ...what happened on September 11th was not a failure of
the system; it was a system that was designed for failure. Every single aspect of it did
· not work to either deter or find terrorists."
CAPPS System
The Computer Assisted Passenger Protection Screening (CAPPS) used to
identify potentially dangerous passengers on 9/11, Dzakovic explains, gives a false
sense of security. He argues that
I really believe that CAPPS is the number one most dangerous system
out there, because it just totally gives a false sense of security. And
CAPPS only, I don't know what the percentage is, but like it would
make a selectee out of 10 or 15 percent of the population of travelers.
What that does is it totally eliminates the other 85 to 90 percent of the
people from further selection other than on a random basis.
Therefore, only a small percentage of passengers were being selected for additional
screening measures. As the Red Team knew, a lot could go undetected. However, six
of the nineteen hijackers according to Commissioner Fielding, and nine according to
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Dzakovic, were selected for additional screening measures by CAPPS. Nonetheless,
the biggest deterrent against aviation terrorism, Dzak<;>Vic explains, is being
interviewed by an experienced risk assessment person, something that did not happen
on 9/11.
Reports of a Gun on board AA 11
On the morning of September 11, 2001, Dzakovic was working at the FAA
operations center .."What happened that day we received from a credible source at the
operation center that a gun was in fact used on one of the flights" (Dzakovic). Even
though the report of a gun on board AA 11 was included in a SUllllllary of events to
Administrator Garvey, the FAA initially denied that such a docu,ment existed.
Instead, the FAA
actually stated that whatthe person meant to write was it wasn't a gun
but it was a knife, and instead of a bullet wound it was a stab wound.
It was that kind of activity going on this entire time, where they just
denied, and in my opinion tried to cover up, what actually went on.
Knowing how easy it was to smuggle a gun on board commercial airliners from his
Red Team experience, Dzakovic was not surprised by the report. In contrast to
reports of a gun on board AA 11, the Commission ultimately concluded that only box
cutters were used to hijack all four planes.
Summary
Providing a stinging critique of the FAA, Dzakovic's experience working with
the Red T.eam allowed for a rare glimpse into the dismal state of civil aviation
security. On the front lines of security evasion, the Red Team was incredibly
successful in their endeavors including smuggling guns and mock explosives on
board as well as gaining access to secure locations in airports and planes. The Red
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Team breached security up to 90 percent of the time. As Dzakovic puts it, "we were
extraordinarily successful in destroying U.S. Flag commercial aircraft and killing
large numbers of innocent people in these simulated attacks" (Dzakovic submitted
statement). This was a regular occurrence.
Dating back to 1997, Dzakovic began speaking loudly about the flaws. First,
he went to the Inspector General's Office only to find that they had their own 20 year
history of reports on the poor performance of aviation security. He notes that "in
1998, I sent a memo through my chain of command to the Administrator of FAA
attempting to have these issues addressed. The Administrator didn't even have the
courtesy to acknowledge receipt" (Dzakovic submitted statement). Even when he was
dismissed after 9/11, Dzakovic continued to persist by filing a Whistleblower
Disclosure with other FAA security officials. Bogdan Dzakovic did all he could to
alert senior FAA officials about the urgent problems in civil aviation security
uncovered by the Red Team.
Rather than address the weaknesses in civil aviation identified by the Red
Team, the FAA sought to downplay, dismiss and cover up their findings. Although
he had tried to work through the system, he remarks that, " ...I saw that was a
pointless effort, because criticism is not accepted in FAA. That's part of the culture"
(submitted testimony). Successfully unveiling the faulty aviation security system
regulated by their parent agency, the Red Team worked themselves-out of a job.
In the year prior to September 11, 2001, Dzakovic maintains that the FAA
issued 15 terrorism warnings to the air carriers. He states that " ...the intelligence
information wa� so great that something was going to happen, and I acknowledge the
fact that we didn't know when or where, but something was going to happen,
something in the near future." Rather than requiring the air carriers to bolster
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security measures at airports and inside _aircraft, the FAA chose.not to respond.
Even though the Commission posits each of the four planes was hijacked
using box cutters with blades less than four inches long, Dzakovic asserts that he
received credible information that a firearm was used on one of the aircraft. Since
one national Red Team study found that over two thirds of firearms made it past
security, Dzakovic wasn't surprise by the report. Not long after, the story began to
change. Rather than a gun on board on of the flights and a passenger with a bullet
wound, it was a box cutter and a stab wound. Days later, Administrator Garvey
announced that no guns were used on any of the aircraft without providing any
explanation for why the false report occurred.
Contrasting the frequent contentions by government officials that the
hijackings on 9/11 were of a unique n·ature since they involved suicidal hijackers,
Dzakovic makes clear that the difference is negligible. The motivations of the
hijackers are secondary to preventing air piracy in the first place. Aviation security is
simple, he maintains, since the two threats to civil aviation are hijackings and
bombings. Had the FAA focused its attention on effective prevention of hijackings,
suicidal or otherwise, the attacks on September 11th may have been disrup�ed.
Although the Red Team successfully fulfilled their mandate to identify
weaknesses in civil aviation security, the FAA failed to use its regulatory powers to
force the air carriers and airports to repair the system. Dzakovic makes clear, "what
was of even more concern to me was that the individuals who occupied the highest
seats of authority in FAA were fully aware of this highly vulnerable state of aviation
security and did nothing" (Dzakovic submitted statement).
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Testimonies of Monte Belger, Jeff Griffith, John White and Benedict Sliney
Assigned or Implied Trust or Duty

Roles and Responsibilities
As acting Deputy Administrator on September 11, 2001, Monte Belger
occupied the second ranking position at the FAA next to Administrator Jane Garvey.
Belger retired from the FAA in September 2002. Thirty years of experience under his
belt working for the FAA, he made his way from an entry-level inspector up through
headquarters. On September 11th, Belger was helping to facilitate communications
with the NMCC at FAA headquarters.
His first day on the job, Benedict Sliney was the Operations Manager Air
Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia on 9/11. Without the
authority to do so, Sliney first ordered the ground stops, which prohibited aircraft
from taking off, in Boston, New York and much of the East Coast. At 9:46, he then
proceeded to order a national grounding which resulted in the safe landing of over
4,500 commercial aircraft by 12:16.
Contributing very little throughout the testimonies, John White was facility
manager of the FAA Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center working
alongside Sliney during the attacks.· Also a silent witness, Jeff Griffith was the
Deputy Director of Air Traffic Control on 9/11. Admittedly, the testimonies revealed
very little about the responsibilities of Sliney, White and Griffith. Furthermore,
finding outside information about the job responsibilities of these witnesses proved
impossible.
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Action or .Inaction on Behalf of State or State Agencies

Awareness of Threat
Although the intelligence community was experiencing a heightened threat
period throughout the spring and summer of 2001, Belger-claims that he had no
knowledge of the increased risk of a terrorist attack and that threat assessments passed
along to the FAA did not reflect this fact. This was certainly not the case.
According to Commissioner Gorelick, the FAA did not alert the airliners of
threat information shared by the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) until July
24, 2001. Belger explains that "there were two types of information that was
generally given to the industry. One �as called a circular, which was just
information, and secondly ... a directive, which would have directed the airlines and
the airports to do something different" (p. 83). Even though circulars went around to
the airliners and airports mentioning the potential for an attack to occur, no directives
were ever given to spur them into taking steps to protect against the looming attacks.
However, Belger maintains that " ... during the summer period, I saw no intelligence,
nor did our security folks tell me anything that would lead us to direct the airlines or
the airports to do anything other than what they were doing" (p. 84). Apparently an
increased potential for a terrorist attack did not warrant heightened security measures.
In contrast to Belger's claims that the FAA was not privy to any information
about the heightened threat period, Commissioner Lehman elaborates on the
information provided to the FAA via the White House.
In fact, the White House did ensure that FAA Headquarters did get that
intelligence, in fact, all of the intelligence staff has verified this, that
Mr. Bono, the head of your security and intelligence, had received all
of that, and had sent it forward, and that Ms. Garvey's assistant filtered
it out. In fact, she didn't even have clearances for it. And that at no
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time was a request made for direct briefings on these matters in that
period leading up to 9/11. (p. 100)
Clearly, some people at the FM were aware of the threat posed by terrorism to civil
aviation. Even though security and intelligence officials were fully aware of the
increased risk for terrorism, senior FM officials including Belger and Garvey went
uninformed of intelligence information surrounding the threat. At the center of
blame, it seems, is Garvey's assistant who did not even have clearances to view
intepigence information, yet took it upon herself to filter out crucial intelligence
information so that it would never cross the Administrator's desk.
Hijacking Protocol
According to Commissioner Gorelick, prior to 9/11, the FM's protocol for
handling a hijacked aircraft" ...was to allow the hijacking to go forward, essentially
not to resist, and deal with the consequences once the plane landed, on the assumption
that that's what the hijackers were going to do" (p. 86). Once an aircraft was thought
to be hijacked, NORAD was to be contacted and jurisdiction over the errant aircraft
was to be assumed by the military until it could be grounded.
In Belger's mind, there was no doubt that the FM security organization as
well as the air traffic control organization knew exactly what to do in the event of a
hijacking. Griffith also confirms this position, stating that the air traffic control field
managers also knew what to do in the case of a hijacking. He argues that
the procedures are very clear. The procedures are trained as a matter
of refresher training in our operational facilities every year, and it
surprises me to hear that someone would think that our field managers
would not know what to do in the event of a hijacking. There are
protocols, there _are check lists, there are folders kept in our operational
positions where people have responsibility for reporting. And through
the years- - not only for hijackings, but aircraft accidents and other
incidents- - reporting is a very high priority. (p. 89)
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A general consensus amongst the witnesses as well as most of the Commissioners, the
response of lower level officials at the FAA was especially well executed and
procedures were followed appropriately. Crediting the training which occurs annually
at FAA operational facilities, both Belger and Griffith agree that the procedures for
handling a hijacked aircraft were well known amongst the field managers.
Coordination between the FAA and NORAD: the NMCC
According to Belger, on 9/11 the FAA communicated with the military
through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). He explains that
the National Military Command Center in a hijack scenario had the
responsibility to coordinate DOD's response to requests from the FAA
or the FBI. The FAA at that time did not have direct dedicated
communication links with NORAD. The NMCC was the coordination
authority between the FAA and DOD organizations. (p. 79)
Thus, the FAA, primarily through the hijack coordinator (a senior person in the
security organization), had to first contact the NMCC in order to request assistance
from NORAD in the event of a hijacking. From then on, it became the NMCC's
responsibility to promptly coordinate a response.
The Air Traffic System Command Control Center was the FAA's nerve center
for information on suspictous aircraft on 9/11. Sliney explains that the Command
Center had a 'military cell' which served as their liaison to the military and whom
was present throughout all of the events that occurred that moming:-Even though the
Command Center notified everyone who needed to be contacted, including the
military, Sliney contends that they did not have the authority to contact the military
for assistance. He states that
we had no process in place where a Command Center would make
such a request for military assistance. I believe that the military was
involved, and you know, I suppose in hindsight it's too simplistic to
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say that they all look alike to me. If you tell the military.you've told
the military. (p. 92)
Rather, it was the responsibility of the air route traffic control center overseeing the
hijacked plane to contact the NMCC in order to obtain assistance from NORAD. To
t�e best of Sliney' s understanding, the notifications for each hijacking were made
promptly. He asserts that "I was given to unde:rstand that all such notifications were
made. I ·had no reason to believe that they were not" (p. 92).
Hijacking Net
In the event of a hijacking, the FAA's operations center procedure was to
establish a line of communication with the NMCC through the hijacking net. Belger
explains that "the hijacking net is an.open communication net run by the FAA hijack
coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the
purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the
same time" (p. 87). Included in the hijacking net is the FAA, DOD (and the NMCC),
FBI, Secret Service and the airliners. As a matter of fact, Belger asserts that "the
National Military Command Center was entered into the hijacking at 9:20 in the
morning. That net's there for everybody to listen, real-time, to hear what's going on"
(p. 101). Noting his aggravation, he argues that "it was my assumption that morning,
as it had been for my 39 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on
that net and hearing everything real-time" (p. 87).
Contrary to Belger's thirty years of experience, the NMCC had not been part
of the hijacking net communications. tie affirms "And I can tell you I've lived
through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level
inspector up through to headquarters, and they have always been there. They were
always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else" (p. 87). An
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exception to the norm, the NMCC had not been involved in the open line of
communication on September 11, 2001. When Belger discovered that the NMCC
was not on the hijacking net, a stream of colorful language flowed from his mouth; an
uncontrollable expression of the frustration that overcame him.
Although the NMCC claims that it initiated a teleconference with an FAA
representative, Belger claims that he is unaware of any attempts made by the NMCC
to contact the FAA. Commissioner Kerrey argues that"...an FAA representative
joined the call who knew nothing, had no responsibility for hijack situations, had no
access to decision makers, and none of the information available to senior FAA
officials" (p. 103). Belger, however, maintains that he was not aware of whom the
NMCC had tried to call. He asserts that
I don't know about the efforts that the NMCC made to make secure
communications calls with the FAA. The FAA has the latest
communication capability. I don't know who they called, but our
intelligence folks were right there next to the operations center, and
they have the latest equipment" (p. 101).
Despite assertions from NMCC that they were in contact with an FAA representative,
Belger makes clear that it certainly was not the appropriate officials.
Transponders
A device on board all commercial aircraft, transponders are one of many
mechanisms which help to facilitate tracking aircraft. With the exception of United
Airlines 175, all of the hijacked aircraft had their transponders turned off long before
they crashed. Sliney agrees with Commissioner Kean's assertion that" ...there's no
reason for anybody who's a pilot ever to tum off the transponder. It should be on at
all time while the plane is in the air" (p. 96). Thus, once the transponders were turned
off on flights AAl 1, AA 77 and UA 93 it became clear that there was a problem.
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Although aircraft whose transponders are disengaged can still be tracked in
areas with extensive radar coverage such as the Northeast United States, an aircraft
flying at low altitudes with its transponder off is more difficult to detect. As Sliney
explains,
but I believe that the altitude of the aircraft would affect our ability to
track the primary or radar target. The transponder enhances that. If the
transponder is on, you can pretty much follow the target anywhere.
But at low altitudes, you would have the terrain and other anomalies of
the radar that would prevent you from tracking the aircraft at a low
altitude. (p. 96)
Commissioner Kean asserts that one of the three hijacked airplanes, though
which one is not specified, actually disappeared for a period of time from radars
because it was flying at such a high altitude. Sliney refutes this notion. Although he·
cannot be sure who had maintained radar contact, it is unlikely that contact was totally
lost. He states,
there are radars that would have seen the target regardless. Would they
have known what to be looking for, ldo not know. Did Boston Center
lose radar control of the aircraft, or lose the target? They could have.
Their altitude- - their altitude structure is much higher than the
terminal radar approach controls, which probably could have seen 'it,
but would not have had the electronic representation of the data
associated with that target at those terminal radar controls that the
center would have. (p. 96)
When asked by Commissioner Kean why the transponder was placed inside
the cabin so that it could easily be turned off, Sliney is not sure. Hereplies that "I
think the biggest factor, at least the biggest anomaly in my mind on that day was I had
never experienced a situation where a hijacker could fly the plane" (p. 97).
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Cockpit Security Alert
A matter of debate, the Commission had been informed that a cockpit security
alert had been suggested, though not issued prior to the crash ofUA93. Gorelick
states that
at9: 16 the tapes reveal that a manager from the Boston center asked
the command center to issue a- - on the day of9/11, issue a nationwide
cockpit security alert, which Boston had done. Which meant, as I
understand it, you told everybody, lock your cockpit doors, or beware
of someone trying to enter the cockpit. (p. 85)
However, this security alert, Gorelick claims, was never issued. Fifteen minutes after
Boston center requested that a nationwide security alert be issued, the cockpit ofUA
93 was breached.
Affirming this contention, Commissioner Rpemer adds that Ellen King, a
floor manager at the Command Center, received a request from Boston center to issue
a security warning. A "very competent individual," King assumed some of Sliney's
duties that morning including organizing the staff as well as overseeing his desk and
telephone. Sliney maintains, however, "that information was not given to me on that
day, making a recommendation to increase the security in the cockpit" (p. 98).
Surprised that King would not have passed such important information on, Sliney
reaffirms that "she's as I indicated, a very competent individual. I would find it hard
to believe that she did not pass that information on somewhere" (p. 99). Wherever
the request was passed along to, one thing remains clear: it never made it to the pilots
ofUA93.
Concurring with Sliney, John White, who was the senior person at the
Command Center, also contends that he was not aware of the request from Boston
center. A warning was issued to the air carriers, however. He states that "I wasn't
aware of that request, this is the first time I've heard of it, today. I have always been
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under the assumption that we did issue a verbal warning to the air carriers about
cockpit security'' (p. 86). The difference between the verbal warning issued to the air
carriers White refers to and the cockpit security alert that was never instituted goes
unelaborated on.
FAA Response fo UA 93
After two planes had already hit the World Trade Center, Cleveland Air
Traffic Control confirmed that UA 93 was hijacked at 9:28. However, it was not until
six minutes later that the FAA Command Center was informed of the hijacking. At
9:49, Cleveland called the Command Center asking '.'Are you going to put planes in
the air? And somebody at headquarters should do something" (Commissioner
Kerrey). In response, the Command Center contacted an official at FAA headquarters
about the urgent need for aircraft to intercept the plane. As Commissioner Kerrey
recounts the exchange between the Command Center and FAA headquarters:
"We want to think about scrambling some aircraft." Command Center
says - - FAA headquarters says, "Oh, God, I don't know." Command
Center, "That's a decision somebody's going to have to make in the
next 10 minutes." FAA headquarters, "You know, everybody just left
the room." (p. 104)
Once push came to shove and a decision had to be made about UA 93, the Command
Center pressed FAA headquarters to request assistance from NORAD. Oddly
enough, no one was around to make that decision.
Although FAA headquarters had not informed the military of the flight headed
towards Washington D.C., there were still military officials involved in what was
going on. Belger argues that
.. .I truly do not mean this to be defensive, but"it is a fact- - there were
military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney
said. They were participating in what was going on. There were
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military people in the FAA's Air Traffic Organization in a situation
room. They were participating in what was going on. (p. 105)
Military officials on duty at both the FAA Command Center as well as the Air Traffic
Control, Belger maintains, were involved in the response even though there was no
ongoing contact between the FAA and the NMCC. Despite their presence, the FAA
was still unable to establish open lines of communication with the NMCC to
coordinate an effective response.
Grounding Commercial Aircraft
His first day on the job as Operations Manager of the Air Traffic Control
System Command Center, Benedict Sliney disregarded the usual command structure
and ordered first ground stops and then the grounding of all commercial aircraft.
Beginning with ' ground stops,' which prohibited aircraft from taking off, in Boston,
New York and much of the East Coast, Sliney maintains that " ...we still had more
reports of aircraft whose course or altitude or other aspects of their flight made them
suspicious in light of the crashes. The national ground stop was just a natural
extension of the smaller scope ground stops" (p. 91).
After both planes had hit the towers, American Airlines 77 had impacted the
Pentagon and United Airlines 93 had been reported hijacked, the FAA decided to
ground

all 4,500 commercial aircraft and hundreds of thousands of passengers at 9:45

a.m. "By 12:16, for the first time in the history of the FAA, the U.S. air space was
empty of all aircraft excep� for military and essential emergency flights" (p. 80).
Orchestrating the safe landing of all commercial aircraft in two and a half hours
without any incidents was· the most remarkable feat undertaken by the FAA that day.
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Summary
Contrary to the claims made by Belger that the FAA did not receive any
information about the heightened threat period throughout the spring and summer of
2001, Commissioner Lehman makes clear that intelligence information was passed
along via the White House. Although this intelligence reached FAA headquarters,
including the FAA intelligence and security team, it was never made available to top
officials such as Belger because Garvey's assistant, who did not have the clearances
to view the information, filtered it out.
On 9/11, appropriate hijacking protocols were well known throughout the
FAA. Belger asserts that "the procedures are trained as a matter of refresher training
in our operational facilities every year, and it surprises me to hear that someone would
think that our field managers would not know what to do in the event of a hijacking"
(p. 89). Similarly, Griffith also confirms this position, stating that the air traffic
control field managers knew what to do in the event of a hijacking. Concerning the
notifications to NORAD about the hijacked aircraft; Sliney states that to the best of
his knowledge, "I was given to understand that all such notifications were made. I
had no reason to believe that they were not" (p. 92).
Since there is no reason for a pilot to ever tum off the transponder, the first
sign of a hijacking occurred once the transponder was switched off on· AA 11. Due to
the extensive radar coverage of the northeastern U.S., even without the transponder it
is still possible to track an aircraft, though this is complicated when a plane is flying
at low altitudes. In contrast to assertions made by NORAD that at least one of the
planes disappeared from the radar entirely, Sliney maintains that it is unlikely that·
contact was totally lost with any of the planes.
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On 9/11, the FAA did not have direct contact with NORAD. Rather, Belger
asserts that the FAA's hijack coordinator, who was a senior person in the security
organization, had to first contact the NMCC in order to request as.sistance from
NORAD in the event of a hijacking. Sliney, on the other hand, argues that it was the
responsibility of the air route traffic control center overseeing the hijacked plane to
contact the NMCC to obtain assistance from NORAD. The Air Traffic System
Command Control Center, the FAA's nerve center for information on suspicious
aircraft on 9/11, however, did not have the authority to contact NORAD directly.
Once the NMCC had been contacted, it became their responsibility to promptly
coordinate a response.
In the event of a hijacking, the FAA's operations center procedure was to
establish a line of communication with the NMCC through the hijacking net. Included
in the hijacking net is the FAA, DOD (and the NMCC), FBI, Secret Service and the
airliners. At 9:20, after two planes had already hit the towers, the NMCC was entered
into the hijacking net. Defying Belger's thirty years of experience handling dozens of
hijack�ngs at the FAA, the NMCC was not online hearing the real-time information
being conveyed throughout the attacks as he had assumed. An exception to the norm,
it is not clear why the NMCC had not been involyed. The NMCC maintains that
contact was made with a lower level FAA official who had no experience or
knowledge of the attacks. Unaware of whom was contacted, Belger makes clear that
it was not the appropriate officials.
A matter for debate, the Commission received information that the FAA's
Boston center requested that the Command Center issue a nationwide cockpit security
alert urging pilots to lock their cockpit doors and to beware of intrusions as early as
9:16. Apparently reaching Ellen King, who had assumed a number of Sliney's
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responsibilities including answering the phone that morning, it is �nclear who the
request was passed on to. Certain of King's competence and credibility, though
unsure of whom she had informed, Sliney claims that he was never made aware of a
request to increase cockpit security. Similarly, White, the facility manager at the
Command Center, was also not informed. The request was never honored and the
cockpit ofUA 93 was breached fifteen minutes after Boston contacted the Command
Center.
Even after UA 93 was confirmed by Cleveland air traffic control to be
hijacked at 9:28 and reported to Command Center at 9:34, a fifteen minute delay
prompted Cleveland to once again call Command Center urging them to respond. At
that point, Command Center contacted FAA headquarters who hesitated to relay the
message to NORAD to intercept the plane. Although Command Center contacted
Headquarters at 9:49 and UA 93 did not crash for almost another fifteen minutes,
fighter aircraft were nevertheless unable to respond.
With three planes having already reached their targets and a fourth plane
reported hijacked, Sliney decided to extend the ground stops he had already put in
place to a nationwide grounding of all commercial aircraft at 9:45. In about two and a
half hours, the FAA was able to successfully ground 4,500 aircraft and hundreds of
thousands of passengers safely without incident. Their failure to prevent the
hijackings aside, the successful execution of the nationwide grounding was the most
notable achievement of the FAA that morning.
· Even though he acknowledged the superb response from lower level FAA
officials, the performance ofFAA headquarters was a particular source of criticism
for Commissioner Lehman. Commenting on the bureaucratic structure of the agency,
he states the " ...FAA had what is to me a surprisingly hierarchal and centralized set
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of protocols where everything had to be cleared upstairs ultimately to headquarters,
when it got to headquarters, it seemed to fall into a black hole" (Lehman in Belger et
al. Testimony p. 100). In their defense, Belger argues that headquarters was focused
on communications with the NMCC. However, Lehman responds that "there was no
direct communication with NORAD from headquarters, even though headquarters
had centralized the decision-making. The communications with NMCC, which you
have said was where the focus of headquarters was, was never established during the
critical period" (p. 101).
Commissioner Kerrey echoes a similar rhetoric, commending those at the
local level including officials at the FA.A's sectors in Boston and New York. He
comments that "you guys did a fabulous job. But I'm with Secretary Lehman, Mr.
Belger, and I think headquarters blew it" (p. 103). Particularly, Kerrey points to FAA
headquarters delayed response to the request for military assistance from Cleveland
Center for UA 93.
The general consensus of many of the Commissioners as well as the witnesses,
FAA officials at the Boston and New York centers responded promptly and efficiently
to the attacks. Since air traffic controllers and managers were required to review
hijacking protocols annually as a matter of training, the procedures were well known.
The failure to respond to the attacks seems to instead lie with FAA headquarters.
Though it is not evident who is to blame, it was clearly the responsibility of FAA
headquarters to have established communications with the NMCC.
Federal Aviation Administration Summary
By September 11, 2001, the FAA was well aware of the threat posed to civil
aviation by terrorists seeking to make their political point. Whether based on
common sense or past experience, the two threats posed to aviation security have
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always been hijackings and explosives. Challenging the contention that the 9/11
hijackings were a new breed, Dzakovic argues that
...from a security point of view there is no difference between
defending against a hijacker that wants to do a September 11th thing or
a hijacker who wants to go to Miami. The key word is you are
defending against a hijacking, and you worry about his motivations
later. (Dzakovic testimony, no page number)
Emphasizing the need to prevent hijackings before they occur, implementing effective
civil aviation security was one of the first fronts on which to confront aircraft piracy.
According to Schiavo, from 1970 to 2001, 823 airplane hijackings had
occurred. "More recently, from 1993 to 1997...worldwide there were 87 hijackings, 7
commandeerings, 5 bombings or shootings, 50 attacks at airports, and 16 shootings at
aircraft in just 5 years" (Schiavo 2003:8). Thus, the prevalence of airplane hijacking
and terrorism had demonstrated a sustained security risk to civil 'aviation.
Following the 1988 bombing of PanAm Flight 103, the FM created the Red
Team to identify security weaknesses by replicating tactics that terrorists could
potentially use. Composed of former security officials, the red team would use
methods available to the general public to breech security checkpoints during
unannounced inspections. Overwhelmingly successful in their efforts, the Red Team
I

.

was able to gain access to secure locations up to 90 percent of the time.
One persistent problem with aviation security was the inadequate performance
of security screeners. Poorly trained and under paid, the turnover rate of security
. screeners reached as high as 400 percent in some airports. As a result, firearms and
mock explosives used by the Red Team, not to mention contraband from the traveling
public, would regularly go undetected by screeners. It is no surp rise then that the
nineteen hijackers were able to smuggle box cutters and mace onto the planes; items
prohibited past security checkpoints by the Checkpoint Operations Guide in effect on
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September 11, 2001 (Schiavo 2003:18). Well-trained and competent screeners could
have easily identified such contraband in violation of federal aviation security
regulations.
Additionally, cockpit intrusions were also a rather frequent occurrence.
According to Thomas (2003:34), in the two years prior to September 11, 2001 there
were over 30 incidents of passengers penetrating the cockpit of a commercial airliner
either partially or completely. Even in the six months follow_ing 9/11, seven incidents
of passengers partially or completely entering the cockpit were recorded (2003:36).
Aware of this threat, FM agents, consumer groups and flight attendants had been
urging the FM to implement reinforced cockpit doors for years. Simply reinforcing
the cockpit door in addition to locking them could have foiled the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. Unfortunately, as Thomas (2003:37) argues, "because of the cost to the
airlines of reinforcing the cockpit doors of eight thousand commercial airliners, the
FM failed to do anything about the problem." As a result, the hijackers were easily
able to enter the cockpit and take control of the plane.
Although the Red Team fulfilled their mandate to identify the weaknesses in
civil aviation, the FM failed to use its regulatory power to bring aviation security up
to par. Rather than address the problems identified by the Red Team, the FM chose
to downplay, ignore and cover up their findings. Had the FM taken steps to regulate
screener performance and mandate the airliners to reinforce cockpit doors, the
September 11th attacks could have been thwarted. Instead, the FM placed the profits
of commercial airline companies ahead of the safety of the public. Once again the
PM's dual mandates of promoting the airlin� industry as well as regulating it proved
to be incompatible.
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If history had not taught the FAA lessons about the dangers posed by terrorism
to civil aviation, intelligence information indicating a heightened threat period should
have. In the year prior to 9/11 the FAA had issued 15 terrorism warnings to the air
carriers. Dzakovic states that "...the intelligence information was so great that
something was going to happen, and I acknowledge the fact that we didn't know
when or where, but something was going to happen, something in the near future"
(Dzakovic testimony, no page number). The head of security and intelligenc�, Mr.
Bono, was also aware of intelligence information given to the FAA by the White
House that indicated the increased potential for a near-term terrorist attack. Only
some of this information made it to Administrator Ga:rvey, while other crucial reports
were allegedly filtered out by her assistant who lacked the clearances necessary to
view them.
Curiously, Deputy Administrator Monte Belger claims that he had no
knowledge of the increased risk of a terrorist attack, nor did FAA threat assessments
reflect this fact. Mistakenly, he asserts that "...during the summer period, I saw no
intelligence, nor did our security folks tell me anything that would lead us to direct the
airlines or the airports to do anything other than what they were doing" (Belger et al.
testimony p. 84). Even though the air carriers were informed of the increased risk for
a terrorist attack, the FAA never directed the airlines or the airports to increase
security measures in preparation.
Administrator Jane Garvey, on the other hand, had been given intelligence
indicating that an attack on American interests may occur, though much of the
information was focused overseas. Despite this information provided by the C½,
Garvey was concerned about the legitimacy of the threat reports. Emphasizing the
lack of 'credible' and 'solid' reporting, Garvey states that she had
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repeatedly gone back to the staff and said, "Where those run to the
ground?" And that's exactly why I said solid, because those were run
to the ground by the intelligence community, by our own folks with the
intelligence community, and for various reasons were discounted as
not credible. (Garvey testimony, no page number) ·
Although she received information that indicated the potential for planes being used
as weapons, Garvey concluded that the reports were not qedible enough to warrant a
response from the FM.
The protocols for handling hijacked aircraft were well known throughout the
FM. Perhaps the most common threat to aviation security, hijacking procedure was
annually reviewed. Credited to annual training, air traffic controllers and their
supervisors were able to promptly respond to the hijackings. Fourteen minutes after
the first signs of trouble, Garvey states that "at about 8:34, based on the good
initiative of the controller and his supervisor, NORAD was actually-- that was the
first notification from the controller and the supervisor to Otis" (Garvey testimony, no
page number). It is worth noting that Garvey goes out of her way to recognize the
extraordinary response and initiative taken by the controller and his supervisor in
notifying NORAD. She believes that officials followed proper protocol and notified .
NORAD in a timely fashion. Commissioners Lehman and Kerrey both agree,
commending the officials at the PM's Boston and New York sectors for their
appropriate responses. Therefore, the accusations made by NORAD officials that the
PM's delayed notification of the hijackings fumbled their response are not
supported.
In contrast to NORAD's timeline which indicates that the first contact from
the FM came at 8 :40, Garvey argues that the six minute discrepancy occurred on
. NORAD's end. Although Boston sector contacted Otis Air Force base requesting
assistance at 8:34, the ',official' notification time was clocked six minutes later after
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Otis reached NORAD headquarters. Supporting the position that NORAD sought to
conceal the actual notification times from the FAA, the unexplained six minute
discrepancy is left for NORAD, not the FAA, to account for.
According to the Commission, by 8:55 AA 77 had turned off course and the
FAA determined that it was hijacked, though it was not until 9:24 that NORAD was
notified. Garvey, however, disagrees arguing that "the timeline that I have, that I
remember, is one that had a notification twice before the time that you mention, so
that there had been three notifications" (Garvey testimony, no page number).
Although NORAD maintains that they were not notified of AA 77 until 9:24, Garvey
makes clear that this was in fact the third, not the first, notification. Once again, the
timeline presented by NORAD omitted two prior notifications therefore mistakenly
placing blame on the FAA for failing to notify them with sufficient time to respond.
By 9:28 Cleveland Air Traffic Control had determined that UA 93 was
hijacked. Reporting the hijacking to Command Center at 9:34, Cleveland was forced
to call back fifteen minutes later urging Command Center to contact FAA
headquarters about scrambling aircraft. Once Command Center reached headquarters,
their response was one of hesitation and delay. By this time, two planes had struck
the towers and another had impacted the Pentagon, yet FAA headquarters was
resistant to request assistance from NORAD. It is not clear whether or not the FAA
ever contacted NORAD to scramble jets in response to UA 93. One thing is for sure,
fighter aircraft were unable to reach UA 93 before it crashed nearly forty minutes after
it was determined to be hijacked.
The first sign of trouble, three of the hijacked aircraft-AA 11, AA 77 and UA
93- each had their transponders turned of£ A device on board all commercial planes,
transponders are one of many mechanisms which help to facilitate tracking aircraft.
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Due to the extensive radar coverage of the northeastern U.S., even without the
transponder it is still possible to track an aircraft, though this is complicated when a
plane is flying at low altitudes. Despite the excuses from NORAD officials that
because the transponders had been shut off they were unable to locate the hijacked
aircraft, Sliney maintains that it is unlikely that contact was totally lost with any of the
planes.
Once the FAA notifies NORAD about an aircraft piracy, responsibility for the
hijacked aircraft shifts. At the point that Boston center contacted Otis about AA 11 at
8:34, NORAD assumed responsibility for investigating the aircraft. Garvey makes
clear that after the FAA contacts NORAD about a hijacked aircraft, "NORAD's
procedures would rule at that point, would prevail at that point." Although the FAA
is responsible for the safety and security of commercial aircraft up until the point that
it is hijacked, NORAD is charged with investigating, surveilling and neutralizing
threats after it has been determined that a hijacking has occurred.
In the event of a hijacking, it was the NMCC's responsibility to coordinate a
response from the DOD and if necessary NORAD. Therefore the FAA did not have
direct lines of communications with NORAD, only the NMCC. The hijacking net
hosted agencies such as the FAA, FBI, Secret Service and DOD (including ·the
NMCC) and provided real-time information about the situation at hand.
Complicating communications with NORAD, the FAA was unable to
maintain connectio� with the NMCC through the hijacking net. Defying Belger's
thirty years of experience in dealing with hijackings at the FAA, the NMCC had not
been participating in the hijacking net since 9:20 as he had assumed. Once Belger
realized the NMCC's absence, he could not conceal his anger and frustration.
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Although they were unable to participate in the hijacking net, the NMCC
claims that they contacted an FAA representative who knew nothing about the
situation, had no experience with hijackings and no access to decision makers.
Unaware of whom was contacted, Belger makes clear that it was certainly not the
appropriate person. Belger also notes that there were many military officials at FAA
headquarters and the Command Center participating in what was going on during the
attacks. Their presence, however, was no substitute for direct lines of communication
with the NMCC.
After three planes had already reached their targets and a fourth plane was
reported hijacked, Sliney ordered an extension of the ground stops he had already put
in place to a nationwide grounding of all commercial aircraft at 9:45. In about two
and a half hours, the FAA was able to· successfully ground 4,500 aircraft and hundreds
of thousands of passengers safely without incident. Their failure to prevent the
hijackings aside, the successful execution of the nationwide grounding wa·s the most
notable achievement of the FAA that morning.
The September 11th attacks could not have been carried out without the aid of
commercial aircraft. Had the FAA fulfilled its regulatory mandate by addressing the
weaknesses in civil aviation security identified by the Red Team, the attacks might
not have occurred. Since the FAA was responsible for setting security standards for
the airliners and airports and ensuring their compliance, the failures of aviation
security on 9/11 are directly linked to the negligence of the FAA. The FAA was well
aware of the problems in civil aviation security years before September 11th but
nevertheless neglected to address them due to the inevitable costs to the industry.
The FAA must be faulted for their failure to enact much needed security
upgrades and enforce regulations already in place, especially in light of intelligence
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information indicating the increased risk for a terrorist attack by al Qaeda. However,
after the attacks had already begun it appears that the decisions and actions carried out
by air traffic controllers and their managers at the FAA' s sectors in Boston, Cleveland
and New York were in line with appropriate hijacking procedure�. From these
testimonies, it does not appear that lower level FAA officials failed to fulfill their
responsibilities; Quite the contrary, both Administrator Garvey and Operations
Manager Sliney assert that to the best of their knowledge, all hijacking procedures
were followed swiftly and effectively. Joining Commissioner Lehman in praising the
actions of these officials, Commissioner Kerrey states that "you guys did a fabulous
job. But I'm with Secretary Lehman, Mr. Belger, and I think headquarters blew it"
(Belger et al. testimony p. 103).
The failure to respond to the attacks seems to instead lie with FAA
headquarters. As Commissioner Lehman asserts " ...FAA had what is to me a
surprisingly hierarchal and centralized set of protocols where everything had to be
cleared upstairs ultimately to headquarters, when it got to head quarters, it seemed to
fall into a black hole" (Belger et al. testimony p. 100). For one, FAA headquarters
was unable to establish contact with the NMCC: the coordinating agency between the
FAA and NORAD. Though it is not evident who is to blame, it was clearly the
responsibility of FAA headquarters to establish communications with the NMCC.
Even though Deputy Administrator Belger had taken actions to ent�r the NMCC into
the hijacking net, their absence remains unaccounted for. Whatever the reason, the
absence of the NMCC on the hijacking net was an anomaly which disabled real-time
communications between the FAA and NORAD about the ongoing attacks.
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CHAPTER IX

DISCUSSION

Prevention
The entire government had been on a state of high alert throughout the spring
and summer of 2001. As Rice put it, "[an attack by al Qaeda] was on the radar screen
of any person who studied or worked in the international security field" (Rice
Testimony p. 12). With the exception of only a few, almost every government official
testified that they were aware of the increased risk of a terrorist attack. Although they
may have been aware that a terrorist attack was right around the corner, no one knew
when, where or how it would occur. The CIA, the Counterterrorism Center, the
Counterterrorism Security Group and the FBI's field offices frantically worked to
uncover the plot. Even though each agency held a piece of the puzzle, no one
implemented a plan of action.
Perhaps more than anyone, the CIA understood the nature of the threat posed
by al Qaeda. After all, the CIA funded,.armed and trained Osama bin Laden and the
members ofthe Mujahideen in the late 1980s against the Soviets, many of whom later
went on to form al Qaeda. At the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, bin Laden and al
Qaeda occupied the bulk of their attention. Generated internally by employees at the
CTC, the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing titled "Bin Laden Determined to
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Strike in US" warned President Bush and members of the NSC of the possibility for a
domestic attack. After interviewing the veteran CIA analysts who authored the PDB,
the 9/11 Commission's investigative staff concluded that the document was not
merely a historic overview as Rice asserted. Instead, the authors claim that "it was
meant to remind President Bush that al-Qaeda remained a dire threat in August 2001
and that a domestic attack was a distinct possibility, no matter what he was hearing
elsewhere" (Shenon 2008:378).
Even though the PDB did overview some of bin Laden's historic attempts to
attack the U.S., the document also stressed that "nevertheless, FBI information since
that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with
preparation for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of
federal buildings in New York" (Presidential). Furthermore, the PDB also indicated
that al Qaeda had established a support network inside the U.S. capable of aiding
terrorist activities. Predicting the 'how' and 'where' of the attacks, the information
contained in the PDB admittedly may not have been enough to have stopped them.
Even so, this intelligence did provide a basis for preventative measures to begin.
In refutation of the frequently offered explanation that the 9/11 attacks were
the result of a legal 'wall' which prevented the sharing of information between the
FBI and the CIA, there appears to have been regular coordination between the two
agencies concerning the threat posed by al Qaeda. Dating back to J997 when the CIA
and the FBI collaboratively established the Alec Station which was dedicated to al
Qaeda investigation and disruption activities overseas, the two agencies worked
together to neutralize the terrorist threat. Over the years FBI-CIA cooperation
continued through the East African Embassy bombings, the bombing of the U.S.S.
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Cole and the successful thwarting of Millennium plot. In their view, both Freeh and
Pickard agree that cooperation between the FBI and the CIA was quite good.
These collabor_ative interactions paved the way for intelligence sharing
throughout the spring and summer of 2001. A product of CIA-FBI coordination, the
August 6th PDB was authored by the CIA yet also contained information uncovered
by the FBI. Furthermore, the CIA provided the FBI with the intelligence needed to
initiate 70 full field investigations on suspected members of al Qaeda. As Pickard
makes clear, without the direction of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, the FBI
was operating in a vacuum. Although their cooperative interactions may not have
been enough to prevent the attacks, there is no support for the notion that the CIA and
the FBI were inhibited by a legal wall which prevented them from sharing intelligence
information.
Despite its fragmentation, the FBI had multiple pieces of information which
hinted at how the attacks might be carried out. The Phoenix memo sent from agent
Kenneth Williams to FBI headquarters on July 10, 2001 observed that an inordinate
number of bin Laden's supporters were training at flight schools in Arizona. Williams
feared that a coordinated effort might be underway by bin Laden to· establish a cadre
of individuals working in civil aviation who may use their training to carry out
terrorist attacks. Had FBI headquarters acted on Williams' suggestions, such as
investigating all U.S. flight schools and discussing the matter with_the intelligence
community in order to corroborate his reports, the 9/11 plot would have become more
clear.
In the year prior to 9/11, two of the nineteen hijackers were living with an
active FBI informant in San Diego. The FBI acknowledges that a San Diego case
agent knew t4at Saudi visitors were residing with the informant who provided
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information on the Islamic terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah. After receiving
information from the CIA on Khalid al Hazmi and Nawaf al Mihdhar, the New York
office had obtained PISA on coverage on the two men and was searching for them
leading up to September 11th• Firmly within his responsibilities as FBI director to
order such a directive, Louis Freeh admits that had there been a formal tasking to
gather more information about al Hazmi and al Mihdhar the attacks might have been
prevented.
The FBI took Zacarious Moussaoui into custody after overstaying his visa on
August 15, 2001. The decision to take Moussaoui into custody after overstaying his
visa was done deliberately in hopes of neutralizing the terrorist threat he was believed
to have posed. Drawing attention to himself at a Minneapolis flight school due to his
interest in piloting a Boeing 767 without having any previous experience flying,
Moussaoui's jihadist beliefs further raised the FBI's suspicion about his intentions.
Suspicions were soon confirmed when the French Intelligence Service reported that
Moussaoui had affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities
connected to Osama bin Laden.
From the perspective of the Minneapolis agents handling the Moussaoui case,
personnel at FBI headquarters" ...continued to, almost inexplicably, throw up
roadblocks and undermine Minneapoiis' by-now desperate efforts to obtain a PISA
search warrant, long after the French intelligence service providedits information and
probable cause became clear" (Rowley 2002). Risking disciplinary actions, the case
agents were so desperate to bypass the resistance from FBI headquarters that they
went directly to the CIA's Counterterrorism Center. Despite their efforts, the PISA
warrant was not approved until after the attacks.
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The New York office, which housed the FBI's bin Laden and al Qaeda unit, as
well as FBI headquarters had received and reviewed the Phoenix memo, actively
investigated al Hazmi and al Mihdhar and had been informed of the Moussaoui case.
Piecing together elements of these three cases brought forth by FBI field offices, a
number of clear warnings emerged. However, this information was never passed on
to the other offices involved in similar investigations. Although it was reviewed, few,
if any, actions were taken by headquarters. A formal tasking issued by top level FBI
officials could have helped to connect each of the isolated cases to a larger
coordinated plot. As director and acting director of the FBI, both Freeh and Pickard
bore the responsibility for such a directive.
· All the malfunctions in civil aviation security coalesced on September 11th to
unveil the FAA's concern for the profits of the airline industry over the safety of the
public. Historically, the FAA' s dual mandate of regulating the airline industry while
simultaneously promoting its economic interests created an environment where sorely
needed safety measures where only implemented in response to a catastrophic event.
Despite the successes of the Red Team in identifying the failures of the civil aviation
security system that the FAA was charged with regulating, the FAA was resistant to
addressing the problems. The Red Team's findings were ignored, downplayed,
dismissed and even covered up by upper level FAA officials.
Even though security features _in place on 9/11 identified ten of the 19
hijackers for additional security measures, all 19 were nevertheless able to
successfully board their respective planes. The hijackers that underwent additional
security measures prior to boarding their planes were in no way thwarted by the
measures in place. Levels of security which the hijackers successfully surpassed
included: questioning, additional metal detection, scanning of bags for explosives and
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holding the checked baggage off of the plane until it was confirmed that the
individuals had boarded. Further, according to Dzakovic nine of the 19 hijackers
were identified by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) as
passengers who should be subject to additional screening, which in most cases
resulted in holding the checked baggage (National Commission 2004).
In the year prior to 9/11 the FM received at least 15 intelligence warnings
about the increased risk for terrorism and had even passed many of the warnings
along to the airliners. However, security upgrades such as installing reinforced
cockpit doors on thousands of aircraft or regulating security screeners' performance at
every airport would have forced the airline industry to sacrifice millions of dollars in
profit; a measure the FM was just not willing to take. Instead, thousands of people
paid with their lives. A systemic problem rooted in the FM's conflicting mandates,
the temptation to place profits over safety was high. Since many former FM
officials go on to work in the airline industry and vice versa, the revolving_door
between government and business promotes an organizational environm�nt fertile for
corruption.
Aside from the rare rocket from below, there are really only two threats to
aviation security: explosives and hijackings. Because prevention of aircraft piracy
begins long before a hijacking ever occurs, the motivations of the offender are not
significant concerns. The 9/11 hijackings were not of a new breed, but rather an
unanticipated outcome to a traditionally anticipated threat It was the duty of the FM ·
to set the security standards for U.S. airports and airliners and ensure the industry's
compliance with such measures. Utterly failing to fulfill its regulatory function, the
FM had allowed U.S. civil aviation security to sink to a dismal state. On September
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11, 2001 the FAA once again sacrificed the safety of the public to the profits of the
airline industry.
What was needed more than anything in the spring and summer of 2001 was a
government wide evaluation and subsequent reaction to the increasing threat posed by
al Qaeda. It was not as if the information was not available; it just was not
coordinated. If many of the executive branch agencies such as the NSC, CIA, FBI,
DOD and FAA had beenbrought together and tasked to assess what was known about
bin Laden and al Qaeda, the attacks may have been prevented. The one organization
capable of executing such a response to the threat remained paralyzed: the NSC.
'1The

National Security Council is the President's principal forum for

considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national
security advisors and cabinet officials" (National Security Council). Regular attendees
of the NSC include the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the
. Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary ofDeferise, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, theDirector of National Intelligence and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. When pertinent, other senior officials such as the Attorney
General are invited to attend. Brining together the most senior government officials
to discuss matters of national security, the NSC was the one organization that had not
only the authority but the responsibility to develop a response to the urgent threat.
The Bush administration was promptly alerted of the increasing threat posed
by terrorism upon taking office. National Security Advisor in the Clinton
administration Sandy Berger informed Condoleezza Rice that she would be spending
more time on issues of terrorism, and specifically al Qaeda and bin Laden, than
anything else in her new role as advisor to the President (Shenon 2008:255). To
stress the seriousness of the issue, Berger went out of his way to stop by Clarke's
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introductory briefing on counterterrorism and al· Qaeda. But, as Shenon (2008 :255)
asserts, "he was never sure he got his message across to Rice or the other members of
the transition team, including her counterterrorism adviser Philip Zelikow."
As the threat of an attack by al Qaeda grew, Clarke attempted to inform his
new boss that action needed to be taken. Clarke presented Rice with a plan to address
the al. Qaeda threat in the Administration's first week in office. By then, it had
recentlybeen confirmed that al Qaeda had been behind the bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole as suspected. An act of aggression against a U.S. military vessel, the Bush
administration had the justification to take actions against al Qaeda or bin Laden. But
to the new administration, the Cole bombing was a relic of the Clinton era.
One of the more significant changes made by President Bush to the NSC upon
taking office was an expansion of the powers of the National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice to include chairing the NSC Principals Committee. Despite the
urgent threat period, there was never a Principals Meeting concerning the threat posed
by al Qaeda held throughout the duration of the Bush administration until exactly one
week before the attacks. As the threat grew during the summer months, many of the .
Principals were away on vacations. President Bush himself spent the entire month of
August away from Washington. Unconcerned about the pressing threat posed by al
Qaeda, the NSC Principals Committee waited eiglit months into their tenure to
formally discuss the nature of the problem. When the atta�ks occurred, the NSC
Principals Committee was awaiting the President's approval for a plan of action
against al Qaeda; virtually the same plan that had been presented to Rice by Clarke
during the Administration's first week in office.
Thanks to the demotion created by Philip Zelikow and instituted by Rice, the
Terrorism Czar Richard Clarke spent significantly less time talking with the National
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Security Advisor on issues of terrorism. Fully aware of the threat at hand, Clarke.
pushed for Rice to convene a Principals Meeting, writing "we urgently need such a
Principals level review on the al Qida network" (NSC Memo from Clarke). From his
experience of thwarting the Millennium attacks, Clarke knew how important
Principals Meetings could be. In fact, he credited them as the key factor in the 1999
success. So frustrated with Rice's failure to respond, Clarke quit his position as head
of the Counterterrorism Security Group in June. Having the power to order such a
meeting, Rice ignored the warnings of Clarke, amongst others, and neglected to
gather the Principals on the immediate threat facing the nation.
The Bush administration was receiving warnings from the CIA as well.
Unlike his interactions with President Clinton, George Tenet had almost daily contact
with George Bush on the President's.insistence. With the exception of the entire
month of August while Bush was away at his ranch in Texas, Tenet was meeting
sometimes six mornings a week to provide Bush and Rice with a daily intelligence
· report which included information about al Qaeda's activities. Since Director of
Central Intelligence was keenly aware of the threat, so much so that he claimed the
"system was blinking red," it is quite likely that Tenet passed this information onto
the President during their daily meetings. Clarke confirms that both he and Tenet
worked hard to convey a sense of urgency to the President about the threat posed by al
Qaeda. Apparently, they never got their message across.
On August 6, 2001 Bush was presented with a Presidential Daily Briefing
from the CIA titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,". the PDB was written as
a reminder that an attack was looming and it could very well occur at home. Contrary
to Rice's frequent assertion that there was no "actionable intelligence," the August 6th
PDB chillingly predicted the who, how and where of the attacks. Once again
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confirmed in the PDB, Rice and Bush had bo_th been aware of al Qaeda's presence
inside the U.S. However, Rice asserts that "but I don't remember the al Qaeda cells
as being something that we were told we needed to do something about" (Rice
Testimony p. 24).
The National Security Advisor did not take any actions to prevent the attacks,
nor did she advise the President to do anything either. Convening a Principals
Meeting concerning al Qaeda early on in the Administration's tenure would have
brought together many top level officials who miserably failed in their responsibilities
on 9/11 such as: President Bush, Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor
Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Director of Central Intelligence Tenet
amongst others. As a NSC Principal, the regular attendance of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff could have also helped to improve the response from the NMCC .
and NORAD.
Furthermore, includi_ng Attorney General Ashcroft in the meeting may have
helped to convey the threat to the FBI as well. Comparatively, Attorney General Janet
Reno was only able to organize information from the FBI concerning the Millennium
threat after she formally tasked the bureau her�el£ Rather than take a proactive role
in responding to the threats, Ashcroft, on the other hand, told acting FBI director
Pickard that he did not want to hear any more about the threat posed by al Qaeda.
The Bush administration and members of the National Secllrity Council were
fully aware of the threat posed by al Qaeda. Even if most of the information
suggested an attack overseas, informati�n contained in the August 6th PDB reveals
that a domestic attack could not be ruled out. In either scenario, as the chief advisor
to the President on issues of national security both at home and abroad, National
Security Advisor Rice failed to take preventative measures to address the threat.
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Instead of being reprimanded for her failure to fulfill her responsibilities both to the
President and to the nation, Condoleezza Rice remains a Cabinet level official in the
Bush administration.
Response
On June 1, 2001 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff updated the policy
for aircraft piracy and the destruction of derelict objects, replacing the previous
protocol from July 1997. Concerning the hijacking protocols of the FAA, the NMCC,
DOD and NORAD, the Joint Chiefs instruction spelled out the process for handling
hijacked aircraft as well as issuing shootdown orders. Although the procedures
changed very little between the July 1997 and the June 2001 instructions, one notable
difference was that the FAA headqu�ers hijack coordinator was specifically
responsible for contacting for NORAD for escort aircraft to intercept the hijacked
plane.
The hijacking procedures in pla_ce on September 11, 2001 required that the
FAA hijack coordinator contact the NMCC in an expedient manner after an aircraft
. was determined to be hijacked. The NMCC would then check with NORAD to
determine the availability of aircraft before sending the request to the DOD, who was
then required to receive approval from the Secretary of Defense before responding.
Once the request was approved by the Secretary of Defense, then the NMCC would
inform the FAA hijack coordinator of the appropriate NORAD Air Defense Sector to
contact for assistance (Chairman A-2). Additionally, the NMCC was to remain in
coordination throughout the hijacking until the situation was resolved.
If all other efforts by NORAD or military aircraft to control the hijacked plane
had failed and it needed to be shot down, then authorization was once again needed
from the Secretary of Defense. As the June 1, 2001 instruction states,
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if destruction is required, the [Deputy Director of Operations at the
NMCC] will forward all requests or proposals for DOD military
assistance to the DOD Executive Secretary and appropriate OSD staff
offices, and then to the Secretary of Defense for approval... (Chairman
C-1)
Therefore, only the Secretary of Defense could authorize the shootdown of a
commercial aircraft.
The actions of FM headquarters as well as the hijack coordinator that
morning are not readily apparent, thus making it difficult to assess whether hijacking
protocols were abided by. Once the first flight (M 11) was determined to be
hijacked at 8:34, an air traffic controller and his manager at Boston sector notified
Otis Air Force Base to scramble jets. In this case, it does not appear that the request
was funneled through the hijack coordinator. On the receiving end, Northeast Air
Defense Sector (NEADS) commander Colonel Robert Marr ordered F-15 fighter jets
to battle stations. Contacting his superior Major General Larry Arnold, Marr sought
authorization to scramble the F-15s once M 11 had hit the WTC. Approving the
request, Arnold claims that he had the clearances necessary to issue a scramble order,
though he was required to get authorization to intercept an aircraft. After Arnold
contacted his superiors at NORAD headquarters to authorize an interception, approval
was needed from the Secretary of Defense to proceed.
The appropriate clearances from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, it
appears, never came. In order to take action against a hijacked air�raft, the NMCC
had to first receive approval from Rumsfeld before a response between NORAD and
the FM could be coordinated. This would shed light on to why aircraft at Otis and
Langley Air Force Bases sat waiting at battle stations but were not launched for a
significant length of time. It would also help to explain why UA 93 had not been
intercepted or shot down.
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There is no evidence in any of the t�stimonies reviewed to suggest that
Secretary Rumsfeld made any authorizations that morning. According to General
Richard Myers who was at the NMCC on 9/11, Rumsfeld did not join him at the
NMCC until 10:30 (Myers et al. p. 44). It appears that Rumsfeld was instead outside
the Pentagon assisting in the clean up of AA 77. As Myers recalls,
the secretary [of Defense], except for the short period of time that he
went outside to examine where the aircraft came into the Pentagon and
to help, because at that point they needed hands and he lent his hands
to help those injured and those responding, but then he came back in
sometime arourid 10:00 and was upstairs. (Myers et. al p. 44)
Abandoning his post in the middle of an attack on the homeland, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld was unavailable to make crucial decisions about the military's
course of action at least between 9:37 and sometime after 10:00.
During the time that Rumsfeld was unavailable, the FAA's Cleveland Center
and Air Traffic Control Command Center were frantically awaiting assistance.
Cleveland Center had reported the hijacking ofUA 93 to Command Center at 9:34.
However, Command Center did not have the authority to notify NORAD directly, so
the information was passed on to FAA headquarters. After fifteen minutes without a
response from FAA headquarters, Cleveland once again called Command Center
urging them to prompt headquarters to notify NORAD to scramble aircraft. In
response, Command Center reached FAA headquarters shortly after 9:49 and stressed
the immediate need to contact NORAD about UA 93. Even after three planes had
already crashed, FAA headquarters seemed hesitant to request assistance. Forty
minutes after Cleveland Center notified Command Center about the hijacking ofUA
93, the plane crashed without ever being intercepted. While Cleveland desperately
waited for military assistance with UA 93, the Secretary of Defense was AWOL and
unable to authorize� response from NORAD.
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The FAA had notified NORAD of the hijacking of AA 77 twice prior to the
first official NORAD notification time at 9:24, according to Administrator Garvey. If
it was in fact the case that the FAA had notified NMCC much earlier, than this would
lend credence to Secretary of Transportation Norinan Mineta's testimony that Vice
President Cheney was tracking the flights' course as early as between 9:15 and 9:20.
In their second testimony to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD officials claimed that
they had never been notified by the FAA that AA 77 was hijacked. One possible
explanation might be that although the hijack notification from the FAA made it to
the Department of Defense and up to the White House, an approval for a response
never made it back down to NORAD.
The 9/11 Commission concluded that Vice President Cheney had not issued a
shootdown order of AA 77, but instead UA 93, from the Presidential Emergency
Operations Center (PEOC). On multiple occasions Cheney had publicly stressed that
the shootdown order was made in consultation with the President. It was necessary to
obtain Bush's prior approval for Cheney to order the destruction of a commercial
airliner since the Vice President has no position in the military chain of command.
Even though authorization to shoot down an aircraft needed to be approved by the
Secretary of Defense, the President as the Commander in Chief could have made such
a decision. Since Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was not available at the height of
the attack to make crucial decisions about shooting down a commercial airliner,
President Bush could have assumed the Secretary's duty.
The 9/11 Commission's investigative staff found that" ...there was no
evidence to suggest that Bush had weighed in on the shoot-down order before Cheney
had issued it. And there was plenty of evidence to suggest that Bush knew nothing
about it" (Shenon 2008:265). From their review of multiple phone logs from the
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communications between the Bush and Cheney the Commission was unable to
uncover any evidence·to support Cheney's claims. Further, an examination of the
notes taken that morning by officials on board Air Force One with Bush and in the
PEOC with Cheney also do not reflect this assertion. Absent any authorization from
President Bush, it therefore appears that Vice President Cheney's shootdown order
was unconstitutional (Shenon 2008).
Serving to complicate the military's response to the hijacked aircraft were the
numerous war games occurring on the morning of the attacks. Fully staffed including
its top officials, NORAD was several days into its annual Vigilant Guardian exercise.
Despite the preparedness and available support, the training exercise severely
confused NORAD's response. To be fair, if authorizations were never received from
the Secretary of Defense, then NORAD would have been blocked from effectively
responding to the hijackings. Nevertheless, as the testimonies of NORAD officials
make clear, employees involved in the exercise were forced to question whether the
hijackings were part of the simulation or were in fact occurring in real life.
Further confusing the reality of the situation, Ruppert (2004) confirms that the
war games involved simulated hijacked aircraft crashing into buildings and artificial
'blips' or phantom aircraft inserted onto NORAD radars which appeared real. The
testimonies of Generals Eberhart and Arnold reveal that NORAD was forced to deal
with many phantoms. A product of the exercise, the deliberately i!lserted 'blips,'
'injects' or phantoms all appeared as indistinguishable from real aircraft on the radar
that day. Although the real AA 11 had already smashed into the WTC, NORAD's
second testimony to the Commission shows that fighter aircraft had been launched in
response to a phantom AA 11 which was heading south. As another plane headed
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towards New York and two other hijacked aircraft approached Washington D.C.,
NORAD's fighter jets were pulled south in pursuit of a phantom AA 11.
The hijack protocol in place on 9/11 required that the NMCC remain in
contact with the FAA throughout the duration of the hijacking situation. On the
morning of the attacks, this clearly was not the case. The Deputy Director of
Operations at the NMCC is designated as the official DOD coordinator between
NORAD and the FAA (Chairman 2). The day before, Admiral Joseph Leidig had
been asked by his superior General Montague Winfield to assume his responsibilities
as Deputy Director of Operations at 8:30 on the morning of September 11th•
Although he was supposed to have convened an Air Threat Conference call, Leidig
mistakenly established a Significant Event Conference after the second aircraft hit the
WTC. The Significant Event Conference call brought NORAD combat commanders
as well as senior military and White House officials together to discuss the threat.
Once General Montague resumed his position, the call was then upgraded to an Air
Threat Conference, though the difference goes unexplored. The FAA, however, was
left out of both calls.
At FAA headquarters, Deputy Administrator Monte Belger thought he had
established contact with the NMCC when he entered them into the hijacking net at
9:20. Included in the hijacking net is the FAA, DOD (and the NMCC), FBI, Secret
Service and the airliners. Contrary to Belger's thirty years of experience in dealing
with hijackings, the NMCC had not been listening in on the real time information
being shared as they always had before, though it is unclear why.
Although Leidig credits the breakdown of communication to compatibility
issues between the secure phones at the NMCC and FAA headquarters, Belger
maintains that the FAA had the appropriate technological capabilities. Another
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possible explanation attributes the failure to establish communications to the
inexperience of Admiral Leidig. Since it was not normally his role to fill, perhaps
Leidig, who was the primary person in charge of coordinating NMCC's response, was
unprepared for the task he was handed. In any scenario, the inability of the FM and
the NMCC to establish communications undoubtedly fumbled an effective military
response to the hijackings.
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CHAPTERX

CONCLUSION
A review of the testimonies from officials representing the NSC, CIA, FBI,
NORAD and FAA to the 9/11 Commission reveals a consistent pattern of government
misdeed surrounding September 11th• Much of the blame for the failures to prevent
the attacks does not reside at the lower levels of these bureaucratic structures. Quite
the contrary; government officials at the highest levels of public office were
particularly guilty of failing to fulfill_their Constitutional duties to protect the public
from external threats. In most cases, officials further down the agency hierarchy
performed their duties quite well.. Their superiors, on the other hand, seemed to be
the most responsible for the failures of 9/11. Concentrated at the highest levels of
public office, the failures and inactions of government officials were committed by
those with the greatest responsibility to protect the public.
Within each agency it appears that officials at the top of the CIA, FBI and
FAA were responsible for a greater degree of negligence than were lower level
officials. From the testimonies of Director of Intelligence George Tenet and Richard
Clarke, it appears that Tenet did all he could to warn President Bush and National
Security Advisor Rice about the looming attacks. For its part, the CIA seemed to be
keenly aware of the al Qaeda threat, though action could not be taken without
direction from the NSC or the DOD.
The failures of FBI headquarters are particularly notable. Even though acting
FBI director Thomas Pickard went out of his way to contact each of the special agents
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in charge at each of the 56 FBI field offices, his efforts were not enough to
corroborate crucial pieces of information.about the 9/11 plot. Many of the field
agents who executed their jobs marvelously in the months leading up to 9/11 felt as
though FBI headquarters was going out of its way to block their efforts. In his eight
year tenure as director of the FBI, Louis Freeh must be held particularly accountable
for the actions and inactions of headquarters. If Freeh or Pickard had formally tasked
the bureau to systematically evaluate all the available information about al Qaeda and
bin Laden, there is a good chance that the 9/11 plot may have been uncovered.
The evidence suggesting that the FAA mishandled their notification of the
hijackings is weak. For the most part, lower level officials promptly identified the
hijacked aircraft and reported them to the proper authorities. Although FAA
headquarters was unable to maintain contact with the NMCC as was required by
hijacking protocols, this breakdown of communication most likely occurred on the
opposing end. Notifications, it appears, were promptly made. A response from the
NMCC, on the other hand, was not.
Though they cannot be faulted for their failure to respond to the attacks, senior
FAA officials must be held accountable for their negligence in preventing them. The
weaknesses of the civil aviation security system which enabled the attacks were not .
new. As the Red Team embarrassingly revealed, the FAA had not been performing
its regulatory functions. Senior FAA officials including Administrator Jane Garvey
and Deputy Administrator Monte Belger had been informed of the security problems
but actively sought to ignore the findings of the Red Team investigations. Even in
light of the intelligence information indicating the increased risk for a terrorist attack,
FAA headquarters took no actions to force the airliners and airports to implement
more stringent security measures. Had the FAA fulfilled regulatory role by
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implementing standards for security screeners and installing reinforced cockpit doors
the hijackings could not have been executed.
Highlighted by the 9/11 attacks, the failures ofcivil aviation security can be
attributed to the conflicting mandates ofthe FM. The problems ofaviation security
were more the result ofthe tensions between promoting the airline industry and
regulating safety than the negligence ofFM officials themselves. Involving the
deviant interactions ofboth a government agency and a corporation, the FM's
inability to regulate the airline industry is best described as a state-facilitated
corporate crime.
Top Bush administration officials particularly neglected to fulfill their
responsibilities both in terms ofprevention and response. As the chiefadvisor to the
President on issues ofnational security, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
did not convince Bush that immediate action needed to be taken. One necessary
initial step was to convene a Principals Meeting on the threat posed by al Qaeda. In
the new administration, the National Security Advisor enjoyed an expansion of
responsibility to include serving as the chair ofthe NSC Principals Committee.
Brining together top Administration officials, a Principals Meeting on al Qaeda would
have provided the coordination necessary to initiate a government-wide evaluation of
threat posed by al Qaeda and bin Laden. Had this coordination taken place, much of
the fragmented information on bin Laden, al Qaeda and the 9/11 plot might have
appeared more cohesive. In the best ofall circumstances, the plot could have been
disrupted before it even began. Less optimistically, an FM mandate to increase
aviation security or a more alert response from NORAD could have foiled the plot
after it had already begun.
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Even if Rice had not advised the President to act, the information Bush was
receiving from Director of Intelligence George Tenet made clear an attack by al
Qaeda was coming, and soon. As the most powerful government official in the U.S.,
President Bush cannot claim innocence. Well aware that members of al Qaeda were
residing in the U.S. and that the threat of an attack was growing, the President quite
clearly had the responsibility and the authority to act. Nevertheless, President Bush
sat idly as the threat period intensified and came to a head on 9/11 without ever taking
initiative to address the problem.
Once the attacks had already begun, the United States military failed on four
separate occasions to intercept or shoot down any of the hijacked aircraft. Even
though it cannot be conclusively determined from the testimonies whether or not the
NMCC had sent the FAA's request for assistance to the Secretary of Defense, it
appears clear that Donald Rumsfeld was nevertheless unavailable to make critical
decisions about the military's response for at least part of the attacks. Since a
response from NORAD was contingent upon the Secretary's approval, NORAD's
inaction could easily be attributed to Rumsfeld's absence. Just as any military official
would be court marshaled for going AWOL in the middle of a battle, so too should
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.
Although it is not clear what Vice President Dick Cheney knew about the
threat of an attack by al Qaeda leading up to September 11th, his actions that morning
raise many questions. Wat�hing the attacks unfold from the Presidential Emergency
Operations Center, the decisions made by the Vice President were not his to make.
As Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta maintains, Cheney had been tracking
AA 77 as it headed towards the Pentagon. While Secretary Rumsfeld was absent and
President Bush was on Air Force One, Cheney took it upon himself to coordinate the
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military's response to the attacks. Since the Vice President has no position in the
military chain of command nor was the President consulted on the matter, the
shootdown orders issued by Cheney were unconstitutional.
The evidence suggests that at least four Cabinet level Bush administration
officials are directly culpable in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. President
George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld all failed to fulfill their
legal obligations to protect American citizens from an attack by al Qaeda. Occupying
the highest government positions, these four individuals were particularly responsible,
as stipulated by the Constitution, for protecting the general welfare and providing for
the common defense. Their failure to do so demands accountability.
The Verdict
Judged by the standards put forth by Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews
(2003), the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defense
(including the National Military Command Center and the North American Aerospace
Defense Command) and the National Security Council concerning 9/11, have each
met the criteria for a state crime of explicit omission.
Generated Harm to Individuals, Groups, and Property
The harm resulting from the 9/11 attack has forever been commemorated, yet
the immediate loss of life and property was only the. beginning. The manner in which
the attacks have been exploited and manipulated to justify an expansion of state
power at the expense of civil liberties ensures that the damage caused by the attacks
lives on. The Bush administration has used the September 11th terrorist attacks to
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implement an agenda of global imperialism and domestic repression. The social and
physical harm that continues to be perpetrated by the state in the name of 9/11 is
perhaps even more significant than the initial act itself.
A Product of Action or Inaction on Behalf of the State or State Agencies
The complexity of organizational dynamics allows for both actions and
inactions to be occurring alongside one another within the same agency. In many
ways action and inaction are one in the same; the decision not to act is an action in its
own right. In most cases, employees working at the lower levels of the agency
hierarchy acted in accordance with appropriate protocols. In contrast, individuals
occupying top positions in the CIA, FBI, FAA, DOD and especially the NSC made
conscious decisions not to act. The culmination of these inactions paved the way for
the attacks to be carried out.
The Action or Inaction Related Directly to an Assigned or Implied Trust and/or Duty
Trust is fundamental to the relationship between the governed and the
governing in a democracy. Relinquishing power and autonomy to a higher authority
in exchange for protection from threats is a core concept of the social contract. In
violation of their organizational responsibilities entrusted upon them by the public,
key government officials in the NSC, CIA, FBI, FAA and DOD failed to take actions
to prevent an attack by al Qaeda when it was clearly their duty to have done so.
A particularly concentrated amount of culpability resides in the NSC and by
e�tension top Bush administration.officials. The inactions of Rice, Bush and
Rumsfeld created the environment for the attacks to occur. What was needed more
than anything was leadership both in terms of preventing the attacks and stopping
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them once they had begun. It was the purpose of the NSC to assess threats to national
security and approve a plan of action against them. Without a coordinated plan of
action from the NSC, it is not apparent what the other agencies would have been able
to achieve on their own. The NSC bore the most responsibility for preventing the
attacks while also being guilty of the most crucial inactions.
Is Committed, or Omitted, by a Government Agency, Organization or Representative
By design, each of the witnesses' testimonies selected for analysis was
employed by one ofthe five agencies in question on September 11, 2001 or in the
months leading up to the attacks. Furthermore, the content of the 9/11 Commission
investigations largely focuses on the governments role in the attacks. Therefore, the
revealed inactions for the most part only pertained to omissions by government
officials.
Is Done in the Selflnterest of {a) the State Itself or (b) the Elite Groups Controlling
the State
In order to evaluate the selfinterest ofthe state or elite groups controlling the
state, it is essential to consider the autonomy of state actors. The extent to which
states act independently of other social groups, classes or organizations in society
determines their capacity to act autonomously (Skocpol 1985 :9). However, neither
the state nor the concept of autonomy is monolithic. Different government factions
may be more or less autonomous dependent on time or place. Thus state autonomy is
relative. As Skocpol (1985) argues, virtually all scholars agree that the U.S. cannot be
described as an autonomous actor. This suggests that decisions made by the U.S.
government are influenced by extra-governmental interests, namely economic elites.

199
Supporting this notion, Kauzalrich, Mullins and Matthews' fifth criteria for a state
crime reflects the assumption that economic elites often have control over the
interests of the state.
Although the goal of this project has not been to explore the underlying
motivations and rationale behind the failures of government agencies to prevent the
attacks, an examination of the relationship between state and economic actors is a
fertile place to start. Even though the interactions between the FAA and the airline
industry demonstrate the clear linkages between government and business, the
relationship between the political and economic is not as clear within the CIA, FBI,
DOD and NSC. Further investigation is needed to assess the extent to which the
inactions of the CIA, FBI, DOD and NSC were autonomous from economic interests.
Whether or not the failure to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks was done in the
self interest of the state is a tenuous speculation to make. Quite obviously, the attacks
have served the interests of the Bush administration who seized the tragedy to justify
an illegal war in Iraq. But to what extent were senior administration officials
complicit in their decisions not to act? The evidence seems to suggest that the failure
to prevent the 9/11 attacks constitutes at least an explicit crime of omission, though a
more complicit form of state crime cannot be ruled out.
In the most explicit sense, a growing sector of the public believes that the
United States government, and particularly the Bush administratiop., played an active
role in the 9/11 attacks in order to justify a war with Iraq. Too startling for many to
consider, the idea that the government would perpetrate acts of terror against its own
citizens has grave implications. The historical record provides evidence suggesting
that such a situation is not beyond the realm of possibility.

Composed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, the ''Northwood Documents"
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detailed numerous approaches for creating a justification for war with Cuba, even
going as far as to perpetrate terrorist activities against U.S. citizens. One proposal
included staging a situation in which a U.S. commercial aircraft filled with college
students on vacation would be "shot down" over Cuban territory. As the document
explains
an aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact
duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary
organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate
would be substituted for the actual aircraft and would be loaded with
the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases.
The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.
(Northwoods p. 10)
The actual aircraft would land, unload the passengers and return to its original status,
while the unmanned drone would take its place, issue a distress signal that it was
under attack by a Cuban MIG aircraft before being blown up by remote. An incident
such as this would be part of a larger terror campaign including simulated hijacking
attempts of commercial aircra� by Cubans, mock sabotages on U.S. military bases
(lobbing mortars, burning aircraft and ships) and sinking a Cuban boat (real or
simulated). To help generate support for retaliation, the document even suggests that .
posting "casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national
indignation" (Northwoods p. 8).
Both the overt and covert military and paramilitary operations included under
Operation Northwoods would be undertaken by a single agency, specifically the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The document makes clear that the simulated terror campaign would
be a catalyzing event by which to initiate a war with Cuba, stating that "it is
recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in
Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action" (p. 2).
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To be fair, nothing comparable to the Northwoods Document has surfaced
implicating the Bush administration in the September 11th terrorist attacks. At the
same time, the 9/11 Commission's investigation never considered such a degree of
government complicity. Even so, that the government would even put to paper
strategies "suitable for planning purposes" (Northwoods p. 4) to deliberately terrorize
its own citizens as a justification for war is a frightening prospect.
Limitations
Moving down the state crime complicity continuum, it cannot be determined
from the data whether government officials engaged in acts of commission, either
implicit or _explicit. In a courtroom where the defendant, prosecutor, judge and jury
are all members of the state, how will the culpability of government officials ever be
objectively assessed?
Objectivity certainly was not possible for the 9/11 Commission to accomplish.
Thanks to the help of the Commission's executive director Phillip Zelikow, the Bush
administration and the National Security Council Zelikow helped to architect, escaped
a serious critique of their failures. Given the executive director's extensive history
with the Bush administration and the NSC, his close personal friendship with
Condoleezza Rice and his continued communications with the Administration during
the course of the Commissions investigations, the findings produced by the
Commission must be scrutinized.
Even though the data may not directly provide evidence for a more explicit
form of state crime such as a crime of commission, the possibility cannot be ruled out..
The resistance of the Bush administration to launch, fund or cooperate with an official
investigation into the attacks raises questions as to what they were trying to hide.
Further fuelling suspicions of a cover up, once an official investigation had finally
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begun, the Bush administration sought to influence the 9/11 Commission's
investigation via the executive director Philip Zelikow. Sifted through the filters of
'state secrets,' national security, classified information, partisanship and the decisions
ofthe executive director, what is known about the role ofthe Bush administration in
the events surrounding _9/11 is only the tip ofthe iceberg.
In order to more fully understand the Bush administration's role in the 9/11
attacks alternative sources ofdata must be used. As the politics ofthe 9/11
Commission acutely demonstrated, government sponsored investigations are
restricted in their ability to explore the depths ofstate criminality. Turning to other
· sources ofdata such as journalistic investigations or archived media coverage ofthe
attacks might help to uncover aspect� of9/11 that the Commission neglected to
examme.
Controlling State Crime
Despite all the evidence indicating that Bush administration officials were
particularly responsible for a crime ofomission, the Commission neglected to hold
Rice, Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld accountable for their faults. Had the Commission
concluded in its final report released in July 2004 that the failures oftop Bush
administration officials led to the attacks, it is unlikely that that they would have
received reelection in November. Instead, the Commission's assessment ofthe
Administration's handling of9/11 was positive enough to ensure Bush's 2004
reelection. Expressing her appreciation for his exceptional work in the 9/11
investigations, newly promoted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed Philip
Zelikow to the job of State Department counselor where he would serve as her all
purpose advisor. Rather than be punished for their failures to act, Bush administration
officials were rewarded with another four year in office.
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The biggest disgrace ofthe.9/11 Commission was its refusal to hold
government officials accountable for their mistakes. Without a detailed consideration
ofthe failures ofgovernment which allowed the attacks to occur, patterns ofstate
criminality will likely persist. Just as significant as the criminal omissions which led
to the attacks are the state crimes ofcommission that continue to be perpetrated in the
name of9/l 1. Viewing the September 11th attacks in terms ofthe failures ofthe U.S.
government rather than the successes ofal Qaeda is the first step to deconstructing the
sanctity of9/11.
As the literature on state crime has shown, state actors regularly engage in
deviant and illegal behaviors which produce social harm above and beyond that of
traditional street crime. When government officials violate the trust inherent in the
relationship between citizens and government, democratic governance in threatened.
If government sponsored investigatory bodies refuse to hold public officials
responsible, who will? Absent any mechanisms for controlling the actions of
government officials, democratic governance is reduced to nothing more than an
autocratic plutocracy.
Since government sponsored investigatory bodies have refused to hold public
officials responsible, citizens must take the fate ofnegligent politicians into their own
hands. By any means necessary citizens must work to incapacitate the state apparatus
and dismantle the locusts ofcorruption and power. Without a stat�_ there can be no
. state crime. Until citizens take back the power relinquished to the state under the
social contract they will be forced to suffer the recidivism ofa tyrant government.

204
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barak, Gregg. 1990. "Crime, Criminology and Human Rights: Towards An
Understanding of State Criminality." The Journal ofHuman Justice 2(1):11-

28. Reprinted in State Crime Vol. L Friedrichs; David 0. (ed). 1998.
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Pp. 31-48.
Bash, Dana, Kelli Arena and David Ensor. 2002. "Sources: Hijackers' ex-landlord
was FBI informant." .CNN.com. Accessed on 22 May 2008.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/09/l 1/ar911.hijackers.landlord>.
Belger, Monte, Jeff Griffith, John White and Benedict Sliney. 17 June 2004.
"Testimonies of Monte Belger, Jeff Griffith, John White and Benedict Sliney
to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Black, Cofer. 13 April 2004. "Testimony of Cofer Black to the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. 1 June 2001. "Aircraft Piracy
(Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects."
Chambliss, William. 1993a: "On Lawmaking [Revised]." Making Law: the State,

the Law, and Structural Contradictions. Eds. Chambliss, William and
Marjorie Zatz. Bloomington: Indiana U�iversity Press. Pp. 3-35.
1993b. "Criminal Law and Crime Control in Britain and
America." Making Law: the State, the Law, and Structura/Contradictions.
Eds. Chambliss, William and Zatz, Marjorie. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press. Pp. 36-64.
1989. "State-Organized Crime- The American Society of
Criminology, 1988 Presidential Address." Criminology. 27(2): 183-208.
1979. "On Lawmaking." British Journal ofLaw and Society.

205
6(2):149-171.
1975. "Toward a Political Economy of Crime." Theory and
Society. 2(2): 149-170.
Clarke, Richard. 24 March 2004. "Testimony to the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Dzakovic, Bogdan. 22 May 2003. "Testimony of Bogdan Dzakovic to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
------. 23 May 2003. "Submitted Statement of Bogdan Dzakovic to the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Federal Bureau of Investigation. "Thomas J. Pickard." Accessed February 2008.
<http://www.fbi.gov/libref/di�ectors/pickard.htm>.
Freeh, Louis J. 13 April 2004. "Testimony of Louis J. Freeh to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Friedrichs, David 0. 2007. Trusted Criminals. Belmont, CA: ThomsonWadsworth.
------. 2000. "State Crime of Governmental Crime: Making Sense of
the Conceptual Confusion." Controlling State Crime. Ed. Jeffery Ian Ross.
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Pp. 53-79.
Garvey, Jane. 22 May 2003. "Testitµony of Jane Garvey to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.'�General Accounting Office. June 2000. "Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems
Impair Airport Screeners' Performance." Report to Congressional
Requestors.
Green, Penny and Tony Ward. 2004. State Crime: Governments, Violence and
Corruption:. London: Pluto Press.

206
------. 2000. "State Crime, Human Rights, and the Limits
of Criminology." Social Justice. 27(1): 101-115.
Henry, Stuart. 1991. "The Informal Economy: A Crime of Omission by the State."
Crimes by the Capitalist State: An Introduction to State Criminality. Ed.
Gregg Barak. Albany: State University of New York Press. Pp. 253-270.
"History of the CIA." Central Intelligence Agency Website. Last updated on 25 Sept.
2007. Accessed 3 March 2008.
<https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-the-cia/index.html>.
"Intelligence Analysis History." Central Intelligence Agency Website. Last updated
on 17 Sept. 2007. Accessed 3 March 2008.
<https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/history.html>.
Kauzlarich, David, Christopher Mullins and Rick Matthews. 2003. "A
Complicity Continuum of State Crime." Contemporary Justice Review 6 (3),·
241-254.
Kramer, Ronald and Raymond Michalowski. 2005. "War, Aggression and State
Crime." British Journal ofCriminology 45: 446-469.
Kramer,.Ronald, Raymond Michalowski and Dawn Rothe. 2005. "The Supreme
International Crime": How the U.S. War in Iraq Threatens the Rule of Law."
Social Justice 32(2): 52-81.
Landay, Jonathan S., Warren P. Strobel, and John Walcott. 2 OctQ_�er 2006.
"Rumsfeld, Ashcroft Received Warning of al Qaida Attack Before 9/11."
McClatchy Newspapers.
Letter to Congress. 13 September 2004. Accessed 16 Sept. 2007.
<http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-911commission-040913.pdf.>.
Lumpkin, John J. 21 Aug 2005. "Federal agency planned plane-crashing-into-

207
building drill last Sept. 11." Associated Press. Washington.
Marrs, Jim. 2006. The Terror Conspiracy: Deception, 9/11, and the Loss of
Liberty. New York, NY: Disinformation.
McKinley, Craig, Larry Arnold and Alan Scott. 23 May 2003"Testimonies ofMjr.
Gen. Craig McKinley, Mjr. Gen. Larry Arnold, and Col. Alan Scott to the
National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Mead, Kenneth. 22 May 2003. "Testimony of Kenneth Mead to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Michalowski, Raymond and Ronald Kramer (Eds). 2006. State-Corporate Crime:
Wrongdoing at the Intersection ofBusiness & Government. New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press.
Michalowski, Raymond and Ronald.Kramer. 1987. "The Space between Laws:
The Problem of Corporate Crime in a Transnational Context." Social
Problems. 34(1): 34-53.
Mineta, Norman. 23 May 2003. "Testimony ofNorman Mineta to the National
Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Molina, Luis F. 2000. "Can States Commit Crimes? The Limits of Formal
, International Law." Controlling State Crime. 2 ed. Ed. Ian Ross. New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Pp. 349-388.
Myers, Richard, Charles Joseph Leidig, Ralph Eberhart and Larry Arnold. 17 June
2004. "Testimonies of Gen. Richard Myers, Adr. Charles Joseph Leidig, Gen.
Ralph Eberhart and Mjr. Gen. Larry Arnold the National Commission on the
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
National Presidential Security Presidential Directive 1. 13 February 2001. Accessed·
on 15 Jan 2008. Available at:

208
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. The
9/11 Commission Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
National Security Council Memo from Clarke to Rice. 25 January 2001.
Accessed 15 Jan 2008. Available at:

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv!NSAEBBINSAEBB 147/clarke%20memo.pd

f>.
National Security Council Website. Homepage. Accessed 1 February 2008.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/>.
NORAD website. "About NORAD." Accessed 1 May 2008.
<www.norad.mil/about/history:html>.
Northwoods Document. 13 March 1962. "Memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense, Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba." Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Available online at:
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf>.
Phoenix Memo. July 10, 2001. Written by Kenneth Williams of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Accessed 15 April 2008. Available online at:
<http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/0412042phoenix1.html>.
Pickard, Thomas. 13 April 2004. "Testimony of Thomas Pickard to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Presidential Daily Briefing. 6 August 2001 "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in
U.S." Accessed 1 Feb 2008. Available online at:
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB116/pdb8-6-200l.pdf>.
Rice, Condoleezza. 8 April 2004. "Testimony of Condoleezza Rice to the National

209
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
Rothe, Dawn and Stephen L. Muzzatti. 2004. "Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism,
Moral Panic, and US Civil Society." Critical Criminology 12: 327-350.
Rowley, Colleen. 21 May 2002. "Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert
Mueller An edited version of the agent's 13-page letter." Times Magazine.
Accessed 8 April 2007.
<http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020603/memo.html>.
Ruppert, Michael, C 2004. Crossing the Rubicon: the Decline of the American

Empire at the End of the Age of Oil. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society
Publishers.
Schiavo, Mary. 23 May 2003. "Submitted Statement of Mary Schiavo to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
------. 1997. Flying Blind, Flying Safe. New York: Avon Books
Schwendinger, Herman and Julia Schwendinger. 1970. "Defenders of Order or
Guardians of Human Rights?" Issues in Criminology. 5(2): 123-157.
Scott, William B. 3 June 2002. "On-the-fly innovation, backed by excellent
training, 'probably saved many lives' when terrorists struck the U.S."

Aviation Week and Space Technology. Rome, N.Y.
Sharkansky, Ira. 2000. "A State Action May Be Nasty But Is Not Likely to Be a
Crime." Controlling State Crime. Ed. Jeffery Ian Ross. -New Brunswick:
..

Transaction Publishers. Pp.35-52.
Shenon, Philip. 2008. The Commission: the Uncensored History of the 9/11

Investigation. New York: Twelve.
Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Brining the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis and

210
Current Research." Bringing the State Back In. Eds. Evans, Peter B,
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 1-37.
Starr, Barbara. 19 Apr 2004. ''NORAD exercise had jet crashing into building."
CNN.com.
Sutherland, Edwin H. 1983. White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version. New Haven:
YaleUniversity Press.
------. 1940. "White-Collar Criminality." American Sociological Review. 5(1): 1-12.
Tappan, Paul W. 1947. "Who is the Criminal?" American Sociological Review.
12 (1): 96-102.
Tenet (1), George and John McLaughlin. 24 March 2004. "Testimony of George
Tenet and John McLaughlin· to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon·theUnited States."
' Tenet (2), George and John McLaughlin. 14 April 2004. "Testimony of George
Tenet and John McLaughlin to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon tli,eUnited States."
Thomas, Andrew R. 2003. Aviation Insecurity: the New Challenges ofAir Travel.
Amherst: Prometheus.
Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime."
Bringing the State Back In. Eds. Evans, Peter B, Dietrich.Rueschemeyer and
Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. Pp. 169-191.
"Two Months Before 9/11, anUrgent Warning to Rice." The Washington Post. 1
October 2006: Al 7.
Wonders, Nancy and Solop, Frederic. 1993. "Understanding the Emergence of

211
Law and Public Policy: Toward a Relational Model of the State." Making
Law: the State, the Law, and Structural Contradictions. Eds. Chambliss,

William and Marjorie Zatz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Pp. 204225.

